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I 
PREFACE 
This thesis consists of four experimental studies on “Behavioral Aspects of Morality and 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Accounting”. CSR activities have a moral connotation 
that does not necessarily have to be in conflict with a firm’s value creation process as is indicated 
by the popular phrase “doing well by doing good”. Prior research has identified various reasons 
why and how CSR can create value for a firm and its shareholders. While this perspective de-
scribes a win-win-relation between moral and financial benefits, critics have raised concerns 
that agents (e.g. managers) might (mis)use firm resources for their personal benefits: they might 
spend money on CSR because they have personal preferences for its moral or societal benefits 
and not because of financial benefits for their firms. If this were the case, agents could be re-
proached for violating their responsibilities towards their principals. In this regard, the Nobel 
Prize laureate Milton Friedman wrote in his article “The Social Responsibility of Business is to 
Increase its Profits” in The New York Times Magazine (1970): “In a free-enterprise, private-
property system, a corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the business. He has 
direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accord-
ance with their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while con-
forming to their basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in 
ethical custom.”  
In my first essay, I examine agents’ moral preferences regarding Corporate Giving, which 
can be seen as a part of CSR. I create a setting where “doing good” is solely costly for a firm. 
Hence, if agents spent firm resources on a moral cause, it would constitute a form of agency 
costs with negative financial consequences for (potential) investors. In a 2 (Morality: morally 
neutral vs. immoral decision) x 2 (Source of Responsibility: agent vs. principal decision) be-
tween-subjects experiment, I analyze whether agents increase moral spending using firm re-
sources to compensate for a prior immoral decision and whether this “moral cleansing” is af-
fected by who is responsible for the prior immoral decision. I predict that agents increase moral 
spending using their principals’ resources when principals are responsible for the immoral de-
cision, but that they do this to a lesser degree when they themselves are responsible. The under-
lying intuition is that agents in the former case have few concerns to use firm resources, but find 
it harder in the latter case to justify the use of firm resources if they themselves are responsible: 
further, agents’ moral identity may be less compromised when they can justify their behavior as 
just “doing their job”. I find that spending of firm resources on a moral cause is indeed higher 
when principals are responsible for an immoral decision compared to a morally neutral decision, 
but is not higher when agents are responsible. Thus, I identify a new form of moral agency costs 
arising in hierarchies from interdependencies of decisions with moral connotations because of 
other-regarding preferences by agents. Supplementary analyses provide further insights: regard-
less of the source of responsibility, financially profiting from an immoral action increases 
agents’ guilt and fairness concerns; however, only when principals are responsible for an im-
moral action, this increases moral cleansing activities. Further, I find no evidence suggesting 
that agents use private resources to compensate for their own immoral actions. This is consistent 
with agents disengaging morally when they are “doing their job” and implies that agents seem 
to use primarily firm resources to for moral cleansing.  
Not only agents may be driven by moral preferences. In addition, investors may be willing 
to support firms with a strong CSR performance for reasons beyond the maximization of ex-
pected financial benefits. For example, they could decide to forego financial profits if a firm 
spends resources on activities with societal benefits. Accordingly, a study by Elliott, Jackson, 
Peecher, and White (2014) suggests that (non-professional) investors might be subconsciously 
affected by a firm’s CSR performance because of an unintended affective reaction. This affect 
could be caused by the morality of CSR activities. The authors claim that they reduce what they 
assume to be an affective reaction by having participants explicitly assess CSR performance 
II 
before they estimate a firm’s fundamental value. Specifically, the authors find that assessing a 
firm’s positive CSR performance before estimating the firm’s value results in lower estimates 
than the estimates without a prior assessment. They explain their results by the correction of a 
misattributed affect, which would lead to better estimates. However, in my second essay, I ques-
tion this explanation and design and conduct an experiment to test an alternative explanation for 
the study’s results. According to an alternative explanation rooted in speech act theory, respond-
ents might have understood the explicit assessment –that is supposed to reduce any unintended 
influence– differently than intended by the researchers and might have subtracted important 
information from their overall assessment of the firm’s fundamental value. Following the two 
competing explanations, I predict two specific patterns resulting from the comparison of three 
conditions. However, I cannot find empirical support to claim differences between conditions 
for the estimates of the fundamental value. This implies that I cannot replicate the effect of 
Elliott et al. (2014). Given the potentially far-reaching implications of their study, knowing 
about the limited robustness and generalizability of their results is important.  
The finding that unintended affective reactions might not play a major role in understand-
ing investors’ decisions regarding firms’ CSR investments increases the importance of research 
on motivations of investors (not) to invest in firms with a strong CSR performance. The third 
essay (coauthored with Markus Arnold, Patrick Martin, and Don Moser) contributes to research 
on this matter. We conduct an experiment to examine German and US investment professionals’ 
use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures when making personal investment de-
cisions and investment recommendations to clients. We predict and find that both groups assess 
higher financial performance and invest more when positive CSR information is disclosed than 
when no CSR information is disclosed. However, these differences are only significant for Ger-
man investment professionals. When CSR information is disclosed, both groups’ assessments 
of CSR performance significantly affect their investment decisions. However, US investment 
professionals appear to require a higher level of assessed CSR performance than Germans before 
they increase their investments in response to disclosed CSR information as compared to when 
no CSR information is disclosed. Importantly, we also predict and find that both groups’ invest-
ment behavior is not only affected by the expected financial effects of CSR activities on the 
firm, but also by the value they place on the societal benefits of the CSR activities. Finally, we 
find that when making investment recommendations to clients both groups use CSR information 
in essentially the same manner as they do when making personal investment decisions.  
Fourth, a research note (coauthored with Ralf Frank) analyzes how including a graphic 
linking potential non-financial (e.g. CSR) performance drivers to financial performance 
measures in voluntary disclosures can cognitively affect investors under time pressure. The dis-
closure of information not based on accounting standards provides firms with leeway for strate-
gic choices as to how and what to report. Graphics might affect investors because they tend to 
be salient and easily accessible –particularly when cognitive resources are scarce, e.g. under 
time pressures. We predict that graphics can direct investors’ attention to particularly positive 
performance indicators, which can then lead to higher assessments of a firm’s investment at-
tractiveness. To test our predictions we manipulate whether investment professionals are pro-
vided with a graphic (or not) before they assess a firm as investment opportunity. Further, we 
examine their information acquisition using eye-trackers. Consistent with our theory, a graphic 
can direct investors’ attention to particularly positive performance indicators and leads to higher 
assessments of a firm’s investment attractiveness. These results are important because they sug-
gest that investors can be guided, if not manipulated by graphics when their cognitive resources 
are scarce. 
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Abstract: 
Agents can face financially profitable, but immoral decisions as part of their job to increase their 
principals’ profits. According to prior research, these decisions might create the desire to com-
pensate for them and to balance moral accounts as it has been shown that individuals tend to 
increase spending on a moral cause after immoral decisions. This so-called “moral cleansing” 
would lead to agency costs if agents use their principals’ resources to pay for the moral activities. 
To examine whether a financially profitable, but immoral decision results in agency costs and 
whether this is affected by the person responsible for the immoral decision I conduct a 2  
(Morality: morally neutral vs. immoral decision) x 2 (Source of Responsibility: principal vs. 
agent) between-subjects experiment. I predict that agents increase their use of firm resources to 
pay for moral cleansing activities when principals are responsible for the immoral decision and 
that this moral cleansing is weaker when agents are responsible. The underlying intuition is that 
agents in the former case have few concerns to use firm resources, but find it harder to justify 
the use of firm resources in the latter case: further, agents’ moral identity may be less compro-
mised when they can justify their behavior as just “doing their job”. Results support my predic-
tions. While spending of firm resources on a moral cause is higher when principals are respon-
sible for an immoral decision compared to a morally neutral decision, moral spending is not 
higher when agents are responsible. Supplementary analyses provide further insights: regardless 
of the Source of Responsibility, profiting from an immoral action increases agents’ guilt and 
fairness concerns; however, only when principals are responsible for an immoral action, this 
increases moral cleansing activities. Further, I find no evidence suggesting that agents use pri-
vate resources to compensate for their own immoral actions. This is consistent with agents dis-
engaging morally when they are “doing their job”. This implies that agents seem to use primarily 
firm resources to manage balanced moral accounts, which emphasizes the importance of an 
agency perspective. 
 
Keywords: Principal-Agent-Theory, Corporate Giving, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), 
Sustainability, Moral Accounting, Moral Reasoning, Moral Balancing, Moral Cleansing, Source 
of Responsibility 
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I. Introduction 
Agents (e.g. managers) can face financially profitable, but immoral decisions as part of 
their job to increase firms value and their principals’ (e.g. firm owners) wealth (Zhong, Ku, 
Lount, and Murnighan 2010). For example, they might need to lay off long-time employees, use 
their firms’ negotiation power against weaker suppliers or competitors, or feel pressure to min-
imize taxes by operating close to legal limits. Actions like these can threaten the agents’ moral 
identity: while they may be justifiable or even necessary from a business perspective, they may 
be in conflict with the agents’ societies’ moral conventions. Thus, these immoral actions could 
trigger a process called “moral cleansing” and could cause agents to engage in moral activities. 
The reason for this is that individuals try to ascertain or restore their moral identity when they 
see it threatened or compromised by prior immoral actions (West and Zhong 2015; Jordan,  
Mullen, and Murnighan 2011) because they want to avoid negative feelings when their actions 
do not correspond with their moral self-image (Blasi 1980; Bandura 1990, 1999). In other words, 
they strive for balanced moral accounts.  
To balance moral accounts after an immoral action, agents could use either private money 
or firm’s resources to pay for moral activities. Whether they use private money or firm resources 
to pay for moral activities that are not creating financial benefits, is an important question from 
an agency perspective. It would be problematic if agents used firm resources because they would 
not maximize their firm’s value and principals’ wealth but pursue their own (moral) goals 
(Friedman 1970).  
In this experimental study, I analyze whether agents use firm resources to pay for moral 
cleansing activities after immoral decisions and whether this is affected by the matter who is 
responsible for the immoral decisions. The latter is important as agents often work in a corporate 
hierarchy. While they can be directly responsible for immoral decisions, they can also get indi-
rectly involved in these. For example, depending on their positions, superiors or shareholders 
might apply pressure on them or order them to make certain decisions; similarly, agents might 
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be overruled by a collective decision or face strong expectations by peers or subordinates. Thus, 
agents may not only be responsible for their own actions, but may also be associated with deci-
sions made by others that are potentially not the decisions they would have made. Who is re-
sponsible for a decision can affect how it is construed and judged (Gino, Norton, and Weber 
2016; cf. overviews by Tetlock 1985 and Harvey, Town, and Yarkin 1981) and, therefore, could 
affect agents’ moral cleansing decisions. 
Prior research supports the view that agents’ moral reasoning might interfere with their 
task to increase their firm’s value. Consistent with a point of view considering moral expendi-
tures problematic from an agency perspective, some archival studies suggest that agents’ deci-
sions to “do good” may reduce their principals’ wealth. For example, Corporate Social Respon-
sibility (CSR) expenditures may have financial benefits for firms, but can also be an important 
field where agency problems can occur due to their inherent moral connotations (Hales, Matsu-
mura, Moser, and Payne 2016). Specifically, firms’ charity donations may be associated with 
CEOs’ personal charity preferences and capital markets may value cash holdings less for firms 
with a higher level of CSR spending (Masulis and Reza 2015). Further, in line with agency 
problems, increasing ownership and monitoring may decrease CSR spending (Cheng, Hong, 
and Shue 2013; Barnea and Rubin 2010).  
Consistent with moral balancing, further archival studies report evidence that firms may 
be socially both responsible and irresponsible (Strike, Gao, and Bansal 2006; Ormiston and 
Wong 2013), that firms with a positive reputation may be more tax aggressive (Bai, Lobo, and 
Zhao 2017; Davis, Guenther, Krull, and Williams 2016), and that CSR expenditures may be 
used to license earnings management (Prior, Surroca, and Tribó 2008). These findings can be 
explained by individuals’ preferences for balanced moral accounts: a perceived surplus of moral 
deeds can license immoral deeds and a perceived surplus of immoral deeds can create the need 
for moral cleansing.  
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Applying this theory to a principal-agent-setting, I expect agents to experience guilt and 
fairness concerns after an immoral action and –compared to a morally neutral decision– to in-
crease their use of firm resources to pay for moral activities when the Source of Responsibility 
matches the source of resources (i.e. principals’ decision and principals’ resources). However, 
as prior research suggests that individuals judge their own actions differently and more leniently 
than the actions of others, I expect the degree of moral cleansing to be affected by the Source of 
Responsibility. Specifically, I predict that –compared to a morally neutral action– agents in-
crease their use of firm resources to pay for a moral cause after an immoral action less when 
agents are responsible for an immoral action than when principals are responsible for the same 
immoral action. In case of the former, a match of Source of Responsibility and the source of 
resources would suggest the use of private money and not firm resources. In addition, agents 
can refuse personal responsibility by justifying immoral actions as “doing their job”. This can 
protect their moral identity and provides a possibility to disengage morally (Bandura 1990, 
1999; Barkan, Ayal, Gino, and Ariely 2012; Shalvi, Gino, Barkan, and Ayal 2015; Gino et al. 
2016). As an additional way to disengage morally, agents can shift the responsibility to balance 
moral accounts to principals. In contrast, relying on principals is less credible when these are 
responsible for an immoral decision. 
Conducting an experiment allows disentangling different reasons or motivations for moral 
spending. For example, firms’ charitable donations might rather serve agents’ moral than their 
firms’ interests, but might also increase employee motivation (Balakrishnan, Sprinkle, and Wil-
liamson 2011; Douthit, Martin, and McAllister 2017). Thus, when using archival data, it may 
be hard to tell whether firm donations are rather meant to increase firm value or to serve agents’ 
personal preferences, e.g. moral balancing. In an experiment, I can create a setting where any 
expected future financial benefits are excluded by design in order to examine agents’ motivation 
for corporate giving: “doing good” can be designed to balance moral accounts, but to decrease 
principals’ profits.  
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Hence, I conduct a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment to analyze whether agents increase 
moral spending after experiencing and financially profiting from a legal, but immoral decision. 
Participants form dyads of firm owners (as principals) and CEOs (as agents): thus, agent deci-
sions directly affect other individuals in the role of principals and residual claimants of firm 
profits. I manipulate the factors Morality (morally neutral vs. immoral decision) and Source of 
Responsibility (principal vs. agent decision). After this decision (i.e. the manipulation), agents 
can decide whether to spend money on a moral cause (i.e. supporting a socially orientated initi-
ative) and whether to use firm resources (i.e. in form of a discount) or private money (i.e. in 
form of a donation) to pay for it. Thus, I can test whether agents engage in moral cleansing and 
–if so– which resources they use. By design, discounts reduce firm profits. Hence, firm resources 
spent on moral cleansing activities would constitute agency costs due to moral accounting 
whereas private money spent would be unproblematic from an agency perspective. In addition, 
I can examine whether this moral balancing is affected by whether the prior immoral decision 
was made by agents or principals.  
Results support my predictions. Specifically, they show that agents increase their use of 
firm resources to pay for a moral cause when principals are responsible for a prior immoral 
decision, but not when agents are responsible for the same decision. Consistent with my theo-
retical reasoning regarding the psychological process, I find supplemental evidence that 
–regardless of Source of Responsibility– an immoral action increases agents’ guilt and fairness 
concerns; however, only when principals are responsible, these fairness concerns lead to an in-
crease in moral activities. In addition, I find no evidence that agents use private money to com-
pensate for their own immoral actions. This is consistent with agents disengaging morally from 
decisions made when they are “doing their job”. This underlines the importance of examining 
the issue of agency costs due to moral accounting because agents primarily seem to use firm 
resources to balance moral accounts.  
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This study makes several important contributions. Most importantly, I identify a new form 
of agency costs caused by interdependencies of decisions with (im)moral connotations and 
other-regarding preferences by agents (Laffont and Martimort 2009). Results suggest that moral 
accounting can cause agents confronted with immoral actions by principals to engage in moral 
cleansing activities costly to the firm. Thus, firms might need to consider these consequences 
from financially profitable, but immoral decision. These findings might be particularly im-
portant for the design of control systems in certain industries, job functions or in firms with 
strong hierarchies. This study further suggests an interesting perspective on the role of agents’ 
moral sensitivity: while this can be associated with reduced agency costs in some cases –e.g. 
lower control costs because of agents’ honesty or trustworthiness (Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, 
and Moser 2001; Beccerra and Gupta 1999)– it could also increase agency costs when agents 
are confronted with immoral decisions. Hence, this study offers a new and important perspective 
on agency conflicts to be explored by future research.  
This study further contributes to research on CSR and possible agency problems. It may 
be important for firms to consider agents’ moral preferences when designing managerial control 
systems in this area as agents might use the moral connotation of CSR activities to manage 
moral accounts with firm resources (Merritt, Effron, Fein, Savitsky, Tuller, and Monin 2012; 
Gneezy, Imas, and Madarász 2014; Cascio and Plant 2015; Effron and Conway 2015). Moreo-
ver, as CSR activities frequently include uncertainty about expected financial benefits (Moser 
and Martin 2012; Martin and Moser 2016), it may be particularly hard to differentiate between 
agents’ motivations and to design control systems. On the other hand, I conjecture that these 
moral aspects of CSR (including but not limited to corporate giving) could be a tool to curtail 
these agency costs as firms might use it to signal to agents that moral accounts are balanced on 
a firm level. Firms might use moral expenditures for impression management: spending re-
sources in a calculated and targeted way to conserve or proactively create a moral image and 
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reputation might, therefore, be an investment to prevent agents from seeking uncontrolled ac-
tions or might license them to immoral decision in their firms’ interest.  
From a theoretical perspective, this study extends research on moral balancing by testing 
its practical reach and implications in an important corporate setting, a principal-agent-setting. 
Specifically, I extend prior research by adding a possibility for individuals to use money not 
belonging to themselves (i.e. firm resources) and an additional source of responsibility (i.e. the 
residual claimant of these firm resources). Finally, agents have another moral rationale to invoke 
as their job entails the duty to make decisions that are good for their firm: this makes the moral 
trade-off more complex and offers agents the possibility to disengage morally. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in section 2, I provide the theoretical 
background for this study and develop my hypotheses; section 3 describes the methodology of 
my study. In section 4, results are presented before section 5 concludes. 
II. Theory and Development of Hypotheses 
Background 
Prior research has described how individuals internally balance their moral accounts: e.g., 
by enduring personal disutility to compensate for prior immoral actions (Wallington 1973;  
Harris, Benson, and Hall 1975; Gneezy et al. 2014). The underlying reason for this is that indi-
viduals are part of a society’s attitudes towards morality, and, in general, like to perceive them-
selves as being moral. Thus, they want to avoid discrepancies between their moral self-image 
and their actions because this creates feelings of dissonance (Blasi 1980; Bandura 1990, 1999; 
Stets and Carter 2011). However, maintaining a perception of being moral is a dynamic and 
idiosyncratic process: individuals have some degree of freedom about the level of morality they 
perceive to be adequate and about how they trade-off moral with immoral actions providing 
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advantages such as increasing personal wealth (Nisan 1990, 1991).1 This dynamic process al-
lows for deviations from a morally ideal point to which individuals can return (Gómez-Miñam-
bres and Schniter 2017; Zhong et al. 2010).  
These deviations can go in two directions. On the one hand, individuals might perceive a 
surplus of moral actions allowing for some immoral actions; on the other hand, they might per-
ceive a deficit of moral actions and feel the need to compensate for this by engaging in moral 
actions. The first phenomenon is called Moral Licensing, the latter Moral Cleansing (Mullen 
and Monin 2016; Blanken, van de Ven, and Zeelenberg 2015; Merritt, Effron, and Monin 2010; 
West and Zhong 2015; Ayal and Gino 2012). Both have in common that they describe a form 
of balancing moral accounts, which I refer to as Moral Accounting2. For example, individuals 
claim a higher (lower) moral identity, state higher (lower) prosocial intentions, and cheat less 
(more) after recalling their own immoral (moral) behavior (Jordan et al. 2011).  
Specifically in the case of moral cleansing, individuals engage in moral activities to relieve 
feelings of guilt and unfairness elicited by immoral actions. Emotions, e.g. guilt, can serve as 
inputs for simultaneous or subsequent judgements (Schwarz and Clore 1983, 2003; Forgas 
2006). Specifically, guilt can be triggered by immoral actions, is a primary emotion (Izard 1977) 
as well as an action-eliciting emotion and central in moral cleansing (Baumeister, Stillwell, and 
Heatherton 1994; Harris et al. 1975; Haidt 2001, 2003). Guilt and fairness concerns can then 
trigger moral actions to relieve these feelings (Darlington and Macker 1966; Ding, Xie, Sun, Li, 
Wang, and Zhen 2016): while there exists disagreement about the relative importance of emo-
tional and rational inputs in this process (Zajonc 1980; Haidt 2003; Keltner, Horberg, and Oveis 
                                                 
1 Increasing personal wealth or a firm’s value can be considered moral actions from a business perspective as well: 
however, they are often in conflict with society’s attitudes towards morality and their implications for moral be-
havior. This study is about the tension arising from conflicts with the latter.  
2 While this study focusses on the cleansing aspect of the Moral Accounting framework, the licensing aspect turns 
the order of events to its head, but is part of the same broader theoretical framework (Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin 
2009). Related concepts are Emotional or Conscience Accounting or Compensatory Ethics (Levav and McGraw 
2009; Gneezy et al. 2014; Zhong et al. 2010). Importantly, my use of the term Moral Accounting differs from the 
use in Murphy, Patvardhan, and Gehman (2017). 
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2006) the two are highly intertwined. Perceived fairness is a downstream, elaborate, and com-
plex result of a process affected by guilt. 
Even though balancing moral accounts may play an important role in a principal-agent-
setting because agents might use the principals’ resources to pay for it, its implications from an 
agency-perspective have not been examined before. In a corporate setting, agents can face de-
cisions that are on the one hand morally critical or even immoral and on the other hand justifiable 
or necessary in order to increase the firm’s success (Zhong et al. 2010). Thus, agents’ moral 
identity could be threatened and they could look for ways to engage in moral cleansing activities. 
Agency problems could arise due to interdependencies between business decisions with moral 
connotations when agents use their principals’ resources to serve their own moral preferences 
thereby reducing firm profits. However, when making predictions regarding agents’ use of firm 
resources, it may be important to differentiate with regard to the Source of Responsibility3. 
Development of Hypotheses  
Effect on Moral Spending when Principals are Responsible for an Immoral Decision 
When principals are responsible for an immoral decision, agents’ moral accounts are af-
fected by association: they are made accomplices to the immoral action and profit from it. Thus, 
I expect them to experience feelings of guilt and unfairness (Gino, Gu, and Zhong 2009) because 
the principals’ decision provides agents with morally “dirty money”. I expect these feelings to 
create a desire to cleanse the prior immoral action morally. However, I do not expect agents to 
use private money instead of firm resources to cleanse the principals’ immoral decision morally. 
Rather, there exist several reasons to expect agents to use firm resources to balance moral ac-
counts.  
As principals are responsible for the immoral action, agents have an easy target to blame. 
Agents can, therefore, justify using the principals’ resources under their control because the 
                                                 
3 This factual shift of responsibility can be understood as an extreme case of the psychologically more nuanced 
concept Locus of Control where a low internal control corresponds with a lower perceived responsibility (Trevino 
1986; Trevino and Youngblood 1990; Lefcourt 2014; Detert, Trevino, and Sweitzer 2008). 
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source of responsibility (i.e. the principal’s decision) matches the source of resources (i.e. the 
principal’s resources). In addition, prior research has shown that individuals tend to judge some-
one else’s actions more harshly and as more immoral to reassure their own moral self-image 
when experiencing ethical dissonance (Barkan et al. 2012; Ayal and Gino 2012). This could 
intensify the agents’ tendencies to use firm resources to pay for moral spending.  
One reason why individuals might refrain from blaming someone else for committing im-
moral actions are situational factors excusing these actions. In this case, agents might also refrain 
from using firm resources. Following another morale rationale, e.g. “doing a job” as an agent 
(Friedman 1970), would be an example of such a situational factor. However, such a moral 
rational is not apparent to agents as principals are the residual claimants of the profits generated 
by the principals’ immoral action. Thus, I expect agents to judge principals as being self-serv-
ingly willing to commit an immoral action for personal enrichment.4 Consequently, agents 
would be unhampered to hold principals accountable for their prior immoral action. Without 
this other rationale as excuse, agents would be unhampered to use the principals’ resources un-
der their control to pay for the moral cleansing activities.  
Another reason for agents not to use firm resources to pay for moral spending would be 
to rely on principals to manage and balance moral accounts. In this case, they could credibly 
refuse the responsibility to balance moral accounts (Bandura 1990, 1999) and leave this decision 
to principals. Agents, in general, might understand it as their task to generate firm profits and 
then rely on principals as residual claimants to take care of any moral cleansing of prior immoral 
actions (Friedman 1970). However, relying on principals to balance moral accounts may hardly 
be justifiable for agents when principals are responsible for a prior immoral decision because 
                                                 
4 The fundamental attribution error or fundamental attribution bias would intensify this reasoning and would let 
agents judge the same actions differently depending on the individual responsible for it (Barkan et al. 2012; Gino 
et al. 2016; cf. overviews by Tetlock 1985 and Harvey et al. 1981). Individuals tend to attribute their own negative 
behavior to situational (instead of dispositional) factors, which helps disengaging morally; however, they tend to 
attribute negative behavior of others to dispositional (instead of situational) factors, which makes it easier to blame 
them. 
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agents can draw inferences from this decision about the principals’ future behavior. Thus, agents 
may find it hard to refuse and shift responsibility to principals to compensate for the immoral 
action. Rather, agents may feel the need to act themselves to balance moral accounts and to use 
firm resources to pay for it. 
Because of good reasons why agents would use firm resources to pay for moral spending 
and the lack of reasons to refrain from doing it, I expect agents to act upon their need to balance 
moral accounts and to use firm resources to pay for this.  
H1: When principals are responsible, agents increase their use of firm 
resources to pay for a moral cause after an immoral action compared to 
a morally neutral action.  
Effect on Moral Spending when Agents are Responsible for an Immoral Decision 
Directional predictions are harder to make when agents are responsible for an immoral 
action. In this case, I expect them to experience feelings of guilt and unfairness due to their own 
actions. However, it is not clear whether agents act upon the desire to balance moral accounts 
and use firm resources to pay for a moral cause. Agents might find it hard to justify using firm 
resources when they themselves are responsible for a prior immoral decision.  
There are still reasons to expect that agents use firm resources to pay for moral cleansing. 
Agents would be financially better off by using firm resources and not their private money when 
they have this opportunity (Pronin, Olivola, and Kennedy 2008). Further, this would be justifi-
able as agents can blame their job duties or firm for putting them in a position where they are 
required to make an immoral decision. Individuals, in general, have various ways to avoid ac-
cepting personal responsibility and blame someone or something else for any negative conse-
quences of their behavior (Bandura 1990, 1999; Shu, Gino, and Bazerman 2011). After all, the 
residual claimants of the financial benefits created by the agents’ immoral actions are the prin-
cipals, which can help to justify using firm resources.  
Another reason would still point in the same direction that firm resources are used to bal-
ance moral accounts, but would suggest a smaller degree of it. Agents might not shift the entire 
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responsibility to their firm to justify using firm resources for moral balancing, but might decide 
to use both firm resources and private money to pay for moral activities. In this case, responsi-
bility would be shared and both private and firm donations would be used to balance moral 
accounts. However, this shifting (of partial) responsibility could also reach a point where a di-
rectional prediction cannot be made any more. When agents accept enough personal responsi-
bility and experience a discrepancy between their moral self-image and actions they are respon-
sible for, matching the source of responsibility (i.e. the agents’ decision) to the source of re-
sources would suggest using the agents’ private money and not firm resources. After all, the 
latter would mean using another individual’s resources who is not directly responsible for the 
immoral action and who is the principal whose interests’ agents are supposed to pursue. 
There are other reasons that could work against predicting an increase in the use of firm 
resources. Agents’ moral identity might be less threatened when they commit immoral actions 
on the job. This would reduce their general need to engage in moral cleansing in the first place. 
Compared to the case when others are responsible for an immoral decision, individuals hold 
themselves accountable differently for their own immoral actions and tend to make self-serving 
judgments (Miller and Ross 1975; Nisbett and Ross 1980; Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer, 
and Babcock 1993; Babcock and Loewenstein 1997; Gino et al. 2016). In general, individuals 
find it harder to blame themselves than to blame someone else. Further, they are adept to disen-
gage morally and rationalize their behavior in order to reduce feelings of dissonance and avoid 
a negative impact on their moral self-image (Festinger 1957; Murphy 2012; Shalvi et al. 2015). 
Individuals have several tools at their disposal how to construe their actions in order to protect 
their moral self-image. Individuals can, to a certain degree (Brown, Tamborski, Wang, Barnes, 
Mumford, Connelly, and Devenport 2011; Haisley and Weber 2010), take self-protecting and 
self-serving actions to disengage from acts that may be evaluated as being immoral (Gino et al. 
2016). One way to accomplish this is the importance they attribute to situational factors, as 
actions are not judged on absolute levels (Trevino 1986; Trevino and Youngblood 1990; 
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Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Felps, and Lim 2009). For example, individuals may create purpose-
fully more ambiguity with regard to the impact of an otherwise clearly immoral decision to 
create a “moral wiggle room” that facilitates self-interested behavior (Dana, Weber, Kuang 
2007; Haisley and Weber 2010; Hamman, Loewenstein, and Weber 2010; Bartling and Fisch-
bacher 2012; Church, Hannan, and Kuang 2014). 
One important situational factor that allows agents to disengage morally is the existence 
of another moral rationale they can claim to follow. Specifically, agents can credibly detach 
their moral identity from an immoral decision as they can credibly claim that they had to make 
the decision as part of their job to increase their firm’s value. This rationale can be used to 
reframe and justify a morally questionable decision (Cohn, Fehr, and Marechal 2014; Hamman 
et al. 2010). Consistent with this theory, Church, Hannan, and Kuang (2012) find that, in a 
budgeting study, agents misreport more when they can justify this behavior by another rationale, 
such as sharing the slack created with another agent. 
Another reason that could results in agents not using firm resources is the possibility that 
they can shift the responsibility to balance moral accounts to the principals as the residual claim-
ants of firm profits. Compared to when principals are responsible for an immoral action, relying 
on these to cleanse the agents’ actions is credible and justifiable when agents are responsible.  
Thus, agents can use various coping mechanisms to detach their moral identity from the 
negative impact of the immoral action they have taken. These coping mechanisms would allow 
agents to refuse personal responsibility, which would decrease the general impact of the immoral 
action on the agents’ moral accounts and, thus, decrease the ex-ante overall need for moral 
cleansing. Agents can still evaluate the action they are responsible for as being immoral unfair, 
but might not feel the responsibility to balance moral accounts. 
Finally, competing theory regarding moral consistency might even explain an overall de-
crease in moral spending when agents are responsible for a prior immoral action. This could 
happen when a prior immoral action made the identity as being self-interested particularly  
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salient (Aquino and Reed 2002; Aquino et al. 2009; Bryan, Adams, and Monin 2013). For ex-
ample, in support of moral consistency, Johnson, Martin, Stikeleather, and Young (2017) find 
evidence that abstractly recalling past mutually beneficial actions leads to disproportionately 
greater moral behavior among agents than for either abstractly recalling selfish or concretely 
recalling mutually beneficial actions. The reason for this would be that showing consistent be-
havior (Festinger 1957; Joosten, van Dijke, van Hiel, and de Cremer 2014) is valued higher than 
having balanced moral accounts. While consistency and balancing arguments can be aligned on 
a more abstract level because balancing allows keeping a consistent moral identity, consistency 
can limit balancing behavior in specific situations. Following the consistency argument, agents 
might even be expected to decrease moral spending after an immoral action. However, con-
sistency is rather associated with an abstract construal of the identity whereas concrete construal 
is rather associated with balancing (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003, 2010; 
Conway and Peetz 2012; Mullen and Monin 2016) and I expect the latter to prevail in the daily 
business operations. Thus, I rather expect agents to construe immoral decisions as resulting from 
specific and single situations (concrete construal) and not as symptoms of a general identity as 
being immoral individuals (abstract construal).  
These considerations make it hard to make a directional prediction regarding the degree 
of moral cleansing activities paid for with firm resources when agents are responsible for a prior 
immoral action. The fact that firm resources are available and agents can blame their job for 
putting them in a situation where they are required to make an immoral decision suggests the 
use of firm resources to balance moral accounts. However, arguments discussed above can ex-
plain how agents may still experience feelings of guilt and unfairness, but not increase their use 
of firm resources to balance moral accounts. Thus, fairness concerns alone might not be suffi-
cient to lead to moral cleansing activities paid for with firm resources when agents are respon-
sible for an immoral action. Specifically, agents could accept (partial) personal responsibility, 
which would work against an increased use of firm resources. Further, agents might detach their 
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moral identity and disengage morally when they make immoral actions on the job, which would 
be expected to decrease the general need of moral cleansing. Finally, consistency arguments 
could even explain a decrease in overall moral spending.  
As there are reasons to expect an increase in moral spending paid for with firm resources 
and reasons questioning this expectation, I do not make a directional prediction regarding the 
simple effect of Morality when agents are responsible for a prior immoral action. However, I 
predict an interaction of Morality and Source of Responsibility: even if agents increased moral 
spending using firm resources after an immoral action for which they are responsible, I expect 
them to do this to a lesser degree than when principals are responsible for a prior immoral action.  
H2: Compared to a morally neutral action, agents increase their use of 
firm resources to pay for a moral cause after an immoral action less 
when agents themselves are responsible for an immoral action than 
when principals are responsible for the same immoral action. 
III. Method 
Design 
To test my hypotheses, I designed and conducted a 2x2 experiment (cf. the appendix), in 
which participants were assigned the roles of either a principal or an agent. Specifically, in my 
experimental setting, principals were given the role of a firm’s owner and agents were given the 
role of the firm’s CEO. Two factors were manipulated between-subjects: Morality (morally neu-
tral vs. immoral decision) and Source of Responsibility (principal vs. agent decision).  
I manipulate Morality by asking participants to imagine a role-play situation and by 
providing participants with information regarding the morality of the decision to defend their 
firm in court against compensation claims by a business partner. In all conditions, the partici-
pants’ firm had been involved in the construction of a community college in a poor neighbor-
hood. This construction had been delayed, which had caused additional costs to the business 
partner. To cover the incurred costs caused by the delay, the business partner was seeking dam-
ages from the participants’ firm. The reasons for this delay depended on the condition. In the 
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conditions with a morally neutral action, the firm had not been responsible for the delay. How-
ever, in the conditions with an immoral action, the firm had been fully responsible for the delay. 
The firm now had to decide whether to pay the compensation, whether to seek a settlement to 
avoid a lengthy and costly try or whether to defend itself in court against these claims. In all 
conditions, succeeding in court was highly likely. In the conditions with a morally neutral action, 
the reason was that the firm had not been responsible for the delay. Thus, defending the firm in 
court is a morally neutral decision. However, in the conditions with an immoral action, the firm 
was fully responsible for the delay. Here, winning in court was highly likely because the firm 
had the possibility to nullify the liability clauses as the opposing party had made a formal error 
in the contract: by acting ruthlessly, but legally, the firm’s lawyers would be able to exploit this 
loophole. As it was made clear that this maneuvering was according to the law, defending the 
firm in court was a legal decision with an immoral connotation.  
In all conditions, the decision was made to defend the firm in court: depending on the 
condition, this implied either a morally neutral or an immoral action. I manipulate the factor 
Source of Responsibility by asking participants to imagine that the decision to defend the firm 
in court had been made by either the principal or the agent. 
All participants were then informed that their firm had been successful in court and had 
not had to pay damages. This court decision secured the firm’s profit (and, therefore, the prin-
cipal’s profit as residual claimant) and a bonus payment for the agent. Thus, both principals and 
agents profited financially from the either morally neutral or immoral decision to defend the 
firm in court. I expect the immoral action to threaten the agents’ moral identity: indirectly as 
accomplices when principals were responsible for the prior immoral action or directly when 
agents themselves were responsible. 
To examine the effect of the manipulations on their moral spending, agents were offered 
to engage in moral activities. Importantly, they could pay for these moral activities either with 
firm resources or with private money. To operationalize the former, agents were offered to grant 
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a discount to a socially orientated initiative on behalf of their firm in an unrelated second project. 
The fact that the moral action affected an unrelated project is important because the support 
could not be seen as repairing an existing business relation damaged by the legal dispute.  
Granting a discount provided agents with an opportunity to balance moral accounts using firm 
resources. It was made clear that agents could not expect any future financial benefits from this 
decision for their firms: any discount granted would solely support a moral cause. As, by design, 
this donation could not result in future financial benefits, any money spent would imply a finan-
cial loss for the firm (and the principals): hence, I can conclude that these donations are agency 
costs.  
The amount of firm resources spent on a moral cause constitutes my primary dependent 
variable. In addition, agents were given an opportunity to pay for the moral activity with their 
private money: they were offered to donate privately to the same socially orientated initiative. 
This was important to offer agents a true decision about which resources they would like to use 
to pay for moral activities and allows an accurate measurement of the agency costs.  
The amounts designated by participants to be spent on the moral cause, i.e. discounts 
granted and private donations, affected the participants’ earnings. Discounts were deducted from 
the firm profits (and, therefore, from the principals’ earnings) and donated to a real world char-
ity. Equally, all private donations were deducted from the participants’ earnings and donated to 
the same charity.  
  
18 
Participants and Detailed Procedures 
Participants were 246 students from a US university forming 123 dyads. One dyad consists 
of a principal (i.e. the firm’s owner) and an agent (i.e. the firm’s CEO). Participants were re-
cruited randomly, invited to the university’s laboratory, and seated in front of individual com-
puter stations. The z-Tree program (Fischbacher 2007) assigned condition, dyad, and role ran-
domly. Instructions were read aloud and displayed on the computer screens. Participants were 
asked to read all instructions and materials regarding the case very carefully, to take a role-play 
situation seriously, and to make deliberate decisions that would remain unknown to other par-
ticipants.  
Participants were told to imagine a profit-orientated construction firm whose owner  
(i.e. the principal) would be the residual claimant of the business periods’ firm profits who had 
hired the CEO (i.e. the agent) to run the firm’s business operations. Participants were then in-
formed about their role as either principal or agent. Participants were also informed that the 
principals could not know all agent decisions and results thereof and, thus, that there existed 
information asymmetry. Participants knew that the experiment would last only one period and 
that their decisions were relevant for their payments. Participants’ earnings beyond the show-up 
fee depended on the participants’ decisions and –for principals– a random element added to the 
firm profit. The latter was introduced to the principal-agent-setting such that principals knew 
that the outcome of this business period was influenced not only by the agents’ decisions, but 
also by (good or bad) luck. Specifically, a random number (a whole number between -2 and +2) 
was added to the firm profits to reflect the influence of chance. 
Participants were then shown a screen containing the manipulations. Specifically, they 
were asked to imagine that they had just experienced the following situation. Their firm had 
been involved in the construction of a community college in a poor neighborhood: this construc-
tion had been delayed, which had caused additional costs to the business partner. In the morally 
neutral (immoral) conditions, the firm had not been (had been fully) responsible for this delay. 
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To cover the incurred costs caused by the delay, the business partner was seeking damages from 
the participants’ firm. The firm had to decide how to react to these claims and whether to defend 
itself in court. In both the morally neutral and the immoral conditions, according to the firm’s 
lawyers, succeeding in court was highly likely. In the morally neutral conditions, the reason was 
that the firm had not done anything wrong. In the immoral conditions, the firm had the possibil-
ity to nullify the liability clauses because the opposing party had made a formal error in the 
contract and –by acting ruthlessly, but legally– the firm’s lawyers would be able to exploit this 
loophole. It was made clear that this maneuvering was according to the law: defending the firm 
in court was a legal decision with an immoral connotation.5 
Still on the same screen, the second manipulation of the factor Source or Responsibility 
took place. Participants were told that either the principal or the agent made the (morally neutral 
or immoral) decision to defend the firm in court against the compensation claims.  
Both principals and agents were then informed about the positive outcome of the court’s 
decision that the firm did not have to pay any damages. This secured the firm’s profit from the 
construction project. They further learned about the financial implications of this decision. In 
addition to their fixed wage of $11, agents received $9 as a bonus payment for this project: this 
guaranteed that agents were affected by and financially profiting from the decision to go to 
court. Principals were informed that this decision secured a project profit of $11(net of the 
agents’ bonus payments) contributing to this period’s firm profits. However, agents as well as 
principals were informed that the business period was not finished and this was not the only 
project. All participants then advanced to their decision screens where the dependent variables 
were elicited.  
                                                 
5 The way I operationalized the manipulations allowed me to control experimentally the immoral decision. For 
example, I did not have to rely on participants recalling an individual and relatively unspecified situation where 
they committed an immoral act, but could create a setting that was common to all participants and clearly referring 
to a business context. 
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On this screen, agents and principals were informed about another and unrelated project 
in the same business period, a renovation project of a community center in a different rather 
poor area. The works were administered by an initiative with a strong social orientation whose 
representatives were expecting positive effects for their community from these renovations 
works. The initiative’s funds sufficed for some basic works; however, to achieve more of their 
goals, the initiative needed to find ways to fund an extension of the project. Thus, the initiative’s 
representatives asked agents for a private donation to the initiative as well as for a discount on 
behalf of the firm; principals were only asked for a private donation to the initiative. The dis-
count granted constitutes a firm donation with a moral connotation, but, by design, implied a 
financial loss for the firm.  
Principals knew less than agents about this business decision. Only agents knew about 
the request for a firm donation. In addition, only agents knew the potential maximum profit ($9) 
this project could contribute to the firm profits if no discounts were granted. Thus, principals 
could not have specific expectations regarding the business period’s firm profits. Further, (good 
or bad) luck in form of a random number (a whole number between -2 and +2) influenced firm 
profit. Thus, principals were only provided with the coarse information that, at the end of the 
business period, they could expect a final firm profit between $9 and $22 including the random 
element. Agents were informed about their information advantage, their principals’ limited in-
formation and that the latter could only expect a firm profit in the range between $9 and $22. 
Thus, agents’ decisions to grant a discount could not be detected by principals and agents were 
made aware of this.  
Importantly, agents and principals were informed that their dyad partner was asked for 
a private donation without learning the amounts donated. Thus, participants were not in a posi-
tion where they had any reason to think about making a moral spending decision in lieu of the 
other participants. Specifically, agents could leave the decision to engage in moral activities 
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with money from the firm’s profits to the principals; i.e., agents had no need or reason to antic-
ipate principals’ moral spending preferences and execute it in lieu of them. Thus, any discounts 
granted constitute a form of agency costs as they only result from the agent’s personal moral 
preferences and do not benefit principals.  
Agents were asked to indicate the amount they would privately donate (between $0 and 
$9) and the amount they would grant as a discount on behalf of their firm (between $0 and $9). 
Hence, to balance moral accounts they were given the choice between two resources to pay for 
moral activities. This design choice reflects the two options agents have in the real world and 
differs decisively from conventional research settings in prior research. The order of these two 
questions was counterbalanced to control for any order effects. While the agents’ earnings were 
reduced by their private donations, they were not affected by the firm donations. 
Principals were also asked to indicate the amount they would privately donate. As at this 
point, principals could not know the firm profits and, consequently, their personal earnings, I 
used the strategy method to elicit the amounts principals were willing to donate privately.  
Specifically, principals were asked how much they would want to donate privately to the initi-
ative in each of the possible firm profits between $9 and $22 (only whole numbers).6 All moral 
spending, i.e. all private and firm donations affected participants’ payments. The amounts do-
nated privately by both agents and principals to the initiative were deducted from the personal 
earnings and donated to the charity Habitat for Humanity.7 The amounts granted by agents as 
firm discounts, were deducted from the firms’ profits (and, thus, from the principals’ personal 
earnings) and donated to the same charity. Thus, the earnings (π, in $) of the participants were: 
πAGENT = WAGEFIX + BONUS - DONATIONPRIV 
πPRINCIPAL = PROFITFIRST + (9 - DONATIONFIRM) + RANDOM - DONATIONPRINCIPAL 
                                                 
6 I provide these details to give an adequate impression of the setting in which agents made their decision. However, 
as the principals’ moral reasoning is not the focus of this research study, this data is not further used in this paper. 
7 While participants were informed in advance about the general purpose of the real-world charity receiving a 
donation, the specific name of the charity was only disclosed when participants were informed about their earnings.  
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WAGEFIX is the fixed wage of agents and is equal to 11, BONUS is the agents’ bonus 
payment for the first project and is equal to 9, and DONATIONPRIV is the amount privately 
donated by agents. PROFITFIRST is the firm profit from the first project net of the agents’ bonus 
and is equal to 11, DONATIONFIRM is the amount granted as a discount by agents, RANDOM 
is a randomly determined whole number between -2 and +2 to reflect the role of chance, and 
DONATIONPRINCIPAL is the amount privately donated by principals.  
Participants then answered PEQ questions about the case, their general attitudes, and 
their demographics. Finally, participants were informed about their personal earnings, and were 
paid individually. On average, participating in the experiment including the payment procedure 
took less than 45 minutes. 
IV. Results 
Manipulation Checks 
To check whether the Source of Responsibility manipulation was successful, I test whether 
participants correctly remembered who had made the decision to go to trial. 29 agents failed this 
manipulation check and are excluded from my analyses.8 Figure 1 shows the final number of 
participants per condition included in my analyses.  
Figure 1: Research Design and Number of Participants by Condition 
  Morality 
  Neutral Immoral 
Source of  
Responsibility 
Principal  24 30 
Agent  20 20 
Note: Participants are only included in the analyses if they correctly answered to the question who had made the 
decision to go to trial. 
  
                                                 
8 Inferences for the agents’ decisions remain unchanged independent of whether the whole sample or the reduced 
sample is used for the analyses. 
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To check whether the Morality manipulation was successful, I first analyze the answers 
to two questions about the perceived morality of the decision to go to trial. Participants were 
asked a) how fair, from a moral perspective, they had found the decision to go to court, and b) 
how guilty they had felt. Participants’ answers are in line with the Morality manipulation for the 
morally neutral vs. immoral conditions (fairness: 3.82 vs. 2.36, guilt: 1.64 vs. 2.78; both t ≥ 3.07 
and p < .01, two-tailed, untabulated).9 Moreover, agents in the immoral conditions do not feel 
significantly less guilty when principals made the decision instead of them (2.90 vs. 2.60,  
t = .54, p > .58, two-tailed, untabulated). This supports the notion that agents experience guilt 
by association (Gino et al. 2009) even if they are not directly responsible for the immoral deci-
sion from which they profit. In addition, I asked participants whether they thought that the firm 
was morally entitled to the profit from the initial project. Compared to participants in the im-
moral conditions, participants in the morally neutral conditions rather considered this to be the 
case (1.68 vs. 2.84, t = 3.61, p < .01, two-tailed, untabulated). Taken together, these results 
indicate a successful manipulation of Morality. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The primary dependent variable to test the hypotheses is referred to as DONATIONFIRM 
and is the amount of firm resources agents decided to spend on a moral cause. As reported in 
Table 1 and displayed in Figure 2, when principals are responsible, agents increased moral 
spending by 42% after an immoral decision ($3.90) compared to a morally neutral decision 
($2.75).  
  
                                                 
9 If increasing personal wealth and firm value were considered as the only relevant moral actions (Friedman 1970), 
I should not observe significant differences. Importantly, the existence of this possible additional moral rationale, 
hence, works against finding results.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Mean, Median, [Standard Deviation]) for Key Measures 
Morality Neutral Immoral 
Source of Responsibility Principal Agent Principal Agent 
GUILT 
1.71 
1 
[1.83] 
1.55 
1 
[1.54] 
2.90 
3.52 
[1.79] 
2.60 
3.52 
[2.09] 
FAIRNESS 
3.71 
4 
[1.49] 
3.95 
4 
[1.36] 
2.50 
2 
[1.74] 
2.15 
2 
[1.60] 
DONATIONFIRM 
2.75 
2 
[2.35] 
4.30 
4.5 
[2.23] 
3.90 
3 
[2.63] 
3.75 
3 
[2.43] 
Figure 2: Firm Donations by Condition 
 
Notes: 94 agent participants passed the manipulation check question about who had made the decision to go to 
court and were included in the analysis. “Morally Neutral”, respectively “Immoral” refers to the manipulated factor 
Morality, “Agent Decision”, respectively “Principal Decision” to the manipulated factor Source of Responsibility. 
The dependent variable is firm donation, specifically the amount granted by agents as a discount to a socially 
oriented initiative [scale from $0 to $9]. 
This is consistent with H1 predicting that –when principals are responsible–agents in-
crease their use of firm resources to pay for a moral cause after an immoral action compared to 
a morally neutral action. When agents are responsible, they appear to decrease moral spending 
slightly after an immoral decision ($3.75) compared to a morally neutral decision ($4.30). The 
apparent increase of the donations when principals are responsible and the slight decrease of 
donations when agents are responsible are consistent with H2 predicting that –compared to a 
2
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morally neutral action– agents increase their use of firm resources to pay for a moral cause after 
an immoral action less when agents are responsible for an immoral action than when principals 
are responsible for the same immoral action. 
Tests of Hypotheses 
To test H1 and H2, I regress the dependent variable DONATIONFIRM on the independent 
variables Morality, Source of Responsibility and the interaction thereof using heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors. Morality is a dummy variable equal to 0 when the prior action is morally 
neutral and equal to 1 when the prior action is immoral. Source of Responsibility is a dummy 
variable equal to 0 when principals are responsible for the prior action and equal to 1 when 
agents are responsible.  
H1 predicts that –when principals are responsible– agents increase their use of firm re-
sources to pay for a moral cause after an immoral action compared to a morally neutral action, 
which would be the simple effect of Morality when principals are responsible. Thus, it would 
be supported by a positive coefficient of Morality. H2 predicts that –compared to a morally 
neutral action– agents increase their use of firm resources to pay for a moral cause after an 
immoral action less when agents are responsible for an immoral action than when principals are 
responsible for the same immoral action. Thus, it would be supported by a negative coefficient 
of the interaction of Morality and Source of Responsibility. Table 2, Panel A, shows the results 
of the linear regression.  
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Table 2: Tests of Hypotheses 
Panel A: Regression Results  
Dependent Variable: DONATIONFIRM 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Constant  2.75 
(.000)*** 
Morality (Neutral/Immoral) 1.15 
(.047)** 
Source of Responsibility (Principal/Agent) 1.55 
(.027)** 
Morality*Source of Responsibility -1.70 
(.047)** 
N 94 
  
Panel B: Simple Effects  
Effect of Morality when principals are responsible 1.15 
(.047)** 
Effect of Morality when agents are responsible -.55 
(.455) 
Notes: The dependent variable DONATIONFIRM is the amount granted by agents as a discount to a socially oriented 
initiative [scale from $0 to $9]. The independent variables are the two manipulated factors Morality (0: morally 
neutral vs. 1: immoral) and Source of Responsibility (0: principal vs. 1: agent). 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. P-levels are one-
tailed for directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. 
Consistent with H1, the coefficient of Morality is positive and statistically significant  
(β = 1.15, p < .05, one-tailed). Consistent with H2, the coefficient of the interaction is negative 
and statistically significant (β = -1.70, p < .05, one-tailed). These results corroborate H1 and H2. 
Finally, Table 2, Panel B, shows that agents do not seem to increase their use of firm 
resources at all to compensate for their own immoral decisions. The simple effect of Morality 
when agents are responsible for the immoral decision shows a negative sign, but is statistically 
not significant (β = 1.15 - 1.70 = -.55, p = .46, two-tailed). 
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Supplemental Analyses 
Path Model 
As explained above, my underlying theory predicts that immoral actions trigger feelings 
of guilt and unfairness. To relieve these feelings, agents can then be motivated to engage in 
moral cleansing activities. However, in the development of H2, I provide reasons why agents 
could refrain from using firm resources when they themselves are responsible for a prior im-
moral action. Thus, these fairness concerns might only have an effect on the agents’ use of firm 
resources when principals are responsible for a prior immoral decision.  
I test the underlying theoretical model with a system of equations that are estimated using 
Zellner’s “seemingly unrelated regressions” (SUR) model (Zellner 1962; Greene 2012). The 
corresponding path model is depicted in Figure 3.   
Figure 3: Path Model 
 
Notes: 94 agent participants passed the manipulation check question about who had made the decision to go to 
court and were included in the analysis. IMMORAL is equal to 1 when the prior action was immoral and 0 when 
it was morally neutral. AGENT is equal to 1 when agents are responsible and 0 when principals are responsible. 
GUILT (FAIRNESS) was elicited by referring to the decision to go to court and asking “How guilty did you feel?” 
(“From a moral perspective, how fair did you find the decision to go to court?”) [scale from 0 to 6]. The dependent 
variable DONATIONFIRM is the amount granted by agents as a discount to a socially oriented initiative [scale from 
$0 to $9]. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. P-levels are one-
tailed for directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. 
Results are consistent with the theory underlying H1 and H2. An immoral action decreases 
perceived fairness directly (β = -1.00, p < .01, one-tailed) and is partially mediated by feelings 
of guilt (effect of the immoral action on guilt: β = 1.14, p < .01, one-tailed; effect of guilt on 
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fairness: β = -.40, p < .01, one-tailed). This means that –regardless of the Source of Responsi-
bility– agents experience guilt and fairness concerns when they profit financially from an im-
moral decision.10  
However, only when principals are responsible for a prior immoral action –i.e. when 
AGENT is equal to 0– these fairness concerns trigger cleansing activities: the coefficient of the 
unmoderated path from FAIRNESS to DONATIONFIRM is statistically significant (β = -.52,  
p = < .01, one-tailed). The coefficient is negative because higher fairness concerns are measured 
as reduced assessments of fairness: lower (higher) fairness assessments imply higher (lower) 
fairness concerns and lead to higher (lower) firm donations. When agents are responsible for a 
prior immoral action –i.e. when AGENT is equal to 1– the effect from FAIRNESS on  
DONATIONFIRM is mitigated: this is indicated by the statistically significant positive interaction 
term (β = .54, p = .03, one-tailed). Hence, when agents are responsible for a prior immoral 
action, fairness concerns alone do not lead to moral cleansing activities (β = -.52 + .54 = .02,  
p = .93, two-tailed). The statistically not significant direct link between IMMORAL and  
DONATIONFIRM (β = .07, p = .89, two-tailed) suggests a full mediation. 
Baseline Effect of Source of Responsibility for a Morally Neutral Decision 
To examine and compare moral cleansing behavior by agents, two morally neutral condi-
tions are needed as baselines in which either principals or agents are responsible. As the differ-
ence between these baseline conditions is irrelevant for the theory tested in this research study, 
a potential baseline effect of Source of Responsibility has been neglected so far. For reasons of 
completeness, a theoretical explanation and evidence on this difference are provided in this 
supplemental analysis. 
The only difference between the two morally neutral conditions is the fact who is respon-
sible for a morally neutral decision securing the firm profit. When principals are responsible for 
                                                 
10 In a more comprehensive model, I include AGENT and its corresponding interactions in the regressions explain-
ing guilt and fairness considerations. However, there are no additional effects and inferences do not change: thus, 
I focus on the more parsimonious model in my analysis.  
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this decision, agents can interpret this as a benevolent act of principals suggesting gratefulness 
and reciprocal behavior (Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger 1997; Kuang and Moser 2009). Agents 
profit from the principals’ decisions securing firm profits and the agents’ salary, but do not have 
to make a decision or to bear any responsibility themselves. Hence, I expect agents to reciprocate 
the benevolent act when they are later given the opportunity to reduce their principals’ wealth 
by granting a discount. I.e., lower firm donations can be expected when principals and not agents 
are responsible for a morally neutral decision.  
Table 2, Panel A, shows that when agents are responsible for a morally neutral decision –
i.e. when Source of Responsibility is equal to 0– DONATIONFIRM is higher than when principals 
are responsible. This is indicated by a positive and statistically significant coefficient of Source 
of Responsibility (β = 1.55, p < .03, two-tailed). This is in line with my expectations.  
Private Agent Donations 
A central design feature of this experiment is that agents can use two kinds of resources 
to balance moral accounts: firm resources and private money. So far, I have focused on the 
former because, from an agency-perspective, only their use is relevant. Results so far suggest 
that agents do not use firm resources to cleanse a prior immoral action when they are responsible 
for it. As is argued in the development of H2, one reason for this might be that agents use their 
private money to balance moral accounts in this case. While this would be unproblematic from 
an agency-perspective, it would be interesting to know whether agents privately compensate for 
actions taken on the job and it would allow a better understanding of their reasoning.  
If agents decided to use private money to cleanse their own immoral actions, I would 
expect higher private donations after an immoral action than after a morally neutral action. How-
ever, an untabulated t-test shows that this does not seem to be the case. DONATIONPRIV is $2.30 
after a morally neutral and $1.75 after an immoral action when agents are responsible. While 
directionally contrary to my expectation, this difference is statistically not significant (t = .86, 
p = .40, two-tailed).  
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Thus, neither for firm resources nor for private money, I find evidence in support of the 
idea that agents increase their moral spending after an immoral action taken on the job. While 
this is not consistent with the argument that agents use private resources and match Source of 
Responsibility and source of resources, it is consistent with the argument that agents have vari-
ous ways to disengage morally and to detach their moral identity from their decisions made on 
the job. An example from prior research can illustrate how behavior can change when individ-
uals think about their professional decisions: Cohn et al. (2014) show that bank employees 
behave more dishonest when professional identity is rendered salient than when it is not ren-
dered salient. Finally, the fact that agents do not seem to use private money to balance moral 
accounts increases the importance of an agency-perspective on agents’ use of firm resources 
after immoral actions. 
V. Conclusion 
In this experimental research study, I examine whether agents use their principals’  
resources to compensate for prior immoral decisions by their firm and whether this is affected 
by who is responsible for this decision (principal vs. agent). I predict and find that Source of 
Responsibility plays an important moderating role for the question whether agents use firm  
resources to balance moral accounts. I find that compared to a morally neutral action, agents 
increase moral spending using firm resources when principals are responsible. However, agents 
do not increase the use of firm resources to pay for cleansing activities when they themselves 
are responsible for the same prior immoral action. Consistent with the underlying theory regard-
ing the psychological process, I find that –regardless of Source of Responsibility– an immoral 
decision increases guilt and fairness concerns; however, only when principals are responsible, 
increased fairness concerns lead to an increase of balancing moral actions. Thus, when agents 
are responsible, fairness concerns are not sufficient to trigger balancing actions. Finally, I find 
that agents do not seem to use private money to cleanse their own immoral action when they 
have the opportunity to use firm resources. This is consistent with agents disengaging morally 
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from their job and it underlines the importance of examining the issue of agency costs due to 
moral accounting. 
I conjecture that my experimental setting constitutes a conservative test of my theory 
because principals are very salient as individuals losing money. Outside of the laboratory, the 
effect might be strong as agents are often dealing with a potentially large number of anonymous 
principals, which could diffuse the perceived impact of agents’ decisions on principals’ wealth.  
This study makes several important contributions and complements recent accounting 
studies on moral balancing and consistency (Millar 2016; Johnson et al. 2017). Most im-
portantly, I identify a new form of agency costs resulting from interdependencies of decisions 
with moral connotations due to other-regarding preferences by agents. This study’s results  
suggest that moral accounting can cause agency costs because agents in hierarchies confronted 
with immoral actions by principals may want to engage in moral cleansing activities costly to 
the firm. Hence, immoral actions to increase firm profits might be (partially) offset by agents’  
decisions to pay for moral cleansing activities using firm resources and firms might be well 
advised to consider these consequences from financially profitable, but immoral decision. These 
findings might be particularly important for the design of control systems in certain industries, 
job functions or in firms with strong hierarchies and offer a new perspective on agency conflicts 
that can be used by for future research studies.  
For example, this study’s results suggest that agents with a high moral sensitivity might 
be particularly active in balancing moral accounts thereby reducing firm profits. This could be 
particularly interesting because it shows a potential downside of hiring agents with a high moral 
sensitivity. While hiring them may sometimes result in lower agency costs –e.g. lower control 
costs because of agents’ honesty or trustworthiness (Evans et al. 2001; Beccera and Gupta 
1999)– it may increase agency costs due to their desire to balance moral accounts. Thus, it could 
be interesting to extend this research study by analyzing potential moderating effect of certain 
personality characteristics or to tasks requiring certain character traits. Further, while I argue 
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that results from my research study generalize to all hierarchical principal-agent-relations with 
principals’ as residual claimants, this assumption might be tested directly by analyzing whether 
there exist differences in the perception of immoral actions due to decisions by firm owners, 
other forms of principals, or collectives. In addition, it might be interesting to analyze moral 
balancing when a different party, e.g. consultants, is involved in, but not fully responsible for 
an immoral decision because responsibility could (partially) be shifted. Note that different from 
other research I propose to focus on agents’ reactions to principal’s decisions (Hamman et al. 
2010; Bartling and Fischbacher 2012).  
This study further contributes to literature on CSR and possible agency problems. It un-
derlines the importance for firms to consider agents’ moral preferences when designing mana-
gerial control systems as agents might use the moral connotation of CSR activities to manage 
moral accounts with firm resources (Merritt et al. 2012; Gneezy et al. 2014; Cascio and Plant 
2015; Effron and Conway 2015). Moreover, as CSR activities frequently include uncertainty 
about expected financial benefits (Moser and Martin 2012; Martin and Moser 2016), it can be 
particularly hard to differentiate between agents’ motivations and to design adequate control 
systems. On the other hand, I conjecture that these moral aspects of CSR (including but not 
limited to corporate giving) could be a tool to curtail the problem of these agency costs as firms 
might use it to signal to agents that a firm balances moral accounts on a firm level. Thus, firms 
might use moral expenditures for internal impression management: spending resources in a cal-
culated and targeted way to conserve or proactively create a moral image and reputation might 
be an investment to prevent agents from seeking uncontrolled actions or to license them to make 
immoral decisions in their firms’ interest. Possibly, this rational might also explain some entre-
preneurs’ visible endeavors to support charities. Empirically testing the conjecture whether pro-
actively creating a moral image, e.g., by investing in CSR or donating, can actually prevent 
agents from engaging in uncontrolled moral cleansing activities might be another interesting 
and important extension of this research study. 
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From a theoretical perspective, this study adds to research on moral balancing by testing 
its practical reach and implications in an important corporate setting, a principal-agent-relation-
ship. Specifically, I extend prior research by adding the possibility for individuals to use re-
sources not belonging to themselves (i.e. firm resources) and an additional source of responsi-
bility (i.e. the residual claimant of the financial profits generated by the immoral action). Finally, 
agents have another moral rationale to invoke as their job entails the duty to make decisions that 
are in their firm’s interest: this makes the moral trade-off more complex and offers agents the 
possibility to disengage morally. 
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Appendix 
Experiment Materials 
[Instructions: CEO participants] 
 
  
40 
[Immoral decision by CEO: manipulation screen for CEO participants] 
 
 
  
41 
[Immoral decision by CEO: decision screen for CEO participants (discount question first)] 
 
 
  
42 
[Immoral decision by owner: manipulation screen for CEO participants] 
 
 
  
43 
[Immoral decision by owner: decision screen for CEO participants (discount question first)] 
 
 
  
44 
[Morally neutral decision by CEO: manipulation screen for CEO participants] 
 
 
  
45 
[Morally neutral decision by CEO: decision screen for CEO participants (discount question first)] 
 
 
  
46 
[Morally neutral decision by owner: manipulation screen for CEO participants] 
 
 
  
47 
[Morally neutral decision by owner: decision screen for CEO participants (discount question first)] 
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[Instructions: owner participants] 
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[Immoral decision by CEO: manipulation screen for owner participants]  
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[Immoral decision by CEO: decision screen for owner participants]  
 
 
  
51 
[Immoral decision by owner: manipulation screen for owner participants]  
 
 
  
52 
[Immoral decision by owner: decision screen for owner participants]  
 
 
  
53 
[Morally neutral decision by CEO: manipulation screen for owner participants]  
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[Morally neutral decision by CEO: decision screen for owner participants]  
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[Morally neutral decision by owner: manipulation screen for owner participants] 
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[Morally neutral decision by owner: decision screen for owner participants]  
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Questionnaire 
Please answer the questions on the next pages to give us a better understanding of your deci-
sions. 
For the following questions, please think back to the time when the decision was made to go to court 
and before you made the [for CEOs: two] decision [for CEOs:s] to support the initiative’s renova-
tion project.  
How guilty did you feel? 
       
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all  Very 
In your opinion, was the company morally entitled to the profit from the initial project by not paying 
damages to the community? 
       
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all  Very 
From a moral perspective, how fair did you find the decision to go to court? 
       
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all  Very 
The description asked you to imagine a situation where this decision was already made: If you had 
had the choice in reality to decide whether to go to court in the situation described or not, how 
likely would you personally have decided to go to court? 
       
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all  Very 
 
For the following question, please think back to the time when you made the decision to support the 
initiative’s project by granting a discount on behalf of the company. [Only CEOs] 
When you made the decision to support the initiative, how strongly did you consider the company’s 
potential future business relations with that particular initiative? 
       
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Not at all  Very 
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Please answer the following questions about your general thoughts and beliefs. 
How strongly do you agree with the following statement?  
Shareholder value maximization within the legal boundaries should be the sole goal of profit-ori-
ented companies. 
       
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Very strongly 
disagree  
Neither disagree 
nor agree 
Very strongly 
agree 
How strongly do you agree with the following statement?  
A high-ranking manager, such as a CEO, should in all his business decisions solely consider what is 
in the best interest of the company’s owner(s).  
       
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Very strongly 
disagree  
Neither disagree 
nor agree 
Very strongly 
agree 
How strongly do you agree with the following statement?  
Companies have the moral obligation to provide more societal benefits than is mandated by law 
(e.g. by donating, engaging in voluntary socially responsible activities that create more costs than 
benefits). 
       
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Very strongly 
disagree  
Neither disagree 
nor agree 
Very strongly 
agree 
How strongly do you agree with the following statement?  
In general, high-ranking managers, such as a CEO, should leave the decision to do good with a com-
pany’s money (e.g. granting discounts or donating company money) to the owner of the company. 
       
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Very strongly 
disagree  
Neither disagree 
nor agree 
Very strongly 
agree 
Being generous as a company, e.g. as seen in this example by granting discounts or by donating 
company money to a charity, can be seen as a way to improve a company’s reputation or increase 
employee engagement and commitment which could pay out in the long run. In your opinion, how 
beneficial is this from a cost-benefit perspective for a company in general? 
       
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Creates much higher 
costs than benefits 
Cost and benefits 
are more or less equal 
Creates much higher 
benefits than costs 
 
  
59 
Listed below are some characteristics that may describe a person: caring, compassionate, fair, 
friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind. The person with these characteristics 
could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person 
who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a 
clear image of what this person would be like, answer the following questions. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Strongly 
Agree 
It would make me feel good to be a person who has these 
characteristics. 
     
-2 -1 0 1 2 
Being someone who has these characteristics is an important 
part of who I am. 
     
-2 -1 0 1 2 
I strongly desire to have these characteristics. 
     
-2 -1 0 1 2 
I often wear clothes that identify me as having these charac-
teristics. 
     
-2 -1 0 1 2 
The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to 
others by my membership in certain organizations. 
     
-2 -1 0 1 2 
I am actively involved in activities that communicate to oth-
ers that I have these characteristics. 
     
-2 -1 0 1 2 
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The following questions are supposed to see what you still remember from the setting de-
scribed. Please answer them to the best of your memory.  
Who made the decision to go to court? 
 You as CEO [for owners: You as Owner] 
 The owner [for owners: CEO] 
 
Was the final company profit of this business period affected by a randomly determined element? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Who received the remaining final company profit at the end of the business period? 
 You as CEO [for owners: You as Owner] 
 The owner [for owners: CEO] 
 
At one point you decided about granting a discount to the initiative’s project on behalf of your 
company: Did this discount affect your personal earnings from the study? [Only CEOs] 
 Yes 
 No 
 
At one point you decided about granting a discount to the initiative’s project on behalf of your 
company: Did this discount affect the company’s profit and, therefore, the owner’s personal earn-
ings from the study? [Only CEOs] 
 Yes 
 No 
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Thank you for participating in this study. 
Finally, we would like to ask you to provide a few personal details. Recall that your answers 
will remain completely anonymous and that we will not be able to link your answers to your 
identity. 
In which phase of your studies are you currently? 
(Please choose only one.) 
 Bachelor   
 Master 
 Other, please specify: _____________________________________ 
 
What is your major? Please specify: ___________________________ 
 
Number of business and economics classes attended so far during your studies? _____________ 
How many terms have you attended university? ________ terms. 
How many years of practical experience do you have? ______ years. 
How old are you? ________ years. 
 
What is your gender? 
 Female 
 Male 
 
What is your nationality? Please specify: ___________________________ 
 
 
[Exit-screen: thank-you, exit instructions, and payment information] 
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“The Unintended Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility Performance on Investors’ 
Estimates of Fundamental Value” 
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Engehaldenstrasse 4, CH-3012 Bern, christoph.hoerner@iuc.unibe.ch 
 
 
Abstract: 
I design and conduct an experimental study to test an alternative explanation for the results of 
the study on “The Unintended Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility Performance on  
Investors’ Estimates of Fundamental Value“ by Elliott, Jackson, Peecher, and White (2014). 
The authors find that explicitly assessing a firm’s positive CSR performance before estimating 
the firm’s value results in lower estimates than the estimates without a prior explicit assessment. 
They explain their results by the correction of a misattributed affect. However, according to an 
alternative explanation rooted in speech act theory, respondents might have understood the ex-
plicit assessment –that is supposed to reduce any unintended influence– differently than in-
tended by the researchers and might have subtracted important information from their overall 
assessment of the firm’s fundamental value. Finding support for this alternative explanation 
would question the validity of the authors’ interesting results regarding the role of affective 
reactions in firm valuations involving CSR performance information. Following the two com-
peting theoretical explanations, I predict two specific patterns resulting from the comparison of 
three conditions. As participants, I recruited students in Switzerland and the US as participants: 
combined, these provide me with a relatively large sample to test the two explanations. How-
ever, I cannot find empirical support to claim differences between conditions for the estimates 
of the fundamental value. This implies that I cannot replicate the effect of Elliott et al. (2014). 
Given the potentially far-reaching implications of their study, knowing about the limited robust-
ness and generalizability of their results is important for the research community. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Speech Act Theory, Affect-as-Information, 
Method, Replication 
  
63 
I. Introduction 
In “The Unintended Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility Performance on Investors’ 
Estimates of Fundamental Value“, Elliott, Jackson, Peecher, and White (2014; in the following: 
EJPW) report an experiment in which they examine the effect of Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity (CSR) information on a firm’s fundamental value estimates. EJPW find that explicitly as-
sessing a firm’s positive CSR performance before estimating the firm’s value decreases these 
estimates compared to estimates without a prior explicit assessment. For negative CSR perfor-
mance, EJPW find directional evidence that firm value estimates are higher after an assessment 
compared to those without assessment. The authors conclude that an explicit assessment miti-
gates the effect of an unintended overweighting of CSR information and explain this as being 
caused by an affective reaction to the CSR performance. By having participants explicitly assess 
CSR performance, the authors expect to correct the unintended reaction by making participants 
aware of the affect’s source (Schwarz and Clore 1983, 2003). Without an objective benchmark, 
the authors treat the estimate after this intervention as the best available standard: in comparison, 
estimates without assessment are considered as being unconsciously influenced.  
In this study, I suggest and test an alternative explanation for this effect. The observed 
effect may also have been caused by the information exchange between experimenter and par-
ticipant, and, specifically, the procedure to elicit estimates from the participants. The order of 
the questions asked in the experimental instrument may have created a difference between what 
the experimenters were asking and what participants thought the experimenters were asking. 
Specifically, when participants were asked first about the CSR performance, they may have 
“subtracted” the influence of CSR when estimating the firm value. Importantly, they may have 
done this because of a conversational norm to avoid giving redundant information and not be-
cause of an unintended affective misattribution. In EJPW’s experiment design, both reasons 
(conversational and affective) would lead to the same pattern of effects. However, importantly 
for research on the role of CSR information, implications of the results differ according to the 
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explanation. An unintended affective misattribution would create distorted estimates that can be 
improved by an explicit assessment. In addition, it could be claimed that CSR influences inves-
tors via affective reactions. However, if the alternative conversational explanation were true, an 
explicit assessment would actually produce worse estimates. In this case, what is removed by 
the explicit assessment would actually be a relevant input for estimating a firm’s value and not 
only an affective reaction. Particularly without an objective benchmark (Guiral, Moon, Tan, and 
Yu 2017), the conclusion could be questioned that explicitly assessing CSR performance before 
estimating a firm’s value actually produces better outcomes. Moreover, support for an alterna-
tive explanation because of conversational norms would be important from a methodological 
standpoint. It would raise awareness for the design of research instruments when specific  
questions are asked before questions that are more general. This is particularly important if these 
assessments are intended to correct a misattribution of affect to its appropriate source (Schwarz 
and Clore 1983, 2003; Forgas 2006). What is removed by the researchers’ intervention may not 
be an unintended effect, but an important element of the answer. 
Specifically, the alternative explanation proposed in this paper is rooted in speech act the-
ory: Grice (1975) assumes that conversations serve the rationale of exchanging meaningful and 
non-redundant information. For respondents, following this “Cooperative Principle” means 
providing as much information as necessary when answering a question, but not more than is 
required. Asking participants, e.g. in a survey or questionnaire, for their estimates or judgments 
constitutes a form of conversation and information exchange as participants respond to questions 
asked by researchers. Particularly in a scientific (oral or written) survey, respondents perceive 
this kind of conversation as serving the rationale of exchanging information (Tourangeau, Rips, 
and Rasinski 2000; Strack, Schwarz, and Wänke 1991; Clark and Schober 1992). 
Applied to the specific context of CSR, participants explicitly assessing a firm’s CSR per-
formance before estimating its fundamental value could get the impression that they have 
already provided information on the firm’s CSR performance (i.e. a “part” of the firm’s overall 
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assessment). Therefore, they might subtract this subset from the following more general and 
overall estimate of the firm value (i.e. the “whole”). When first asked to assess explicitly CSR 
performance, participants may be reluctant to include a CSR effect on firm value when provid-
ing an assessment of a firm’s value. Participants could consider including the CSR component 
to be redundant with their first response about the CSR performance. As cooperative respond-
ents, they would avoid providing information twice and exclude it (Bless and Schwarz 2010) 
when a conversational situation is perceived as ambiguous and unclear. This exclusion might 
result in a “subtraction effect” (Schuman and Presser 1996) as a “part” can be subtracted from 
the “whole” in question implying that respondents change their construal of the “whole” com-
pared to the construal of the “whole” without an explicit assessment of the “part”.  
An example can help illustrating the theory’s central reasoning.1 Imagine you have a 
spouse who just caught an infection and two children who are currently fine, and someone asks 
you for the well-being of your relatives. The order of the two questions a) “How is your family?” 
(“whole”) and b) “How is your spouse?” (“part”) would affect how you construe and answer the 
more general question a). Being first asked a), you would probably refer to some average of 
your family’s well-being and answer something like “So-so” followed by a more precise answer 
to the following question b) regarding your spouse’s well-being (“Not so well.”). However, 
being asked b) first, you would provide this specific information (“Not so well.”) and mentally 
subtract the subset “spouse” from the set “family” when answering the following question a). 
The reason for this is that you have already provided information regarding your spouse and do 
not want to provide redundant information. Although you are answering exactly the same ques-
tion a), the order of the two questions matters for the understanding of what is actually referred 
to. Now, you would probably understand the content of “family” differently and only provide 
                                                 
1 The following example is based on Clark and Schober (1992). 
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information regarding the well-being of your children: “Fine!” Note that it is common for re-
spondents to answer questions not literally, but in a way that they perceive to be most helpful to 
the questioner. This occurs in daily conversations and can be explained by different layers of 
speech acts (Austin 1962). To illustrate this, think about a situation where you are asked whether 
you have the time. Only few people would not directly tell the time (assumed they know it), but 
answer “Yes.” However, this would the correct answer to the literal question asked (Clark and 
Schober 1992). 
A similar “subtraction effect” might have occurred in EJPW and might (partially) explain 
their results. Asking participants to estimate a firm’s fundamental value constitutes a “whole” 
question, whereas asking for CSR performance constitutes a “part” question. The experimental 
intervention to explicitly assess CSR performance introduced a “part” question before eliciting 
the dependent variable in some, but not all conditions. Thus, the intervention may have changed 
some participants’ construal of what was asked because information about CSR performance 
constitutes a different subset of the set of information needed to estimate a firm’s future devel-
opment: assessing financial performance is traditionally a prominent subset of this whole set of 
information; assessing performance constitutes another subset.  
The purpose of my study is to test whether a “subtraction effect” can be an alternative 
explanation to the affect interpretation offered by EJPW. To test the validity of this alternative 
explanation I conduct an experiment with 142 participants (51 students from a Swiss university 
and 91 participants from a large public US university) based on the materials of EJPW. I focus 
on the case of positive CSR performance. Here, the support for EJPW’s results is strongest and 
provides the best test case. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions:  
1) Participants are not explicitly asked about a firm’s CSR performance before they estimate the 
firm’s fundamental value. 2) Participants are explicitly asked about a firm’s CSR performance 
before they estimate the firm’s fundamental value. 3) Participants are explicitly asked about a 
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firm’s CSR performance before they estimate the firm’s fundamental value; however, an expla-
nation is added to clarify the conversational context of the fundamental value question, which 
prevents participants from changing their construal of the “whole”. Conditions 1) and 2) repli-
cate the corresponding conditions in EJPW to establish a baseline effect, a decrease of the fun-
damental value estimate. Condition 3) allows testing the alternative explanation. Depending on 
the explanation, a difference between conditions 2) and 3) is or is not to be expected. According 
to the “affect explanation”, there should be no difference; according to the “speech act explana-
tion”, fundamental value estimates should be higher in 3). 
However, I cannot find empirical support to claim any differences for fundamental value 
estimates between the three conditions. This implies that I cannot replicate the effect from EJPW 
for which I want to test an alternative explanation. These (non-)findings question how strongly 
we should rely on the affect effect reported by EJPW. Knowing about the robustness of prior 
and potentially influential research is important for experimental research. Problems of lacking 
replication studies are well-discussed (Salterio 2014) and calls for them can be increasingly 
encountered within the accounting community (Dyckman and Zeff 2014; Shields 2015) and 
outside of it (Open Science Collaboration 2015).  
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the theory in detail and 
develops my hypotheses. Section 3 explains my research design. Section 4 reports the results of 
the experiment, and section 5 concludes the paper.  
II. Theory and Development of Hypotheses 
In the case of a firm with positive CSR performance information, EJPW find that having 
participants explicitly assess CSR performance before making the fundamental value estimates 
results in lower estimates than estimates without a prior explicit assessment. The authors explain 
their results using affect research. They follow prior research by Schwarz and Clore (1983, 
2003) who find that the current state of the weather can lead to an affective reaction and an 
undue effect of the weather on the respondents’ judgments about their general life happiness 
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(Tourangeau and Rasinski 1988). The reason is that respondents can mistake their affective re-
action as relevant information regarding the judgment they are actually supposed to make 
(c.f. also Forgas 2006): thus, they misattribute the source of the affect and use it as information 
regarding the judgment. However, once the researchers direct the participants’ attention to the 
actual source of this affect (i.e. the state of the weather), its influence on the following judgement 
disappears: participants are now enabled to attribute the affective response correctly to its source 
and do not confound it with the judgment to be made. This correction of a misattribution is 
common and has been employed in other accounting research, e.g. with regard to the effect of 
readability on investors (Rennekamp 2012) or for jurors in an auditing context (Kadous 2001). 
EJPW apply this “affect explanation” to a CSR setting and find results consistent with this the-
oretical explanation. 
It is, however, possible to draw on an alternative “speech act explanation” to explain 
EJPW’s results. According to this, one could argue that participants’ understanding of the ques-
tion about the firm’s fundamental value might differ from what the researchers actually intend 
to ask. In this case, the authors’ results might be considered an artifact of their data elicitation 
procedure. This reasoning is based on Grice’s (1975) seminal contribution to speech act theory. 
It focuses on the relation of what is meant when an individual utters something and what is 
understood, inferred, and interpreted by an interaction partner (Strack and Martin 1988). These 
interactions include question-answer-situations that are key to experimental and (oral or written) 
survey research (Tourangeau et al. 2000; Strack et al. 1991; Clark and Schober 1992).  
Specifically, what has been observed by EJPW may be a so-called “subtraction effect” 
that belongs to problems arising in so-called “part-whole-questions” (Schumann and Presser 
1996). These refer to situations where an individual is asked about a specific subset before being 
asked about the more general set it belongs to (Strack, Martin, and Schwarz 1988; Mason 1994; 
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Hilton and Slugowski 2001).2 One example for a subtraction effect is the spouse-family-exam-
ple from the introduction (Clark and Schober 1992). Similarly, Bradburn and Mason (1964) 
provide evidence that respondents in a survey subtract the evaluation of the role of their marriage 
state from the evaluation of their general life happiness when being asked the marriage question 
first. Bradburn (1982) refers to evidence for a subtraction effect in the 1980 General Social 
Survey, and Tourangeau and Rasinski (1988) explain this evidence as being consistent with an 
understanding of being asked: “Aside [emphasis added] from your marriage, how happy are 
you?” In another survey, respondents are asked about their general support of legal abortions 
for married women: the respondents’ support depends on the positioning of the specific question 
whether pregnant women should have the legal right to an abortion when there is a high chance 
of a birth defect (Schumann and Presser 1996). The authors provide a further example where 
respondents are asked for their consent to the two statements that driving standards have de-
creased for people in general and that they have so specifically for young drivers. Again, the 
support to these statements depends on the order of the questions. Relatedly, Mason (1994) 
reports evidence that respondents subtract the state of a local economy from a global economy 
when they are asked about the local economy first. 
These subtractions can be explained by Grice’s (1975) explanations how conversations 
usually aim at exchanging meaningful information. According to these, conversations follow a 
“Cooperative Principle”.3 This implies giving as much information as necessary, but not more 
                                                 
2 These effects can go two ways. They can be overly consistent and have too high correlations between the “part” 
and the following “whole” questions; alternatively, they can consist in the removal or subtraction of the “part” from 
the “whole”. Different labels for these phenomena can be found in the literature, e.g., subtraction/contrast/exclu-
sion/ redundancy for the latter and consistency/assimilation/inclusion/salience effects for the former (Schuman and 
Presser 1996; Schwarz, Strack, and Mai 1991; Bless and Schwarz 2010; Bradburn and Mason 1964).  
3 Grice writes about a general purpose and fundamental feature of conversations. There might be special cases 
where cooperation is not the goal of a conversation and, specifically, conversational conventions might be 
(mis)used to mislead a conversation partner. Furthermore, these might not be that extraordinary in the field of 
accounting (Bloomfield 2008, 2012); however, the content of this study’s application is unproblematic in this re-
gard. 
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than is required. The examples listed above consist of a “part”-question preceding a correspond-
ing “whole”-question. Respondents interpreting their first answer as already providing infor-
mation about the “part” want to be cooperative and avoid giving redundant information (Bless 
and Schwarz 2010). Therefore, they exclude the “part” when providing the assessment and eval-
uation of the “whole”.  
Bless and Schwarz (2010) describe a model of the circumstances under which these “part-
whole-effects” are most likely to occur. When making evaluative judgments, respondents form 
mental representations of the objects about which they are asked. These representations are con-
text-sensitive and influenced by what is easily accessible, salient, and appears to be relevant 
(c.f. also Strack and Martin 1988). Consistency effects occur when the salient, specific subsets 
are understood by respondents as valid and adequate proxies for the more general set. In these 
cases, the correlation between assessments of the “part” and the “whole” tends to be overly high. 
On the contrary, subtraction effects occur when the salient, specific subset leads to a change in 
the representation of the more general set, e.g. by mentally subtracting the former from the rep-
resentation of the latter. How the first salient item and, therefore, the whole context are under-
stood can depend on conversational norms (Bless and Schwarz 2010). 
This reasoning can be applied to the question of the informative value of CSR performance 
information for firm valuations. Part of forecasting a firm’s development is an adequate assess-
ment of the actions taken by a firm with regard to its dynamic environment. CSR expenditures 
can belong to these actions. Prior literature has argued that they constitute investments indicat-
ing or leading to positive future financial performance. For example, (potential) employees 
might value CSR activities (Balakrishnan, Sprinkle, and Williamson 2011; Bhattacharya, Sen, 
and Korschun 2008; Douthit, Martin, and McAllister 2017) and customers might reward a strong 
CSR performance (Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan 2010). By making CSR investments, 
companies may save energy costs (Rangan, Chase, and Karim 2015) and decrease the risk of 
negative publicity or government regulation (Paine 2000). Prior research suggests that the costs 
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of capital can be lower for strong CSR performers (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang 2011; El 
Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra 2011; Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2014; Goss and 
Roberts 2011) and that firms might invest in CSR to signal their anticipation of stronger future 
financial performance (Lys, Naughton, and Wang 2015).  
Critics, however, claim that money might be spent on CSR not to increase firm value but 
to serve personal moral interests. From an agency-theory-perspective, this would mean a misuse 
of principals’ resources (Friedman 1970). Prior research provides evidence that agents’  
decisions to “do good” can reduce their principals’ wealth. Firms’ charity donations may be 
associated with their CEO’s personal charity preferences and the capital market values cash 
holdings less for companies with a higher level of CSR spending (Masulis and Reza 2015). 
Consistent with agency problems, increasing ownership and monitoring decreases CSR spend-
ing (Cheng, Hong, and Shue 2013; Barnea and Rubin 2010). Thus, CSR investments may have 
negative, positive, or no net effects on the future financial development of this firm (Waddock 
and Graves 1997). Hence, information about these actions taken is important for the analysis of 
a firm as potential investment. Information about potential investments can be considered as 
consisting of different subsets needed to estimate a firm’s future development. The assessment 
of financial performance is traditionally a prominent subset of this comprehensive set of infor-
mation (Elliott, Hobson, and Jackson 2011); information about CSR performance constitutes 
another subset.  
Gathering data about the assessments of these subsets in experiments or (written or oral) 
surveys involves asking participants questions and, thus, a conversational interaction as de-
scribed above. Asking participants in an experiment, e.g. in a questionnaire, about a firm’s fun-
damental value constitutes a “whole” question, whereas asking for CSR performance constitutes 
a “part” question. Consequently, asking for an assessment of the CSR performance before ask-
ing for the general evaluation could lead to a subtraction effect because participants mentally 
subtract anything related to the subset CSR from the overall assessment of the firm’s activities 
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and potential, i.e. the firm’s fundamental value. Hence, participants’ understanding of the more 
general and overall assessment would depend on whether participants explicitly assess CSR 
performance or not (i.e. EJPW’s manipulation). These arguments provide an alternative, speech 
act theory based explanation of the effect reported in EJPW: the explicit assessment of the CSR 
performance could have the effect that participants subtract and exclude CSR performance as-
sessments from their general and overall assessments of a firm’s fundamental value. Thus, the 
manipulation might not correct a misattribution of an affective reaction, but might change the 
participant’s understanding of the more general assessment, i.e. the firm’s fundamental value.  
The two alternative explanations (i.e. affect and speech act) lead to the same directional 
prediction for the effect of an explicit assessment on estimates of a firm’s fundamental value 
per share. According to both, these estimates should be reduced in the case of positive CSR 
performance. Thus, a further step is necessary to test these competing theories and their explan-
atory power. Prior research has provided a remedy for both subtraction and consistency effects 
in part-whole-questions (Strack et al. 1988; Schwarz et al. 1991; Clark and Schober 1992). As 
the reason for the undesired effects is the ambiguity involved in the respondents’ interpretation 
of the questioner’s intent, it suffices to clarify the conversational context and to suggest an un-
ambiguous interpretation of the question asked. For example, this can be achieved by introduc-
ing a short explanation of the meaning of the question and the relation between the “part” and 
“whole” questions. I.e., it can be made clear to participants not to subtract a subset from the 
more general set, but rather to integrate it in an overall evaluative judgment. This would still 
allow asking the specific question first to assure a correct attribution of a potential affect’s 
source.  
Hence, clarifying the conversional context in an additional condition allows having par-
ticipants explicitly assess a firm’s CSR performance before estimating its fundamental value; 
however, it also allows testing the competing theories. Depending on the explanation (affect vs. 
speech act), the expected pattern of these three conditions differs. Both explanations predict a 
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negative effect of an explicit assessment on the fundamental value per share when CSR perfor-
mance is positive. However, predictions differ with regard to the effect of a modified explicit 
assessment in which the conversational context is made clear. According to the “affect explana-
tion”, there should be no difference between an explicit and a modified explicit assessment. 
From an affective perspective, these two conditions are equivalent; importantly, there exist no 
reasons to expect that a clarified conversational context affects estimates for reasons unrelated 
to the understanding of the question. According to the “speech act explanation”, clarifying the 
conversational context should prevent or undo a subtraction effect. Thus, there should be a  
positive effect of a modified explicit assessment compared to an unmodified explicit assessment, 
resulting in a pattern over the three conditions resembling a “v”. Importantly, as affect attribu-
tion is not affected, adding a third condition clarifying the conversational context allows a clean 
test of the competing explanations. Thus, I state two competing hypotheses regarding the pattern 
of the three conditions to test the competing explanations.  
H1 (“Affect Explanation”): 1) When CSR performance is positive, in-
vestors who do not explicitly assess CSR performance estimate a firm’s 
fundamental value higher than investors who explicitly assess CSR per-
formance. 2) Clarifying the conversational context of the explicit assess-
ment does not have an additional effect. 
H2 (“Speech Act Explanation”): 1) When CSR performance is positive, 
investors who do not explicitly assess CSR performance estimate a 
firm’s fundamental value higher than investors who explicitly assess 
CSR performance. 2) Clarifying the conversational context of the ex-
plicit assessment moves investors’ estimates of a firm’s fundamental 
value towards estimates without an explicit assessment. 
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Figure 1, Panel A and B, depicts and contrasts these two expected patterns.  
Figure 1: Expected Patterns for Hypotheses 
Panel A: H1 (Affect Explanation) 
 
Panel B: H2 (Speech Act Explanation) 
 
Note: Estimates of the firm’s fundamental value per share (FVPS) as calculated by the template provided. 
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III. Method 
Design 
I use a 1x3 between-subjects experimental design with three different realizations of  
assessing the positive CSR performance. Except for the additional third condition, this study 
closely replicates the experiment conducted by EJPW using the materials sent to me by the 
authors. However, different from EJPW, I focus on the two positive CSR performance condi-
tions (with and without explicit assessment): for these, EJPW have found the strongest support 
for their theory. Figure 2, Panel A through C, shows the timeline and contrasts the different steps 
of participants according to their condition.  
Figure 2: Timeline for Each Condition 
Panel A: Condition 1 “No Explicit Assessment” 
 
Panel B: Condition 2 “Explicit Assessment” 
 
Panel C: Condition 3 “Modified Explicit Assessment” 
 
Note: Due to space restriction, “Performance” was left out after “Social”, “Environmental”, and “Financial” in this 
figure. 
In the first condition (“No Explicit Assessment”), participants are provided with back-
ground information about a firm and its industry, information about the firm’s positive social 
and environmental performance as well as information about its financial performance. While 
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financial performance is assessed, there is no explicit assessment of the social and environmen-
tal performance in this condition before the fundamental value per share (FVPS) is estimated. 
In the second condition (“Explicit Assessment”), participants are provided with the same mate-
rials. However, they are additionally asked to assess explicitly the social and environmental 
performance directly after reviewing the corresponding positive CSR performance information. 
Participants are also asked to assess the financial performances before they estimate the FVPS. 
The third condition (“Modified Explicit Assessment”) is new and parallels the second condition 
except for one important detail: when asked to estimate the FVPS, the directions to this question 
clarify the conversational context and the question’s relation to the questions asked before. A 
short paragraph (see below for the exact wording) is added to make it clear to participants that 
they are now asked for an overall evaluation of the firm as potential investment –after having 
answered questions about the specific performances. 
Participants 
Like EJPW, I rely on business administration students as proxies for reasonably informed 
non-professional investors. First, I recruited 51 Swiss students mostly pursuing a master degree 
from their accounting course. To increase the power of my study, I collected additional data 
from 91 business administration students from a US university. Thereby, I could use a very 
similar population to replicate the EJPW study and I could guarantee that there were no language 
problems with the English materials. Additionally, having two samples provides the opportunity 
to compare results between participants from these two countries. For my main analyses,  
however, I collapse the two samples. In my supplementary analysis, I show that findings are not 
driven by differences between samples. 
From these 142 students, three observations were discarded from the analyses.4 Thus, my 
overall sample consists of 139 observations (51 Swiss and 88 US students), assigned randomly 
                                                 
4 The materials they returned revealed that they did not understand these or that they did not try to work on the task.  
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to three conditions. Specifically, there were 47 in the “No Explicit Assessment” condition, 45 
in the “Explicit Assessment” condition, and 47 in the “Modified Explicit Assessment”  
condition.  
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. In addition to the in-
formed consent form, they had to sign, three envelopes containing the experiment materials were 
placed in front of the participants, which they were asked to complete in the order given to them. 
EJPW indicate that their participants were familiar with the residual earnings model used in the 
study. Thus, to make sure that participants had a basic understanding how to use the Excel tem-
plate with the valuation model, US students were given a brief introduction before an experiment 
session started.5  
The first envelope always contained overview information about the firm XYZ and its 
industry. All participants were then provided with information about the firm’s positive social 
performance. Only in the two assessment conditions, participants then had to assess the social 
performance by answering several questions about it. Next, all participants were provided with 
the firm’s positive environmental performance: again, only participants in the two assessment 
conditions had to assess it. On the last pages in this first envelope, participants in all conditions 
reviewed and explicitly assessed the firm’s financial performance. 
Participants were then asked to proceed with the second envelope. Only in the “Modified 
Explicit Assessment” condition, participants’ directions for the first question begin with a small 
paragraph clarifying the conversational context and the question’s relation to the former ques-
tions. It is important to make the correct conversational context clear to participants to test the 
alternative “speech act explanation”. Specifically, participants were provided with the following 
contextualization:  
                                                 
5 A similar approach was also used by Guiral et al. (2017). A brief introduction was not given to the Swiss sample 
because I knew they were already familiar with similar valuation models. 
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By now you have received data on XYZ’s social responsibility performance, 
environmental performance as well as financial performance and answered 
specific questions related to these different performances. Based on the 
data received we will now ask you to come up with an overall evaluation of 
XYZ as potential investment and estimate XYZ’s fundamental value.  
The directions in the other two conditions started without this clarification. As dependent 
variable, participants in all conditions then had to estimate the firm’s FVPS using a residual 
earnings model. For this purpose, participants were provided with a prepared Excel sheet to 
calculate the model based on their estimates for the firm’s income of the next four periods, the 
rate of the cost of capital, and the long-term growth rate (Penman 2009). After two question sets 
on their personal willingness to invest and their expectations of other investor’s willingness to 
invest, all participants were asked to store their materials in an envelope and proceed with the 
third envelope that contained questions about this particular case, the participants’ general atti-
tudes, demographics, and the manipulation checks. Participants finished their participation and 
collected their fixed payment of $15 (respectively CHF 20).  
IV. Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Consistent with EJPW, and to check whether participants understood that the firm showed 
a positive CSR performance, I asked participants whether the firm’s social (environmental) per-
formance was above, about, or below the industry average. 84.2% (92.1%) of the participants 
answered this question correctly for the social (environmental) performance.6 These values are 
comparable to the ones in EJPW.  
Because EJPW report an outlier problem, I check whether my data is also affected by 
outliers. Figure 3, Panel A through C, shows histograms for my three conditions.  
  
                                                 
6 Analyzing only participants having provided correct answers to these questions does not change my inferences.  
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Figure 3: Histograms by Condition 
Panel A: Condition 1 “No Explicit Assessment” 
 
Panel B: Condition 2 “Explicit Assessment” 
 
Panel C: Condition 3 “Modified Explicit Assessment” 
 
Notes: Estimates of the firm’s fundamental value per share (FVPS) as calculated by the template provided.  
The dashed line marks the cutoff for outliers (FVPS > 60). 
Based on these, participants with FVPS estimates higher than 60 are discarded for the 
parametric tests. This still means that I can use data from 85 participants for the conditions for 
the replication of the EJPW study (33 participants). 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of my dependent variable (FVPS). They are similar 
to the ones from EJPW: means are 22.83 in the “No Explicit Assessment” condition, 22.07 in 
the “Explicit Assessment” condition, and 23.11 in the “Modified Explicit Assessment” condi-
tion (Table 1, Panel A). While this pattern rather resembles the “v” predicted in H2, differences 
between conditions are relatively small.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Mean, Median, (Standard Deviation), [Observations]) for Estimates of FVPS 
Dependent Variable: FVPS Condition  
 
No Explicit 
Assessment 
(1) 
Explicit 
Assessment 
(2) 
Modified Explicit 
Assessment  
(3) 
 
Panel A: Complete Sample 
   
 22.83 22.07 23.11 
 21.25 20.60 20.96 
 (11.79) (8.47) (9.10) 
 [44] [41] [46] 
 
Panel C: US Sample 
   
 22.50 21.35 22.68 
 20.57 20.66 20.24 
 (11.01) (5.64) (9.27) 
 [28] [25] [28] 
 
Panel B: Swiss Sample 
   
 23.40 23.20 23.78 
 22.56 19.84 22.27 
 (13.41) (11.75) (9.06) 
 [16] [16] [18] 
Note: Participants’ estimates of the firm’s FVPS as calculated by the Excel sheet provided. 
Tests of Hypotheses 
The two competing hypotheses predict two different patterns of results over the three con-
ditions. H1 predicts that investors who do not explicitly assess a CSR performance estimate a 
firm’s fundamental value higher than investors who explicitly assess CSR performance when 
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CSR performance is positive. It further predicts that clarifying the conversational context of the 
explicit assessment does not have an additional effect. While H2 predicts the same first effect, 
it additionally predicts a second effect in the opposite direction of the first effect. Specifically, 
according to H2 clarifying the conversational context of the explicit assessment moves inves-
tors’ estimates of a firm’s fundamental value towards estimates without an explicit assessment.  
I use pairwise comparisons of the condition means to test my hypotheses. Table 2, Panel 
A, reports the results of the t-tests; Table 2, Panel B and C, shows an overview of the stepwise 
comparisons.  
Table 2: Tests of Hypotheses 
Panel A: t-Tests   
Dependent Variable: FVPS  Condition  
 
No  
Explicit  
Assessment 
Explicit  
Assessment 
Modified  
Explicit  
Assessment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Conditions (1) vs. (2) 
22.83 vs. 22.07 
t = .337, 
p = .737 
 
Conditions (2) vs. (3)  
22.07 vs. 23.11 
t = -.547, 
p = .586 
Conditions (1) vs. (3) 
22.83 vs. 23.11 
t = -.126, 
p = .900 
Panel B: H1 (Affect Explanation)  
 Prediction  
Step 1: (1) > (2) Not supported 
Step 2: (2) = (3) Not rejected 
Panel C: H2 (Speech Act Explanation)  
 Prediction  
Step 1: (1) > (2) Not supported 
Step 2: (2) < (3) Not supported 
Note: Estimates of the firm’s FVPS as calculated by the Excel sheet provided.  
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Both hypotheses first predict that means of FVPS are higher in the “No Explicit Assess-
ment” than in the “Explicit Assessment” condition. Finding support for this effect is key to this 
study because its goal is the test of two alternative explanations for this effect. While descriptive 
results are consistent with this prediction (22.83 vs. 22.07), this difference is statistically not 
significant (t = .34, p = .74). Because I am unable to find results corroborating this first effect 
and both H1 and H2 critically depend on it, I cannot find empirical support for both hypotheses. 
Importantly, this implies that I am unable to replicate the effect of EJPW.  
For reasons of completeness, I still report tests for the second parts of H1 and H2. While 
“Modified Explicit Assessment” has a directionally higher mean than “Explicit Assessment” 
(23.11 vs. 22.07), this effect is not statistically significant either (t = .55, p = .59). In addition, 
means of “No Assessment” and “Modified Explicit Assessment” are statistically not different 
either (22.83 vs. 23.11, t = .13, p = .90).  
Finally, similar to EJPW I use a non-parametric test. However, untabulated Wilcoxon 
rank-sum tests including outliers do not suggest any differences between conditions either (all 
z ≤ .51, p ≥ .61).  
Supplementary Analysis 
Differences between US and Swiss Participants 
In a supplementary analysis, I test whether there exist differences between the US and the 
Swiss sample. Means (Table 1, Panel B and C) for “No Explicit Assessment” are 22.50 for US 
and 23.40 for Swiss participants; for “Explicit Assessment”, they are 21.35 for US and 23.20 
for Swiss participants, and for “Modified Explicit Assessment”, they are 22.68 (US), respec-
tively 23.78 (Swiss).  
Although means generally seem to be higher for Swiss, participants, comparing Swiss and 
US participants within each condition does not yield significant differences (all tests 
untabulated): “No Explicit Assessment” (t = .58, p = .56), “Explicit Assessment” (t = .71, 
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p = .48), and “Modified Explicit Assessment” (t = .44, p = .66). Also collapsed across condition, 
the difference is statistically not significant (t = .68, p = .50). 
More importantly, similar to the collapsed sample, means between conditions are not sig-
nificantly different when compared separately for US and Swiss participants: “No Explicit As-
sessment” vs. “Explicit Assessment” (US: t = .47, p = .64; Swiss: t = .04, p = .97), “Explicit 
Assessment” vs. “Modified Explicit Assessment” (US: t = .62, p = .54; Swiss: t = .16, p = .87), 
and “No Explicit Assessment” vs. “Modified Explicit Assessment” (US: t = .07, p = .95; Swiss: 
t = .10, p = .92). Thus, H1 and H2 both are not supported regardless of the sample used.  
V. Conclusion 
This study aimed at providing and testing an alternative explanation for the interesting 
findings and potentially far-reaching implications of EJPW. While the authors provide an affect-
based explanation for their results, I suggested that these are caused by the design and structure 
of their questionnaire. An alternative theory claims that participants might have subtracted some 
“part” of their overall “whole” assessment of the firm’s value to comply with Grice’s (1975) 
“Cooperative Principle” and, specifically, to avoid giving redundant answers. To claim support 
for my alternative and competing explanation rooted in speech act theory, my goal was to undo 
the effect of an explicit assessment by clarifying the conversational context while assuring a 
correct attribution of any potential affective reaction. Thus, I tried to replicate EJPW’s effect 
and to undo it in an additional condition with a modified explicit assessment. 
To test my alternative explanation, I first conducted the study with 51 students in Swit-
zerland. I recruited additional 91 business administration students from a large public US uni-
versity to increase the statistical power and to very similar participants as EJPW. Despite the 
sample size being relatively large compared to the one used by EJPW, in neither sample sepa-
rately nor in the combined sample can I find statistically significant differences between condi-
tions. This implies that I am unable to replicate the first effect reported by EJPW for which I 
wanted to test an alternative explanation.  
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Although this study cannot make the (methodological) contribution it was intended to 
make, the non-findings are certainly relevant for CSR accounting research. Replication studies 
are important to revalidate scientific discoveries and serve as important protection against neg-
ative consequences from publication bias. Problems of lacking replication studies are well-dis-
cussed (Salterio 2014) and calls for them can be increasingly encountered within the accounting 
community (Dyckman and Zeff 2014; Shields 2015) and outside of it (Open Science Collabo-
ration 2015). Whereas other research has shown that EJPW’s findings might not generalize to 
investment professionals (Arnold, Hörner, Martin, and Moser 2018), this study suggests that the 
results from EJPW may not be very robust for non-professional participants either (Guiral et al. 
2017). Thus, conclusions from this study should be drawn very cautiously, particularly, if they 
are based on the premise that CSR performance information is merely working through affective 
reactions of investors.   
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Abstract:  
We conduct an experiment to examine German and US investment professionals’ use of corpo-
rate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures when making personal investment decisions and 
investment recommendations to clients. We predict and find that both groups assess higher  
financial performance and invest more when positive CSR information is disclosed than when 
no CSR information is disclosed. However, these differences are only significant for German 
investment professionals. When CSR information is disclosed, both groups’ assessments of CSR 
performance significantly affect their investment decisions. However, US investment profes-
sionals appear to require a higher level of assessed CSR performance than Germans before they 
increase their investments in response to disclosed CSR information as compared to when no 
CSR information is disclosed. Importantly, we also predict and find that both groups’ investment 
behavior is not only affected by the expected financial effects of CSR activities on the firm, but 
also by the value they place on the societal benefits of the CSR activities. Finally, we find that 
when making investment recommendations to clients both groups use CSR information in  
essentially the same manner as they do when making personal investment decisions. Our find-
ings have implications for researchers studying the empirical interrelation between CSR perfor-
mance, financial performance, and investment behavior, as well as for standard setters and in-
vestors. 
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I. Introduction 
Recent review studies examining the association between corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) performance and financial performance suggest that this association may be small but 
significantly positive, albeit such research also reports conflicting findings (Brooks and 
Oikonomou 2018; Friede, Busch, and Bassen 2015; Lu and Taylor 2016; Margolis, Elfenbein, 
and Walsh 2009; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003). While this suggests that investment pro-
fessionals may consider CSR performance information relevant for investing decisions, there 
are many unanswered questions about how this influential and important group of investors use 
CSR performance information. First, we do not know whether investment professionals expect 
disclosed positive CSR performance to affect financial performance or the extent to which such 
expectations influence their investment decisions. Second, we know little about whether and 
how disclosed CSR performance information influences professional investors’ investment de-
cisions for reasons beyond any expected financial effects. More specifically, we do not know 
whether and how investment professionals’ personal perceptions of a firm’s disclosed CSR per-
formance combines with their personal beliefs about the benefits of CSR activities for society 
to influence their investment decisions. Third, we do not know whether investment profession-
als’ personal views about CSR influence their investment recommendations to clients (Ioannou 
and Serafeim 2015; Luo, Wang, Raithel, and Zheng 2015). Our study addresses these questions 
using data collected from both German and US investment professionals. 
Some prior experimental studies using non-professional investors as participants suggest 
that investors may respond positively to CSR performance disclosures beyond any expected 
effect on financial performance because they value the societal benefits associated with CSR 
activities (Riedl and Smeets 2017; Martin and Moser 2016). Thus, investors’ preferences for the 
societal benefits of CSR and any expected effect on financial performance could jointly affect 
investment decisions. Moreover, as preferences for the societal benefits of CSR likely differ 
across individuals, countries or cultures (KPMG 2011; BNY 2012; Amel-Zadeh and Serafeim 
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2017), such differences could help explain prior mixed evidence on investor reaction to CSR 
performance.  
We use experienced investment professionals from Germany and the US as participants 
in our experiment for several reasons. First, experienced investment professionals may use CSR 
performance information in ways different from the non-professional investors used as partici-
pants in most prior experimental studies. Second, investment professionals are likely to have an 
outsized effect on market prices. Finally, because investment professionals often recommend 
investments to clients or make investment decisions on their behalf, it is important to understand 
whether and how their personal use of CSR information influences their decisions on behalf of 
their clients. In our experiment, the investment professional participants serve as both 1) highly 
sophisticated personal investors, and 2) professional financial intermediaries who provide in-
vestment advice to less sophisticated clients. Because we collect separate data sets from German 
and US investment professionals, we are able to investigate whether these separate groups make 
similar or different investment decisions and use similar or different decision processes.  
There are several reasons why it is challenging to address our research questions using 
archival data. First, it is difficult to isolate investors’ reaction to CSR disclosures because other 
disclosures and events relevant to firm value occur simultaneously. Second, even if investors’ 
reaction to CSR disclosures can be isolated and documented, it is difficult to determine the rea-
son(s) for this reaction. This is especially true if, in addition to expected financial effects, the 
reaction is influenced by investors’ preferences for the societal benefits of CSR activities and 
this reaction varies across individuals. Finally, it is difficult to use archival data to examine 
individual investment professionals’ personal investment decisions and to compare those deci-
sions to their investment recommendations to clients.  
We overcome the challenges of using archival data noted above by exploiting several ad-
vantages of experiments. First, we are able to isolate the impact of CSR disclosures on invest-
ment choices by manipulating rather than measuring the presence or absence of such disclosures. 
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Second, because our investment professionals explicitly assess both CSR performance and fi-
nancial performance (in counter-balanced order), and also indicate the extent to which they be-
lieve that CSR activities provide important societal benefits, we are able to isolate the incremen-
tal effect of each of these factors on their investment decisions. Third, because we use invest-
ment professionals as participants, we can examine how and why such individual experienced 
investment professionals respond to CSR disclosures rather than only how investors as a group 
respond as is done in capital market archival studies. Finally, we are able to examine whether 
and how investment professionals’ personal beliefs and attitudes regarding a firm’s CSR activ-
ities influence their recommendations to clients. 
Our first hypothesis predicts that professional investors expect that good CSR perfor-
mance increases a firm’s financial performance and, therefore, that they expect better financial 
performance when a firm discloses positive CSR performance information than when no CSR 
performance is disclosed. Consistent with this prediction, a between-condition comparison finds 
that investment professionals assess financial performance to be higher when positive CSR per-
formance is disclosed (CSR condition) than when it is not (No CSR condition), although this 
difference is only statistically significant for our German participants. However, using data only 
within the CSR condition, we find a positive and significant effect of investment professionals 
assessed CSR performance on assessed financial performance for both German and US invest-
ment professionals. While these within condition results show that both German and US invest-
ment professionals’ assessments of CSR performance affect their assessments of financial per-
formance, the difference in results between the CSR and No CSR conditions for the US and 
German participants suggests that US investment professionals require a higher level of assessed 
CSR performance before expecting a corresponding increase in financial performance. 
Our second hypothesis predicts that investment professional’s higher assessed CSR per-
formance leads to more investment for two reasons, i.e., they believe that higher CSR perfor-
mance increases financial performance and that higher CSR performance yields more societal 
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benefits. Thus, we expect more investment when a firm discloses positive CSR performance 
information than when it does not. Consistent with this prediction, a between-condition com-
parison finds that both German and US investment professionals invest more in the CSR condi-
tion than in the No CSR condition, although this difference is not significant for the total sample 
of US participants. However, when we split the US participants into subsets based on the extent 
to which they believe CSR activities provide important societal benefits, we find that those at 
or above the median invest significantly more when positive CSR information is disclosed than 
when it is not. The combined findings that this subgroup invests more but does not expect sig-
nificantly higher financial performance when a firm discloses positive CSR performance is con-
sistent with our prediction that factors other than expected financial performance affect the in-
vestment decisions of at least some portion of investment professionals. This issue is examined 
further in the tests of our final hypothesis. 
Our final hypothesis predicts that investment professionals’ assessment of CSR perfor-
mance will positively affect their investment decisions beyond any expected financial effect 
because they value the societal benefits of CSR activities. We find support for this hypothesis for 
both German and US investment professionals. That is, using data from within the CSR condi-
tion, we find that for both groups, higher assessed CSR performance leads to higher investments 
through both an indirect path via expected financial performance and a direct path after control-
ling for expected financial performance.1 Importantly, we show that this direct effect of assessed 
CSR performance on investment is driven by the value that investment professionals’ place on 
the societal benefits associated with the firm’s CSR activities. Moreover, this direct effect of 
assessed CSR performance on the amount of investment is significantly larger than the indirect 
effect operating through the effect of assessed CSR performance on financial performance. 
                                                 
1 A possible additional explanation for investment professionals’ use of CSR performance information in their 
investment decisions is their expectation regarding how other investors will respond to CSR performance infor-
mation. As explained in our results section, we rule out this alternative explanation for our results by measuring 
and controlling for this possibility for our US participants. 
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Regarding our research question, we find that both our German and US investment pro-
fessionals use disclosed CSR information in essentially the same way when making recommen-
dations to clients as when making their own investment decisions, although the recommended 
investment amounts are slightly lower than the personal investment amounts. That is, both 
groups’ investment decisions and recommendations to clients reflect their expectations regard-
ing the effect of CSR performance on financial performance as well as their personal views 
regarding the societal benefits of CSR activities. 
Overall, our findings expand our understanding of how investment professionals use CSR 
disclosures in their personal investment decisions and when acting as financial intermediaries 
for clients. Investment professionals use CSR disclosures to assess the firm’s CSR performance, 
which in turn affects the amount they invest in the firm for two reasons. First, consistent with 
standard economic reasoning, on average, investment professionals expect better CSR perfor-
mance to increase financial performance, which leads to more investment. However, and more 
importantly, beyond the expected effect on financial performance, investment professional’s 
investment amounts are heavily influenced by the value they place on the societal benefits of a 
firm’s CSR activities. Specifically, we show that the extent to which they believe that CSR 
activities provide important benefits for society represents an important predictor of how they 
use CSR disclosures in their personal investment decisions and when making recommendations 
to clients.  
The findings described above inform the long-running academic debate regarding the link 
between CSR performance, financial performance, and investment. We provide clear evidence 
that the effect of perceived CSR performance on financial performance cannot fully explain 
investors’ response to CSR performance. Rather, individual beliefs about the degree to which 
CSR activities provide important societal benefits also help explain investment decisions. More-
over, because such beliefs differ across individuals, countries, and/or cultures, identical financial 
and CSR performance disclosures can lead to different investment decisions. Consistent with 
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this perspective, although our results show that German and US investors react very similarly 
to differences within each group in how investors assess CSR performance, we also provide 
evidence that disclosure of identical CSR information can still lead to differences between the 
groups in investment amounts. These insights should help standard setters decide whether to 
require or encourage firms to disclose CSR information and also what types of disclosures might 
be most useful. Given how investment professionals use CSR disclosures, it would appear that 
investors would benefit from better information regarding how CSR performance affects finan-
cial performance and how a firm’s CSR activities benefit society. 
Our results also have potentially important implications for those who receive investment 
advice from investment professionals. Given our finding that investment professionals’ use CSR 
information in the same way when making recommendations to their clients as when making 
their own personal investment decisions, those relying on investment professionals for invest-
ment recommendations should be aware that the advice they receive reflects such personal 
influences.  
Finally, we extend the findings of Elliott, Jackson, Peecher and White (2014) by showing 
that their finding that non-professional investors’ decisions are not affected by CSR disclosures 
when they are explicitly asked to first evaluate CSR performance does not necessarily hold for 
sophisticated investment professionals. We find that CSR disclosures influence investment pro-
fessionals’ investment decisions and recommendations whether they explicitly assess CSR per-
formance before or after they make their investment decisions. 
The next section develops our hypotheses and research questions; section 3 describes the 
method; section 4 reports our results; and section 5 concludes. 
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II. Theory and Development of Hypotheses and Research Question 
As suggested earlier, positive CSR performance could potentially provide financial bene-
fits for firms. For example, CSR activities appear to help attract and retain superior employees 
(Balakrishnan, Sprinkle, and Williamson 2011), increase employee effort by boosting employee 
morale (Bhattacharya, Sen, and Korschun 2008), increase customer satisfaction and revenue 
(Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan 2010), lower energy costs (Rangan, Chase, and Karim 
2015), reduce the risk of negative publicity or government regulation (Paine 2000), lower the 
cost of capital (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang 2011; El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra 
2011; Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2014; Goss and Robert 2011), represent a strategic com-
petitive advantage (Porter and Kramer 2011), or provide a way for firms to signal stronger future 
financial performance (Lys, Naughton, and Wang 2015). 
Of course, even if CSR activities are associated with financial benefits for the firm, this 
does not ensure that engaging in such activities will necessarily result in increased financial 
performance because the cost of such activities could outweigh the financial benefits. Further, 
investors may believe that there are (are not) financial benefits for the firm irrespective of 
whether such net financial benefits actually exist. That is, perceptions may not correspond with 
reality. Many studies have tested for an overall connection between CSR performance and fi-
nancial performance. While the empirical evidence is mixed, the more recent meta-analyses of 
such work conclude that there is likely a small positive effect of CSR performance on financial 
performance (Brooks and Oikonomou 2018; Lu and Taylor 2016; Friede et al. 2015; Margolis 
et al. 2009; Orlitzky et al. 2003). Based on this prior research, we expect investment profession-
als to believe that better CSR performance increases a firm’s financial performance. Conse-
quently, we predict that when a firm discloses positive CSR performance information, invest-
ment professionals assess financial performance higher than when no CSR information is 
provided.  
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Thus, our first hypothesis is: 
H1: Investment professionals assess financial performance higher when 
a firm discloses positive CSR performance information than when no 
CSR information is provided. 
There are two reasons to expect the disclosure of positive CSR performance information 
to increase investment professionals’ willingness to invest. First, if investment professionals 
expect positive CSR performance to result in better financial performance (as predicted in H1), 
standard economic reasoning suggests that their investment decisions would also be positively 
affected by positive CSR performance information. That is, if positive CSR performance infor-
mation increases investment professionals’ expectations regarding financial performance, and 
expected financial performance, in turn, affects their investment decisions, we would expect to 
see a positive link between assessed CSR performance and investment amounts mediated by the 
assessed financial performance.  
Second, investment professionals may be more willing to invest in firms that disclose 
positive CSR performance for reasons beyond the effect of positive CSR information on ex-
pected financial performance. The substantial and growing interest in socially responsible 
investing indicates that an increasing number of investors may value the societal benefits asso-
ciated with a firm’s CSR activities rather than basing their investment decisions solely on 
expected financial performance. The Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (2016) recently 
reported that approximately $12 trillion in assets were invested using socially responsible strat-
egies in Europe and $8.7 trillion were invested using such strategies in the United States. Recent 
academic research also suggests that investment decisions may reflect the value investors place 
on the societal benefits of a firm’s CSR activities. For example, Martin and Moser (2016) pro-
vide experimental evidence that non-professional investors pay more for the stock of a company 
that makes and discloses an investment to reduce carbon emissions even though this investment 
lowers firm profit. Likewise, Renneboog, Horst, and Zhang (2008) review the socially respon-
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sible investing (SRI) literature and conclude that “the existing studies hint but do not unequiv-
ocally demonstrate that SRI investors are willing to accept suboptimal financial performance to 
pursue social or ethical objectives.” 
Based on the reasoning and prior research described above, we expect that a higher as-
sessment of CSR performance leads to higher investment. Consequently, when a firm discloses 
positive CSR performance information, investors will invest more than when no CSR infor-
mation is disclosed. We formally state this second hypothesis as: 
H2: Investment professionals are more willing to invest when a firm  
discloses positive CSR performance information than when it does not 
disclose CSR information. 
If investment professionals’ investment decisions reflect the value they place on the soci-
etal benefits associated with a firm’s disclosed CSR activities (as suggested in the development 
of H2), there will be an incremental effect of CSR performance information on investment pro-
fessionals’ willingness to invest after controlling for any perceived effect of CSR performance 
on financial performance. Recent academic research suggests that the general investor popula-
tion may indeed make investment decisions based on factors outside of the typical economic 
framework such as moral and ethical considerations and social preferences (e.g., Lewis and 
Mackenzie 2000; Lewis 2001; Glac 2009; Renneboog et al. 2008; Riedl and Smeets 2017).2  
Although there is some prior evidence that non-professional investors use CSR infor-
mation in their investment decisions because they value the associated societal benefits, it is 
unclear whether such findings extend to experienced investment professionals. It is possible that 
investment professionals’ experience could make them less likely than non-professional inves-
tors to base their decisions on considerations other than financial performance. However, based 
on the preponderance of the prior evidence, we expect that a substantial portion of investment 
professionals will consider CSR performance when making investment decisions because they 
                                                 
2 Cf. also Huang and Watson (2015) for a related discussion and Friedman and Heinle (2016) for an analytical 
model assuming that social preference matter.  
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value the societal benefits of CSR activities beyond any effect on financial performance. This 
leads to our third hypotheses: 
H3: Investment professionals’ assessments of CSR performance will 
positively affect their willingness to invest beyond any perceived effect 
on financial performance.  
Investment professionals often act as financial intermediaries who make recommenda-
tions to clients (e.g. investment advisors or analysts) or invest directly on clients’ behalf 
(e.g. fund managers). Thus, an important question is whether their investment recommendations 
to clients are the same or different from their personal investment decisions. The answer to this 
question likely depends on the reason(s) why investment professionals use CSR information 
when making personal investment decisions.  
Specifically, if investment professionals are personally more willing to invest when a firm 
discloses positive CSR performance because they believe a firm’s CSR activities improve its 
financial performance, it is likely that they would make recommendations to clients similar to 
their own personal investment decisions. However, if investment professionals are personally 
willing to invest in firms with positive CSR performance because they value the societal benefits 
of CSR activities beyond any impact on financial performance, it is unclear whether they would 
be willing to make recommendations that are consistent with their personal investment deci-
sions. On the one hand, their fiduciary responsibility to their clients could make them less will-
ing to recommend investments based on their personal attitudes regarding the societal benefits 
of CSR activities. On the other hand, prior research in psychology suggests that individuals are 
often more willing to commit others to a cause for the common good than they are to commit 
themselves (Pronin, Olivola, and Kennedy 2008). Thus, we investigate the following research 
question:  
RQ: When a firm discloses positive CSR information, do financial  
intermediaries make investment recommendations to clients that are 
consistent with, or different from, their personal investment decisions? 
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III. Method 
Participants 
Our participants are 81 members of an association of German investment professionals3 
and 87 US investment professionals who are alumni of a large US public university business 
school. Potential German participants were pre-selected by the association according to their 
occupation. Potential US participants were prescreened to be investment professionals by the 
alumni office and contacted in advance about their willingness to participate in a research study 
without being informed about the purpose or any details of the study. Only participants who 
indicated their willingness to participate in the study received a follow-up invitation. Potential 
participants were then solicited via email sent by the association (German participants) or one 
of the researchers on behalf of the alumni organization (US participants).4 Table 1 provides 
information about our participants.  
As shown in Panel A of Table 1, 90 German investment professionals and 89 US invest-
ment professionals completed the experiment.5 Nine German participants and two US partici-
pants are excluded from our final data set because they either never reviewed any of the infor-
mation provided about the firm or did not review such information until after they had indicated 
their willingness to invest and their recommendation to a client (three participants). The remain-
ing 81 German investment professionals and 87 US investment professionals are included in our 
final data set. These participants are affiliated with many different financial firms and thus they 
                                                 
3 While this association may have German-speaking non-German members (e.g. from Austria or Switzerland), we 
refer to our sample as German because only four participants did not answer that their nationality was German.  
4 In Germany, the email was sent to 1,285 email addresses. However, some of these email addresses were outdated 
and some members have more than one email address. Because 90 investment professionals completed our exper-
iment, a very conservative estimate of our response rate is 7.0 percent (90/1285). In the US, the email was sent out 
to 679 email addresses. As 89 investment professionals completed the experiment, the US response rate is 13.1 
percent (89/679). The response rate is likely higher in the US than in Germany because the US participants were 
pre-contacted about their willingness to participate in the study. 
5 Overall, 142 (127) participants accessed the specific instructions and therefore started the experiment in Germany 
(the US). 52 (38) of them did not finish the study. Excluding participants who dropped out because they appear to 
have misunderstood the technical instructions that they could not re-enter the experiment at a later point in time, 
the dropout rate of the experiment is 29.7 percent (25.2 percent) in Germany (the US) which is below the average 
dropout rate of online experiments of about 35% (Reips 2000). Importantly, drop-out rates are insignificantly  
different across conditions (χ2 test, all p’s > .40). 
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represent a broad range of views regarding CSR rather than the views promoted by a small 
number of large financial firms. 
Table 1: Sample Description 
 
German US 
Panel A: Number of Participants   
Study Completed Total n = 90 n = 89 
 Financials only n = 35 n = 32 
 CSR n = 55 n = 57 
Participants Excluded Total n = 9 n = 2 
 Reason for exclusion   
 No review of data at all n = 6 n = 2 
 Review of financial data only after an-
swering willingness to invest questions  
n = 3  
Final Sample Total n = 81 n = 87 
 Financials only n = 30 n = 32 
 CSR  n = 51 n = 55 
Panel B: Participants by Occupation (Final Sample) 
Occupation % % 
Fund manager  30.86 34.48 
Financial analyst 27.16 27.59 
Investment advisor  20.99 24.14 
Other type of analyst (fund analyst, credit analyst) 3.70 .00 
Other (e.g., risk manager, product developer, product manager) 17.28 13.79 
Panel C: Participants’ Experience in Investment Valuation (Final Sample) 
Years of Investment Valuation Experience % % 
Less than 5 years 22.22 29.88 
5 to 9 years 23.46 42.53 
10 to 14 years 13.58 18.40 
15 to 19 years 7.41 2.30 
20 to 24 years 11.11 2.30 
25 years and more  22.22 4.60 
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Panel B of Table 1 classifies our participants by their position in their firm. Most German 
and US participants are fund managers (German = 31%; US = 34%), financial analysts (German 
= 27%; US = 28%), or investment advisors (German = 21%; US = 24%).6 Panel C of Table 1 
shows that our investment professionals have substantial investment valuation experience. Ger-
man participants have mean investment valuation experience of 13 years and mean overall ex-
perience of 18 years. US participants have mean investment valuation experience of 8 years and 
mean overall professional experience of 9 years. Thus, we view our investment professionals as 
appropriate participants to serve as professional personal investors and as financial intermedi-
aries who make investment recommendations to clients. Finally, nine percent of our participants 
are female. There are no significant differences across our experimental conditions (described 
below) for experience in investment valuation, overall professional experience, nationality or 
gender (all p’s > .40). 
Design  
We use a 1x2 experimental design, manipulating the presence/absence of CSR infor-
mation between participants, resulting in a No CSR condition and a CSR condition. In the No 
CSR condition, participants had access to financial information relevant for an investment de-
cision. In the CSR condition, participants had access to the same financial information and ad-
ditional information regarding the firm’s CSR activities. We repeat our experimental design and 
procedures separately for our two participant groups of German and US investment profession-
als.7 
                                                 
6 Participants are classified based on the occupation they indicated on the post-experiment questionnaire. Partici-
pants indicating “other occupation” and providing details about their occupation are re-classified into another specific 
category when possible. 
7 The experiment with German participants included an additional “picture” manipulation nested within the CSR 
condition that was not included in the experiment with US participants. Specifically, one-half of the German par-
ticipants in the CSR condition were provided with a psychologically appealing picture related to each of the two 
broad categories of numerical CSR information provided to participants (environmental information and infor-
mation about employees; details provided later), while the other half of German participants in the CSR condition 
received the numerical CSR information without any pictures. Because we found no significant effects of this 
picture manipulation on any of our variables of interest in the German data, we did not include this manipulation 
when collecting our US data. Given the lack of effect of our picture manipulation, we combine the German data 
with and without pictures into a single CSR condition and do not consider this manipulation further.  
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Overview of Experiment  
In both the No CSR and CSR conditions, participants read background information about 
the firm and had access to financial performance data, while only the participants in the CSR 
condition had access to the CSR performance data. After reading the information participants 
had access to in their respective conditions, participants indicated the amount they would be 
willing to personally invest in the firm and the amount of investment they would recommend to 
a client. These amounts represent our primary dependent variables.  
After collecting the primary dependent measures described above, participants responded 
to a series of questions designed to help us understand how participants’ used CSR information 
when making their personal investment decisions or their investment recommendations to a  
client. Specifically, participants provided their assessment of 1) the firm’s current and longer-
term financial performance, 2) the firm’s CSR performance (only participants in the CSR con-
dition made this assessment as information regarding the firm’s CSR activities is needed to 
make this assessment), and 3) the extent to which they believed that a firm’s CSR activities 
provide important societal benefits. In addition, US participants indicated how they believed 
other stock market investors would respond to the disclosed CSR performance information. Fi-
nally, participants responded to several demographic questions. Next, we describe our experi-
mental instrument and data collection procedures in more detail.  
Detailed Procedures  
When our investment professionals accessed the web-link in the message inviting them to 
participate, they were randomly assigned to one of our experimental conditions. The appendix 
contains the firm background and financial information provided to all participants in all condi-
tions and the CSR information provided only to the participants in the CSR condition.  
The background information describes Furniturama, a hypothetical manufacturer and re-
tailer of furniture. Participants learn about the firm’s market, products, input materials, supply 
chain, and a recent expansion of its product mix. Importantly, this background information does 
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not include any information about the firm’s CSR activities or how such activities might relate 
to its products or financial performance. We did this to avoid confounding our manipulation of 
CSR information and because we suggest as part of our underlying theory that investors likely 
develop such connections themselves.  
The financial information includes income statements, the three main categories from the 
cash flow statement, and some performance and capital structure ratios for a 3-year period, along 
with annual percentage changes. Participants were also told that the firm has a typical industry 
earnings multiple but were not given other stock market data as our main focus is on investment 
professionals’ fundamental valuations of financial and CSR disclosures. Overall, the financial 
data reflect a slight increase in revenues over the last three years and a rather stable profit mar-
gin.  
The CSR performance information includes numerical data for environmental and em-
ployee issues. Any effect of past CSR performance on current financial performance is already 
reflected in the financial information provided. As with the financial information, participants 
receive three years of CSR data and the annual percentage changes for each individual item. The 
CSR information also included the industry average and range for each item.8 To aid in pro-
cessing, the disclosure indicates whether higher or lower numbers reflect more environmentally 
friendly or employee friendly performance. Overall, the CSR data indicate that performance in 
both CSR categories (environment and employees) improves over the 3-year period. In the first 
year, all CSR measures start at a level that is slightly better than the industry average. In subse-
quent years, performance improvements are such that two of the four measures in each broad 
CSR category reach the top 10 percent and the other two measures reach the top 20 percent in 
the industry if industry performance is equally distributed. Participants could freely choose to 
review the financial and CSR information at any point in the study after it was initially provided, 
                                                 
8 Information on industry average was included to provide a relevant benchmark for the firm’s CSR activities. 
While CSR reports may not always include such information, we include it to proxy for the general knowledge of 
industry CSR performance that we believe investment professionals have in actual investment decision settings.   
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including when they were answering any subsequent questions. To ensure the relevance and 
realism of the financial and CSR performance information provided, we had three senior invest-
ment professionals with expertise in CSR who did not participate in the subsequent experiment 
review our materials. We made slight adjustments based on their feedback.  
The experiment was administered online in order to gain access to the necessary partici-
pant pool of senior investment professionals as suggested by Harrison and List (2004). To de-
crease the likelihood of uncontrolled factors influencing our results (Charness, Harvy, and 
Sonsino 2007), we followed the recommendations of Reips (2000) for conducting online exper-
iments. Specifically, we carefully controlled the pool of participants (Birnbaum 2004; Charness 
et al. 2007) by requiring participants to use a personal access code embedded in a web link 
leading to the experiment (Birnbaum 2004). The link prevented participants from entering the 
experiment more than once, thereby reducing the risk of sampling biases. As reported in our 
earlier footnote, the drop-out rate for our experiment is below the average drop-out rate for 
online experiments, reducing concerns about self-selection (Reips 2000).9  
We assured the participants that their responses would be anonymous, and described the 
study in general terms to deter participants from forming implicit expectations when analyzing 
the information provided and giving their responses. The experimental instructions emphasized 
that participants should only start the experiment if they had sufficient time to complete it. In 
addition, the instructions emphasized that participants should complete the study alone and not 
talk to others while participating in the study or after they had participated.  
                                                 
9 We also used the early–late respondents’ test to detect possible response bias (Armstrong and Overton 1977). An 
underlying assumption of this test is the similarity of late respondents and non-respondents such that a systematic 
non-response bias would become apparent by comparing late respondents to early respondents. We compared the 
earliest and latest one-third of responses for all our dependent and process variables and found no significant dif-
ferences between early and late responses (all p’s > .40). We also compared the earliest and latest one-third of 
responses for the time invested in the experiment (p = .655), whether participants were interested in getting a report 
of the results (p = .244), and the type of reward requested, i.e., Amazon gift card versus donation (p = .955) and 
found no significant differences. These findings suggest that our data do not reflect any significant non-response 
bias. 
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We offered participants a report on the findings from our study and a payment for their 
participation. For the payment, participants could choose between an Amazon gift card for €35 
(German participants) or $35 (US participants), or a donation to one of three charities (a foun-
dation fighting cancer, a foundation fighting hunger and poverty, and a research institution) for 
the same amount. The organizations to which the donation could be made were not disclosed 
until the end of the experiment to prevent participants from deciding whether to participate based 
on their preferences for specific charities.  
Measures 
Our primary dependent variables are the amount that participants indicated they were will-
ing to invest in the firm and the amount they indicated that they would recommend as an invest-
ment to a client. The questions used to collect these measures are shown in Panel A of Table 2. 
In addition, we collect two important measures we expect to help to understand the investors’ 
reasoning: participants’ assessment of the firms’ financial performance and their assessment of 
the firm’s CSR performance. The questions used to collect these measures are shown in Panels 
B and C of Table 2, respectively. As can be seen in Panel B, participants assessed both the firms’ 
current and long-term financial performance. As can be seen in Panel C, participants assessed 
the firm’s performance on both environmental and employee issues, as well as the firm’s overall 
performance on environmental and employee issues combined. We also collect a critical ex-
pected moderator of our main predictions. Specifically, participants indicate the degree to which 
they believe firms’ CSR activities provide important societal benefits in general. The questions 
used to collect this measure are shown in Panel D of Table 2. For the US sample, we also meas-
ured participants’ beliefs regarding the effect of the firm’s CSR activities on other investors’ 
decisions to invest. The questions to collect this measure are shown in Panel E of Table 2.  
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Table 2: Measurement of Key Measures 
Panel A: Willingness to Invest 
INVPERSONAL 
Assume that you have decided to invest 5% of your personal investment 
portfolio [i.e., 10,000 € ($)] in the furniture industry. How much of this 
10,000 € ($) amount would you be willing to invest in Furniturama?  
[in ,000 € ($)] 
INVCLIENT 
Assume that you have a client who has decided to invest 5% of his/her in-
vestment portfolio [i.e., 10,000 € ($)] in the furniture industry. How much 
of this 10,000 € ($) amount would you advise your client to invest in Fur-
niturama? [in ,000 € ($)] 
Panel B: Financial Performance 
FINPERFCUR 
How do you evaluate Furniturama’s current financial performance?  
[Scale from -5 (very bad) over 0 (average) to 5 (very good)] 
FINPERFLT 
How do you evaluate Furniturama’s longer-term future financial perfor-
mance? [Scale from -5 (very bad) over 0 (average) to 5 (very good)] 
Panel C: CSR Performance 
ENVPERF 
How do you evaluate Furniturama’s performance on environmental is-
sues? [Scale from -5 (very bad) over 0 (average) to 5 (very good)] 
EMPPERF 
How do you evaluate Furniturama’s performance on employee issues?  
[Scale from -5 (very bad) over 0 (average) to 5 (very good)] 
CSRPERF 
How do you evaluate Furniturama’s overall performance on environmen-
tal and employee issues combined? [Scale from -5 (very bad) over 0 (av-
erage) to 5 (very good)] 
Panel D: Societal Benefits 
Please indicate how strongly you agree with each of the following statements. 
SOCBENENV 
A firm’s actions to improve its impact on the environment provide im-
portant societal benefits. [Scale from -5 (strongly disagree) over 0 (neither 
agree nor disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)] 
SOCBENEMP 
A firm’s actions to improve employees’ working conditions throughout its 
supply chain provide important societal benefits. [Scale from -5 (strongly 
disagree) over 0 (neither agree nor disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)] 
Panel E: Expectation of Others’ Investments 
OTHERINVENV 
Please indicate how you believe Furniturama’s actions to improve its im-
pact on the environment would affect other investors’ decisions to invest 
in Furniturama. [Scale from -5 (very negatively) over 0 (no effect) to 5 
(very positively)] 
OTHERINVEMP 
Please indicate how you believe Furniturama’s actions to improve em-
ployees’ working conditions throughout its supply chain would affect 
other investors’ decisions to invest in Furniturama. [Scale from -5 (very 
negatively) over 0 (no effect) to 5 (very positively)] 
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Finally, because Elliott et al. (2014) provide evidence that explicitly assessing CSR per-
formance before making their valuation judgments negated the effect of positive CSR infor-
mation on non-professional investors’ valuations judgments we counterbalanced the order in 
which our investment professionals made their investment decisions and recommendations 
(Panel A of Table 2) and assessed the firms’ CSR performance (Panel C of Table 2). Specifi-
cally, approximately half of our participants in the CSR condition made their investment and 
recommendation decisions first, then assessed financial performance next, and finally assessed 
CSR performance last. The other half of participants in the CSR condition assessed CSR per-
formance first, then made their investment and recommendation decisions next, and finally as-
sessed financial performance last. 
IV. Results 
Overview of Descriptive Data 
Before providing formal tests of our hypothesis, we provide descriptive data and note 
some important patterns in our results. Table 3 provides means, medians, and standard devia-
tions for the key measures we use in our analysis.  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (Mean, Median, [Standard Deviation]) and Observations for Key Measures 
  German Investors  US Investors 
  No CSR CSR  No CSR CSR 
INVPERSONAL
a  3.07 3.96  2.73 3.08 
  3.00 3.50  2.75 3.00 
  [2.00] [2.44]  [1.80] [2.16] 
INVCLIENT
 b  2.93 3.62  2.66 2.88 
  2.75 3.00  2.75 2.50 
  [1.99] [2.30]  [1.79] [1.93] 
FINPERFCUR
 c  1.17 2.16  1.28 1.51 
  2.00 3.00  1.00 2.00 
  [1.78] [1.49]  [1.63] [1.73] 
FINPERFLT
 d  .40 1.27  .00 .16 
  .00 1.00  .50 .00 
  [1.71] [1.70]  [2.27) [1.97] 
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FINPERF e  .78 1.72  .64 .84 
  1.25 1.50  1.25 1.00 
  [1.55] [1.43]  [1.81] [1.51] 
CSRPERF f  N/A 3.06  N/A 3.24 
  N/A 3.00  N/A 3.00 
  [N/A] [1.36]  [N/A] [1.25] 
SOCBEN g  3.17 3.47  3.06 3.41 
  3.00 4.00  3.00 4.00 
  [1.46] [1.50]  [1.49] [1.64] 
OTHERINV h  N/A N/A  N/A .97 
 N/A N/A  N/A 1.00 
  [N/A] [N/A]  [N/A] [1.07] 
Number of Observations  30 51  32 55 
Notes:  
a INVPERSONAL: Amount [in ‘000 € ($)] of 10,000 € ($) investors are willing to invest in Furniturama for their own 
personal investment portfolio. 
b INVCLIENT: Amount [in ‘000 € ($)] of 10,000 € ($) investors would advise a client to invest in Furniturama. 
c FINPERFCUR: Evaluation of Furniturama’s current financial performance [scale from -5 to 5]. 
d FINPERFLT: Evaluation of Furniturama’s longer-term future financial performance [scale from -5 to 5]. 
e FINPERF: Financial performance, calculated as the mean of current and future financial performance. 
f CSRPERF: Furniturama’s performance on environmental and employee issues combined [scale from -5 to 5]. 
g SOCBEN: Assessment of whether a firm’s actions to improve its impact on environment and employee working 
conditions provide important societal benefits, calculated as the mean of two questions. 
h OTHERINV: Assessment of the effect of Furniturama’s actions related to environmental and employee issues on 
other investors’ investment decisions. 
As indicated above, Elliott et al. (2014) find that when unsophisticated investors explicitly 
assess CSR performance before making valuation judgments the positive relation between CSR 
performance and valuation judgments they documented earlier no longer holds. Thus, in a first 
step, we test whether this is the case for our sophisticated investment professionals and regress 
their personal investment amounts (INVPERSONAL), on their assessment of CSR performance 
(CSRPERF), a mean-centered indicator variable for Order (indicating whether CSR perfor-
mance was assessed before or after determining the investment amount) and the interaction  
between CSRPERF and Order separately for our German and US participants. We find no evi-
dence in either sample that assessing CSR performance before making the investment decision 
reduces the effect of our investment professionals’ CSR assessment on their personal investment 
amounts. Specifically, the effect of CSRPERF on INVPERSONAL
 is positive and significant  
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(p’s < .01 in both cases), while neither interaction is significant (both p’s > .30). 10 Thus, we do 
not consider Order further in our analysis and continue reporting the descriptive statistics of our 
key measures.  
Consistent with the positive CSR information used in our experiment, Table 3 shows that 
our investment professionals’ mean assessment of the firm’s overall CSR performance, 
CSRPERF, is positive (German = 3.06, US = 3.24, on a scale from -5 to +5). Also, consistent 
with H1, which predicts that investment professionals assess a firm’s financial performance 
higher when positive CSR performance is disclosed than when it is not, Table 3 shows that 
FINPERF is higher in the CSR condition than in the No CSR condition for both German partic-
ipants (1.72 vs. .78, a difference of 120 percent) and US participants (.84 vs. .64, a difference of 
31 percent). However, the difference appears larger for German than for US participants.  
Consistent with H2, which predicts that personal investments amounts are higher when 
positive CSR information is disclosed than when it is not, Table 3 shows that this pattern holds 
for both our German participants (3.96 vs. 3.07, a difference of 29 percent) and US participants 
(3.08 vs. 2.73, a difference of 13 percent), although the difference again appears larger for Ger-
man participants than for US participants. Data patterns related to H3 will be discussed later in 
conjunction with the related formal statistical tests. 
Finally, Table 3 provides initial evidence regarding RQ1, which asks how investment pro-
fessionals’ personal investment decisions compare to their recommendations to clients. Partici-
pants’ mean investment amount recommended to clients (INVCLIENT) is higher when CSR infor-
mation is provided than when it is not for both German participants (3.62 vs. 2.93, a difference 
of 23 percent) and US participants (2.88 vs. 2.66, a difference of 8 percent). Again, the difference 
in investment amounts recommended to clients appear larger for the German participants than 
                                                 
10 We do not find any significant order effects on CSRPERF, FINPERF, INVPERSONAL, or INVCLIENT (t-tests, all p’s 
> .20). In addition, we also run the same regressions with the recommended investment amounts, INVCLIENT, as the 
dependent measure for both the German and US participants and find the same result as when using INVPERSONAL  
as the dependent variable (both interactions: p’s > .40; CSRPER: p’s < .01).  
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for the US participants and the mean recommended investment amounts appear slightly lower 
than the personal investment amounts for both groups of participants. 
Tests of H1 
H1 predicts that investment professionals assess higher financial performance when a firm 
discloses positive CSR performance information than when it does not. To test H1, we compare 
FINPERF for the CSR condition versus the No CSR condition. The t-test results are reported in 
Panel A of Table 4.  
Table 4: Means and t-Tests for Financial Performance Assessment and Measures of the Willingness to Invest 
Panel A: FINPERF No CSR CSR 
German investors:  Means .78 1.72 
   t-test t= 2.7465, p= .004*** 
US investors:   Means .64 .84 
   t-test t= .5143, p= .307 
Panel B: INVPERSONAL  
German investors:  Means 3.07 3.96 
   t-test t= 1.7868, p= .039** 
US investors:   Means 2.73 3.08 
   t-test t= .7692, p= .222 
Panel C: INVPERSONAL for Investors with above Median Belief in Societal Benefits of CSR 
German investors:  Means 3.61 4.68 
   t-test t= 1.4017, p= .084* 
US investors:   Means 2.43 3.38 
   t-test t= 1.4001, p= .086* 
Panel D: INVCLIENT  
German investors:  Means 2.93 3.62 
   t-test t= 1.3558, p= .089* 
US investors:   Means 2.66 2.88 
    t-test t= .5403, p= .295 
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. P-levels are 
one-tailed for directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. 
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German investment professionals assess a significantly higher financial performance 
when positive CSR information is disclosed than when no CSR information is disclosed (1.72 
vs. .78, p = .004). US investment professionals also assess directionally higher financial perfor-
mance when positive CSR performance is reported, but the difference between conditions is not 
significant (.64 vs. .84, p = .307).  
In addition to the between-conditions test reported above, we also examine whether within 
the CSR information condition, investment professionals who assess a higher CSR performance 
also assess a higher financial performance by regressing FINPERF on CSRPERF separately for 
German and US participants. The results are reported in Table 5. 
Table 5: Effect of CSR Performance Assessment on Financial Performance Assessment 
 German Investors US Investors 
Dependent Variable: FINPERF 
Coefficient 
(Robust Standard Error) 
Constant .9626 
(.4870)* 
.1373 
(.4405) 
CSRPERF .2462 
(.1456)** 
.2160 
(.1233)** 
R2 .06 .03 
N 51 55 
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. P-levels are 
one-tailed for directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. 
CSRPERF and FINPERF are positively related for both German and US investment pro-
fessionals (German: .25, p = .048, US: .22, p = .043), showing that, within the CSR condition, 
both groups perceive a positive relation between CSR performance and financial performance. 
However, while the coefficients for the German and US investment professionals are quite sim-
ilar, the regression constants, which represents the estimated financial performance when 
CSRPERF equals zero, appear to be different (German = .96 vs. US = .14), although the differ-
ence is just shy of statistical significance at conventional levels (2 = 1.52, p = .109). This may 
help explain why we observe statistically significant between-condition differences in FINPERF 
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for German participants but not for US participants. We examine this issue further by substitut-
ing the median assessment of CSRPERF of 3 into the regressions. This yields an estimated value 
of 1.72 (.97 + 3 x .25) for the German investors but only .80 (.14 + 3 x .22) for US investors. 
Thus, while German and US investment professionals assess differences in financial perfor-
mance relative to differences in their assessment of CSR performances, US investors appear to 
require a higher level of assessed CSR performance to assess a positive effect of disclosed CSR 
performance on financial performance compared to no disclosure. To summarize, we find sup-
port for H1 for our German participants but only directional support for our US participants. 
Tests of H2 
H2 predicts that investment professionals are more willing to invest when a firm discloses 
positive CSR performance information than when no CSR performance information is dis-
closed. To test H2, we compare INVPERSONAL for the CSR condition versus the No CSR condi-
tion separately for the German and US participants. The t-test results are reported in Panel B of 
Table 4. Consistent with H2, investment amounts for German participants are significantly 
higher when positive CSR information is disclosed than when it is not (3.96 vs. 3.07, t = 1.79, 
p = .039). In contrast, while directionally consistent with H2, investment amounts for US par-
ticipants are not significantly different between the CSR and No CSR conditions (3.08 vs. 2.73, 
t = .77, p = .222).  
Because we predict that beliefs regarding the societal benefits of CSR activities are an 
important predictor of investment behavior, we repeat the test reported above using only partic-
ipants whose beliefs in the societal benefits of CSR activities (SOCBEN) are at or above the 
median. The results, which are reported in Panel C of Table 4, show that despite reduced statis-
tical power due to reduced sample size, INVPERSONAL is significantly higher in the CSR condition 
than the No CSR condition for both the German (4.68 vs. 3.61, p = .084) and the US (3.38 vs. 
2.43, p = .086) participants. Thus, we find support for H2 for our German participants and mod-
erate support for H2 for our US participants.  
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For consistency between our tests of H1 and H2, we repeat the t-tests conducted for H1 
with FINPERF as the dependent variable using only those participants with above median be-
liefs regarding the societal benefits of CSR activities. Untabulated results continue to show sig-
nificantly higher assessment of financial performance in the CSR versus No CSR condition for 
German participants (2.00 vs. .82, p = .004), but no significant difference for US participants 
(.87 vs. .50, p = .238). Thus, although US participants with higher beliefs in the importance of 
the societal benefits of CSR activities do not assess statistically significantly higher financial 
performance when positive CSR information is disclosed than when it is not, they nevertheless 
do invest more when positive CSR information is disclosed than when it is not. This suggests 
that US investment professionals value the societal benefits of CSR activities beyond any ex-
pected financial effect as hypothesized in H3, which we test next. 
Tests of H3 
H3 predicts that the degree to which investment professionals value the societal benefits 
of CSR activities can drive their investment decisions beyond any expected effect of CSR per-
formance on financial performance. Because CSR performance assessments, financial perfor-
mance assessments, and investment amounts are closely interrelated, we test H3 using a covar-
iance-based structural equation model (SEM) with a heteroscedasticity-robust estimator for 
standard errors. For the tests of H3, we use data from the CSR conditions (n=51 for the German 
sample, n=55 for the US sample) only. The initial SEM results for both samples are reported in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Path Model on the Effect of the CSR Performance Assessment on Investors’ Personal Willingness to Invest 
Panel A: German Investors 
 
Note: N=51, CD = .259.  
Panel B: US Investors 
 
Note: N=55, CD = .129.  
Panel C: US Investors with Control for Others’ Investment Behavior 
 
Notes: N=55, CD = .178.  
The path models are estimated using a covariance-based structural equation model with heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
P-levels are one-tailed for directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. 
CSRPERF: Furniturama’s performance on environmental and employee issues combined [scale from -5 to 5]. 
FINPERF: Financial performance, calculated as the mean of current and future financial performance [on a scale 
from -5 to 5].  
INVPERSONAL: Amount [in ‘000 € ($)] of 10,000 € ($) investors are willing to invest in Furniturama for their own 
personal investment portfolio. 
OTHERINV: Assessment of the effect of Furniturama’s actions related to environmental and employee issues on 
other investors’ investment decisions, calculated as the mean of two questions [scale from -5 to 5]. 
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Figure 1 confirms our within-condition findings for H1 by again documenting a signifi-
cantly positive relation between CSRPERF and FINPERF for both German (Panel A: .25,  
p = .048) and US investment professionals (Panel B: .22, p = .039). Consistent with H3, Figure 
1 shows that even after controlling for the significantly positive effect of FINPERF on INVPER-
SONAL, there is a significantly positive effect of CSRPERF on INVPERSONAL for both German 
(Panel A: .76, p < .001) and US (Panel B: .52, p = .007) participants. These results are consistent 
with the development of H3, which suggests that investment professionals value the societal 
benefits of CSR activities beyond any expected effect of the CSR activities on financial perfor-
mance. We note also that this direct effect of assessed CSR performance on INVPERSONAL is 
significantly larger than the indirect effect operating through financial performance for both the 
German (.765 vs .246 x .597 = .147, z = 3.39, p = .001) and US (.522 vs .216 x .420 = .091,  
z = 1.93, p = .053) participants. Below we provide further, more direct, evidence that this direct 
effect is explained by the value that our investment professionals place on the societal benefits 
of the disclosed CSR performance.  
However, before moving to this more direct evidence, we first provide evidence that the 
significantly positive direct path between CSRPERF and INVPERSONAL is not explained by par-
ticipants’ expectations regarding how other investors’ will react to the disclosed CSR infor-
mation. We do so by including OTHERINV as a control variable in the analysis of our US 
participants (see Table 2, Panel E for the question used to collect this variable).11 As shown in 
Panel C of Figure 1, OTHERINV is positive and marginally significant (.41, p = .084), indicat-
ing that, as would be expected, professional investors invest more when they expect the stock 
price to increase because they expect others to invest more. However, for our study, the more 
important finding is that even after controlling for the expectations regarding other investors 
expected reactions to the disclosed CSR information, the paths from CSRPERF to both 
                                                 
11 We only collected this variable from the US participants and can, therefore, only include it as a control variable 
when analyzing the US data. 
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FINPERF (.22, p = .039) and to INVPERSONAL (.59, p = .009) remain significantly positive. That 
is, all of our previously reported results for US investment professionals are robust to controlling 
for how they expect other investors to react to the CSR information. Thus, our results provide 
strong support for H3. 
To provide more direct evidence that the value investment professionals place on the so-
cietal benefits of the firm’s CSR performance explains the direct effect of CSRPERF on INVPER-
SONAL after controlling for FINPERF, we test whether SOCBEN moderates this direct path 
(SOCBEN is the mean of the responses to the two questions shown in Table 2, Panel D). The 
results are reported in Figure 2.  
As Figure 2 shows, SOCBEN positively moderates the direct path from CSRPERF to 
INVPERSONAL for both the German (Panel A) and US (Panel B) investment professionals and 
significantly so for the US participants (.33, p = .002). Although the results for the German 
sample are directionally consistent, they are slightly below the conventional level for marginal 
significance (.12, p = .106). Importantly, when SOCBEN is included as a moderator, the direct 
effect of CSRPERF on INVPERSONAL becomes insignificant for both the German (Figure 2, Panel 
A: .28, p = .427) and US (Figure 2, Panel B: -.45, p = .269) participants.  
This means that, when SOCBEN equals zero, i.e., a participant believes that CSR activities 
have neither positive nor negative societal effects, the assessment of CSR performance has no 
significant effect on the amount of investment beyond any financial performance effect. This 
result provides direct support for our interpretation that the effect of CSR performance assess-
ments on investment amounts beyond any expected financial effect reflects the value our invest-
ment professionals place on the societal benefits associated with the company’s CSR activities. 
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Figure 2: Investment Professional Beliefs’ in the Societal Benefits as Moderator for the Effect of the CSR Performance 
Assessment on Investors’ Personal Willingness to Invest 
Panel A: German Investors 
 
Notes: N=51. Fit statistics: χ2 = 10.567 (p = .005); Comparative Fit Index = .936; Tucker Lewis Index = .713; 
SRMR = .098. 
Panel B: US Investors 
 
Notes: N=55. Fit statistics: χ2 = 1.358 (p = .507); Comparative Fit Index = 1.000; Tucker Lewis Index = 1.018; 
SRMR = .051. 
The path models are estimated using a covariance-based structural equation model with heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
P-levels are one-tailed for directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise.  
SOCBEN: Assessment of whether a firm’s actions to improve its impact on environment and employee working 
conditions provide important societal benefits, calculated as the mean of two questions. 
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Tests of RQ1 
RQ1 asks whether investment professionals’ recommendations to clients are consistent 
with or different from their personal investment decisions. Table 4 (Panel D) reports results of 
the t-tests for the CSR versus No CSR conditions using INVCLIENT as the dependent variable. 
The results for both the German and US participants are very similar to those using personal 
investment amounts. Specifically, INVCLIENT is higher when positive CSR information is pro-
vided in both samples but only significantly so for German investors (German: 3.62 vs. 2.93,  
t = 1.36, p = .089; US: 2.88 vs. 2.66, t = .54, p = .295).  
Figure 3 reports both the basic model (Panel A) and the extended model (Panel B) used to 
test H3 for both the German and US participants using INVCLIENT as the dependent variable 
rather than INVPERSONAL. 
As shown in Panel A, all findings for INVCLIENT from the basic model are consistent with 
those for INVPERSONAL. Specifically, for both the German and US participants, there is a signif-
icantly positive effect of CSRPERF on both FINPERF (German: .25, p = .048, US: .22,  
p = .039) and on INVCLIENT after controlling for FINPERF (German: .73, p < .001, US: .42,  
p = .024). These results are consistent with the results for participants’ personal investment 
amounts, indicating that our investment professionals consider the same factors when making 
investment recommendations to clients as they do when making their personal investment deci-
sions. 
The findings reported in Panel B are also consistent with our prior findings for INVPER-
SONAL. That is, SOCBEN has a significant moderating effect on the relationship between 
CSRPERF and INVCLIENT for both our German (.16, p = .049) and US participants (.27,  
p < .001). These results provide evidence that investors’ beliefs in the societal benefits of CSR 
activities can affect their investment recommendations to their clients in the same manner as 
they affect their personal investment decisions. 
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Figure 3: Path Model on the Effect of the CSR Performance Assessment on Investment Professionals’ Recommendations to their Clients 
German Investors 
 
 
 US Investors 
Panel A: Basic Model 
 
 
 
Notes: German investors: CD = .265; US investors: CD = .107. 
Panel B: Extended Model 
 
 
 
Notes: German investors: χ2 = 10.567 (p = .005); Comparative Fit Index = .936; Tucker Lewis Index = .713; SRMR = .098. US investors: χ2 = 1.358 (p = .507); Comparative Fit 
Index = 1.000; Tucker Lewis Index = 1.019; SRMR = .051. Observations include all participants from the positive CSR performance information present conditions (N=51 for 
German investors (Panel A), N=55 for US investors (Panel B)). Positive CSR performance information is manipulated by disclosing information about the firm’s positive CSR 
performance together with financial performance information. 
The path models are estimated using a covariance-based structural equation model with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 
5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. P-levels are one-tailed for directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise.  
INVCLIENT: Amount [in ‘000 € ($)] of 10,000 € ($) investors would advise a client to invest in Furniturama. 
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Taken together these results show that the disclosure of positive CSR information affects 
the investment amounts investment professionals recommend to clients in the same way and for 
the same reasons as such information affects investment professionals’ personal investment 
amounts. That is, positive CSR performance disclosures make investment professionals both 
more likely to personally invest and more likely to recommend investment to clients. Moreover, 
these investment and recommendation decisions are made both because the investment profes-
sionals believe that positive CSR performance leads to better financial performance and because 
they value the societal benefits of the CSR activities beyond any expected financial effects.  
Supplemental Analyses 
German vs. US Investment Professionals 
The analyses reported thus far show that within the CSR condition, German and US in-
vestment professionals respond very similarly to disclosed positive CSR performance infor-
mation. However, from prior results it appears that US investment professionals seem to require 
a higher level of CSR performance than German professionals before they expect a correspond-
ing increase in financial performance in the CSR versus No CSR conditions. Thus, US invest-
ment professionals seem somewhat more hesitant than German investment professionals as to 
level of CSR performance that is necessary to increase financial performance. 
Regarding the reasoning within the CSR information condition the fit statistics of the ex-
tended path model (Figure 2) suggest that there might an additional difference between the two 
samples. Specifically, the fit statistics of the model for the German participants displayed in 
Figure 2 are below the usual acceptable thresholds while all fit statistics for the US participants 
exceed these thresholds (Byrne 2001; Hu and Bentler 1999). Therefore, we also explore whether 
investment professionals’ beliefs about the societal benefits of CSR activities affect the link 
between CSR performance and financial performance assessments. This link could be affected 
if our investment professionals engaged in motivated reasoning.  
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Motivated reasoning is the tendency of individuals to access, process or evaluate infor-
mation in biased ways based on their own motivations (Kunda 1990). Hales (2007) provides 
evidence that motivated reasoning can affect the evaluation of disclosed financial information. 
In our case, investment professionals who believe CSR activities provide more societal benefits 
may be more likely to also believe that positive CSR performance results in better financial 
performance, while investment professionals who do not believe CSR activities have societal 
benefits may be less likely to believe that positive CSR performance results in better financial 
performance. Survey evidence suggests that the belief that CSR activities benefit firms finan-
cially is more common and has a longer history in Western Europe than in the US (KPMG 2011; 
BNY 2012; Amel-Zadeh and Serafeim 2017). Thus, such motivated reasoning could be more 
prevalent among German investment professionals. To test whether this is the case, we check 
for a moderating effect of participants’ beliefs regarding the benefits of CSR activities to society 
(SOCBEN) on the path from assessed CSR performance (CSRPERF) to assessed financial per-
formance (FINPERF). The results are reported in Figure 4.  
Panel A of Figure 4 shows that, for German investment professionals, SOCBEN has a 
significantly positive moderating effect on the relation between CSRPERF and FINPERF (.17, 
p = .011). That is, consistent with motivated reasoning, the more German investment profes-
sionals believe in general that there are important societal benefits of CSR activities, the more 
positive they see the link between CSR performance and financial performance.  
In contrast, Panel B shows there is no such moderating effect of SOCBEN on the link 
between CSRPERF and FINPERF for US participants (.01, p = .471). Here only the moderating 
effect of SOCBEN on the direct link between CSRPERF and INVPERSONAL persists. Thus, it 
appears that German investment professionals may engage in motivated reasoning while US 
investment professionals do not.  
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Figure 4: Extended Path Model on the Effect of Investors’ General Attitude towards the Societal Benefits 
 of CSR Activities on the Relation between CSR performance and financial performance 
Panel A: German Investors 
 
Note: N=51, CD = .878. 
Panel B: US Investors 
 
Notes: N=55, CD=.933.  
Observations include all participants from the positive CSR performance information present conditions (N=51 for 
German investors (Panel A), N=55 for US investors (Panel B)). Positive CSR performance information is manip-
ulated by disclosing information about the firm’s positive CSR performance together with financial performance 
information. The path models are estimated using a covariance-based structural equation model with heteroscedas-
ticity-robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. P-levels are one-tailed for directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise.  
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Overall, our results show that German and US investment professionals react to positive 
CSR performance information in a very similar manner. However, while both groups assess a 
positive link between CSR performance and financial performance, the reason for this link ap-
pears to differ somewhat across the two groups. For German participants the link appears to be 
at least partially due to motivated reasoning while for US participants this does not appear to be 
the case.  
Current vs. Longer-Term Financial Performance 
Our analysis so far has used measures of financial performance that combine investment 
professionals’ assessment of both current and long-term financial performance. We also exam-
ine whether any of our results differ if we use the separate measures for investment profession-
als’ assessments of current and long-term financial performance in our tests. We first analyze 
the models in Figure 1 using assessments of current financial performance (FINPERFCUR) and 
long-term financial performance (FINPERFLT) rather than the combined variable. Consistent 
with the argument offered by some that CSR performance assessment mainly affects long-term 
financial performance (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2014; Vogel 2005), untabulated results 
show that for both German and US investment professionals, the effect of CSR performance, 
CSRPERF, on long-term financial performance, FINPERFLT, appears stronger (German: .23,  
p = .033; US: .21, p = .050) than the effect on current financial performance, FINPERFCUR 
(German: .18, p = .135; US: .07, p = .317). 
However, the direct effect of CSR performance, CSRPERF, on investment, INVPERSONAL, 
always persists whether current financial performance or long-term financial performance is 
used in the analysis (all p’s < .010). These results illustrate the robustness of our conclusions 
regarding the important role beliefs about the societal benefits of CSR activities play in predict-
ing investment behavior. 
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V. Conclusion 
We examine whether and how experienced German and US investment professionals use 
disclosed CSR information in their personal investment decisions and investment recommenda-
tions to clients. Given that most firms now disclose some information about their CSR activities 
(KPMG 2015), it is important to understand how and why investment professionals and financial 
intermediaries use such information.  
We predict and find that German and US investment professionals assess higher financial 
performance when positive CSR information is disclosed than when no CSR information is dis-
closed, although these differences are statistically significant only for the German investors. 
Within the CSR condition, both German and US participants’ assessments of CSR performance 
significantly affect their investment decisions. However, US investment professionals appear to 
require a higher level of assessed CSR performance than Germans before they increase their 
investments in response to disclosed CSR information as compared to when no CSR information 
is disclosed.  
We also predict and find that both German and US participants invest more when positive 
CSR information is disclosed than when no CSR information is disclosed, although for US in-
vestment professionals the difference is only significant for those who believe most strongly 
that CSR activities provide important societal benefits. This subgroup invests more but does not 
expect significantly higher financial performance when a firm discloses positive CSR perfor-
mance information, suggesting that for at least some portion of investment professionals, factors 
other than expected financial performance affect their investment decisions. Consistent with this 
view, we also predict and find that investment behavior is not only affected by the expected 
financial effects of CSR activities on the firm, but also by the value investors place on the soci-
etal benefits of the CSR activities. Importantly, we show that this direct effect of assessed CSR 
performance on investment amounts is driven by the value that investment professionals’ place 
on the societal benefits associated with the firm’s CSR activities. Finally, we find that when 
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making investment recommendations to clients both groups use CSR information in essentially 
the same manner as they do when making personal investment decisions. 
Our results help inform the academic debate regarding the connection between CSR per-
formance, financial performance, and investment. It appears that the effects of CSR performance 
on financial performance are often insufficient to fully explain investor response to positive 
CSR. Rather, individual beliefs about the degree to which CSR activities provide important so-
cietal benefits help explain investment decisions. Moreover, because such beliefs can differ 
across individuals, countries, and/or cultures, even identical financial and CSR performance 
disclosures can lead to different investment decisions. Consistent with this perspective, even 
though our results show that German and US investors react very similarly to differences in 
assessed CSR performance, we also provide evidence that disclosure of identical CSR infor-
mation can still lead to differences in investment amounts. 
Our results also add to our understanding of how investment professionals use CSR infor-
mation by showing that their beliefs regarding whether CSR activities provide important societal 
benefits represent an important predictor of how they use CSR disclosures in their personal in-
vestment decisions and when making recommendations to clients.  
Our findings have potentially important implications for those who receive investment 
advice from investment professionals. We find that investment professionals’ use CSR infor-
mation in the same way when making recommendations to their clients as when making their 
own their personal investment decisions. Thus, those relying on investment professionals for in-
vestment recommendations should be aware that the advice they receive reflects such influence.  
Finally, we extend the findings of Elliott et al. (2014) by showing that their finding that 
non-professional investors’ decisions are not affected by CSR disclosures when they are explic-
itly asked to first evaluate CSR performance does not hold for sophisticated investment profes-
sionals. We find that CSR disclosures affect investment professionals’ investment decisions and 
recommendations even after they explicitly assess CSR performance. 
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Our study has limitations that could be addressed in future research. First, our study ex-
amines investment professionals’ reactions to positive CSR information. Future research could 
examine whether our results change if CSR information is negative or not uniformly positive. 
Second, our study uses CSR information that is closely related to the firm’s business activities. 
Future research could examine whether investment professionals react differently to information 
about CSR activities that are less closely related to the firm’s general business activities. Finally, 
future research could examine how our results regarding CSR disclosures relate to other forms 
of non-financial disclosures.  
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Appendix 
Experiment Materials 
[US version] 
Background Information about Furniturama 
Furniturama is a manufacturer and retailer of furniture. The company was founded in 1973 
and has about 5,200 employees (calculated as full-time-equivalents). This number has re-
mained more or less stable over the last three years. Furniturama is based in continental North 
America [German: Europe]. Its products and brand are well established across North America 
[German: in over 20 European countries]. The company’s growth was above average during 
the first half of its life, but its growth has slowed down in recent years.  
Wood currently makes up 70% of the raw materials used in Funiturama’s furniture. Plastics 
and similar materials make up about 20%, and the remaining 10% of raw materials include 
primarily glass, steel, and fabrics. While traditionally wood made up more than 70% of Furni-
turama’s raw materials, in recent years plastics and other similar materials have become more 
popular; their usage has increased while the usage of wood has decreased.  
Furniturama owns a substantial part of its supply chain, including the plants in which its furni-
ture is manufactured and the retail stores in which it is sold. However, Furniturama buys its 
wood mainly from suppliers located in North America [German: Northern Europe], Brazil, Cam-
eroon and Indonesia. About half of this wood is then processed by Furniturama’s sawmills, 
with the other half being processed by smaller sawmills owned by other companies that are 
situated close to the main wood suppliers. The processed wood is then shipped to Furni-
turama’s manufacturing plants. 
The company has long been a leader in the production and sale of relatively inexpensive, but 
good quality, systems of shelves, wardrobes, and cupboards that can be combined very flexi-
bly for use in offices, living rooms, family rooms, or bedrooms. However, this particular type 
of furniture has recently faced some pricing pressure because of competitively priced imports 
from Asia. To keep its profit margin high, Furniturama has begun expanding its product mix to 
include higher-quality and higher-priced furniture to be sold to more affluent customers.  
 
 131 
Financial Performance Data 
 
 2014 
+/- 
2014/13 
2013 
+/- 
2013/12 
2012 
Income Statement  
($ (€), in thousands) 
Total Revenues 870,651 1.0% 861,942 3.8% 830,214 
Total Cost of Sales -569,876 -0.4% -571,889 3.7% -551,400 
 Gross Profit 300,775 3.7% 290,053 4.0% 278,814 
 Gross Margin 34.5% 0.9% 33.7% 0.1% 33.6% 
 General and Administrative Expenses -69,420 0.3% -69,210 1.8% -67,988 
 Sales and Marketing Expenses -119,527 5.5% -113,256 4.5% -108,410 
 Research and Development Expenses -24,548 9.7% -22,385 7.0% -20,929 
 Operating Income 87,279 2.4% 85,202 4.6% 81,487 
 Operating Margin 10.0% 0.1% 9.9% 0.1% 9.8% 
 Interest Payments -18,021 -2.6% -18,502 -3.6% -19,194 
 Taxes -16,761 6.9% -15,674 9.4% -14,327 
 Net Income 52,498 2.9% 51,025 6.4% 47,966 
 Profit Margin 6.0% 0.1% 5.9% 0.1% 5.8% 
       
Cash Flow  
($(€), in thousands) Net Cash Flow from Operating Activities 115,999 2.6% 113,081 5.1% 107,592 
 Net Cash Flow from Investing Activities -40,385 2.4% -39,420 1.4% -38,872 
 Net Cash Flow from Financing Activities -48,385 3.5% -46,752 3.0% -45,381 
 Change in Cash and Cash Equivalents during Year 27,229 1.2% 26,909 15.3% 23,339 
       
Performance Ratios ($(€)) 
Gross Profit per Unit 161.8 3.4% 156.6 5.3% 148.7 
 Net Profit per Unit 28.2 2.6% 27.5 7.7% 25.6 
       
Capital Structure 
Equity Ratio 54.5% 1.3% 53.2% 1.2% 52.0% 
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Environment and Employee Data [only CSR condition] 
 
 
2014 
+/- 
2014/13 
2013 
+/- 
2013/12 
2012 
Industry 
Range 
Industry 
Average 
Environmental Issues        
Higher numbers indicate more environmentally friendly performance:        
Share of total wood waste that is recycled 80.2% 9.5% 70.7% 9.9% 60.8% 10% - 88% 53% 
Share of total energy usage from renewable sources 53.1% 6.5% 46.6% 10.7% 35.9% 5% - 65% 33% 
Lower numbers indicate more environmentally friendly performance:        
Total water pollution as measured by Chemical Oxygen De-
mand (COD) in mg/L of wastewater released 214.1 -13.9% 248.8 -13.3% 287.1 135 - 540 320 
Total air pollution from Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC) in 
mg/m3 released 12.5 -21.1% 15.9 -26.4% 21.6 9 - 43 25 
        
Employee Issues        
Higher numbers indicate more employee-friendly performance:        
Share of Furniturama's operations in compliance with Interna-
tional Labor Organization standards 87.1% 3.2% 83.9% 5.1% 78.8% 60% - 90% 76% 
Share of Furniturama's suppliers in compliance with Interna-
tional Labor Organization standards 66.2% 4.9% 61.3% 5.1% 56.2% 30% - 70% 52% 
Total spending on employee safety and training (in $ (€) per 
full time equivalent employee) 1,415.3 14.4% 1,273.4 19.8% 1,033.2 300 - 1700 960 
Lower numbers indicate more employee-friendly  
performance:        
Share of absent time from scheduled work due to work-re-
lated injuries and hazards 1.0% -0.1% 1.1% -0.2% 1.3% 0.7% - 2.2% 1.4% 
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Questionnaire  
 
Please answer the following questions. 
For the next two questions assume that Furniturama’s stock is currently selling at a typical earnings mul-
tiple for the furniture industry.  
Assume that you have decided to invest 5% of your personal investment portfolio (i.e., $10,000) in the 
furniture industry. How much of this $10,000 amount would you be willing to invest in Furniturama?  
[$, in thousands] 
                     
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Assume that you have a client who has decided to invest 5% of his/her investment portfolio (i.e., 
$10,000) in the furniture industry. How much of this $10,000 amount would you advise your client to 
invest in Furniturama?  
[$, in thousands] 
                     
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
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How do you evaluate Furniturama’s current financial performance? 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Very 
bad 
       
Average 
       Very 
good 
How do you evaluate Furniturama’s longer-term future financial performance? 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Very 
bad 
       
Average 
       Very 
good 
How do you assess Furniturama’s risk that a future event will have a major negative effect on its earn-
ings?  
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Very 
low 
       
Average 
       Very 
high 
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[Only CSR condition: order counter-balanced (either first or third question block).] 
How do you evaluate Furniturama’s performance on environmental issues? 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Very 
bad 
       
Average 
       Very 
good 
How do you evaluate Furniturama’s performance on employee issues? 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Very 
bad 
       
Average 
       Very 
good 
How do you evaluate Furniturama’s overall performance on environmental and employee issues com-
bined?  
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Very 
bad 
       
Average 
       Very 
good 
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To help us better understand the reasoning behind your evaluations please also answer the following 
questions. [Only CSR condition.] 
How did your assessment of Furniturama’s performance on environmental issues influence your evalua-
tion of the company’s current financial performance? 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Very nega-
tively 
      
Not at all 
      Very 
positively 
How did your assessment of Furniturama’s performance on environmental issues influence your evalua-
tion of the company’s longer-term future financial performance? 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Very nega-
tively 
      
Not at all 
      Very 
positively 
How do you believe an average stock market investor assesses the effect of Furniturama’s performance 
on environmental issues on the company’s longer-term future financial performance?  
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Very nega-
tively 
     Neither positively  
nor negatively 
     Very 
positively 
How did your assessment of Furniturama’s performance on employee issues influence your evaluation 
of the company’s current financial performance? 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Very nega-
tively 
      
Not at all 
      Very 
positively 
How did your assessment of Furniturama’s performance on employee issues influence your evaluation 
of the company’s longer-term future financial performance? 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Very nega-
tively 
      
Not at all 
      Very 
positively 
How do you believe an average stock market investor assesses the effect of Furniturama’s performance 
on employee issues on the company’s longer-term future financial performance?  
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Very nega-
tively 
     Neither positively  
nor negatively 
     Very 
positively 
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How do you believe Furniturama’s performance on environmental issues influences the risk that a fu-
ture event will have a major negative effect on its earnings? 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Decreases 
risk very 
strongly 
      
Not at all 
      Increases 
risk very 
strongly 
How do you believe Furniturama’s performance on employee issues influences the risk that a future 
event will have a major negative effect on its earnings? 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Decreases 
risk very 
strongly 
      
Not at all 
      Increases 
risk very 
strongly 
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Please answer the following questions. [Only CSR condition.] 
When I evaluated Furniturama I assumed that their future performance on environmental issues would 
be… 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
very  
bad. 
       average.        
very 
good. 
When I evaluated Furniturama I assumed that their future performance on employee issues would be… 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
very  
bad. 
       average.        
very 
good. 
How much time did you spend analyzing the information regarding Furniturama’s performance on envi-
ronmental issues? 
                     
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
No time 
at all 
             
A very high 
amount of 
time 
How much time did you spend analyzing the information regarding Furniturama’s performance on em-
ployee issues? 
                     
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
No time 
at all 
             
A very high 
amount of 
time 
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Please indicate how strongly you agree with each of the following statements. 
A firm’s actions to improve its impact on the environment are important for the firm’s long-term value 
creation. 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly dis-
agree. 
     
Neither agree 
nor disagree. 
     
Strongly 
agree. 
A firm’s actions to improve employees’ working conditions throughout its supply chain are important 
for the firm’s long-term value creation. 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly dis-
agree. 
     
Neither agree 
nor disagree. 
     
Strongly 
agree. 
Information about a firm’s actions to improve its impact on the environment is important to determine 
its firm value. 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly dis-
agree. 
     
Neither agree 
nor disagree. 
     
Strongly 
agree. 
Information about a firm’s actions to improve employees’ working conditions throughout its supply 
chain is important to determine its firm value. 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly dis-
agree. 
     
Neither agree 
nor disagree. 
     
Strongly 
agree. 
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Please indicate how strongly you agree with each of the following statements. 
A firm’s actions to improve its impact on the environment provide important societal benefits. 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly dis-
agree. 
     
Neither agree 
nor disagree. 
     
Strongly 
agree. 
A firm’s actions to improve employees’ working conditions throughout its supply chain provide im-
portant societal benefits. 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly dis-
agree. 
     
Neither agree 
nor disagree. 
     
Strongly 
agree. 
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Please indicate how strongly you agree with each of the following statements. 
Assume that a firm’s activities to improve its impact on the environment reduce its financial profits. 
Please indicate your agreement to the following statement:  
As a private investor, I would be willing to forgo financial profits if a firm improved its impact on the en-
vironment. 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly dis-
agree. 
     
Neither agree 
nor disagree. 
     
Strongly 
agree. 
Assume that a firm’s activities to improve employees’ working conditions throughout its supply chain 
reduce its financial profits. Please indicate your agreement to the following statement:  
As a private investor, I would be willing to forgo financial profits if a firm improved employees’ working 
conditions throughout its supply chain. 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly dis-
agree. 
     
Neither agree 
nor disagree. 
     
Strongly 
agree. 
Assume that a firm’s activities to improve its impact on the environment reduce its financial profits. 
Please indicate your agreement to the following statement:  
The average stock market investor would be willing to forgo financial profits if a firm improved its im-
pact on the environment. 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly dis-
agree. 
     
Neither agree 
nor disagree. 
     
Strongly 
agree. 
Assume that a firm’s activities to improve employees’ working conditions throughout its supply chain 
reduce its financial profits. Please indicate your agreement to the following statement:  
The average stock market investor would be willing to forgo financial profits if a firm improved employ-
ees’ working conditions throughout its supply chain. 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly dis-
agree. 
     
Neither agree 
nor disagree. 
     
Strongly 
agree. 
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Please answer the following questions. 
What % of other stock market investors do you believe would be willing to forgo any financial profit if a 
firm improves its impact on the environment?  
[Please enter a value between 0 and 100.] 
   %  
 
What % of other stock market investors do you believe would be willing to forgo any financial profit if a 
firm improves its employees’ working conditions throughout their supply chain?  
[Please enter a value between 0 and 100.] 
   %  
 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you prefer to invest in individual stocks or in a market wide equity 
index fund. 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly 
prefer  
individual  
stocks. 
    
Both are  
equally  
attractive. 
    
Strongly 
prefer  
equity  
index. 
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Please indicate how strongly you agree with each of the following statements. [These were additional 
questions included in the US version and not in the German version. The No CSR condition only 
included the first two questions.] 
I am willing to invest more in a firm that takes actions to improve its impact on the environment than 
one that does not because I value the societal benefits of such actions. 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly dis-
agree. 
     
Neither agree 
nor disagree. 
     
Strongly 
agree. 
I am willing to invest more in a firm that takes actions to improve employees’ working conditions 
throughout its supply chain than one that does not because I value the societal benefits of such actions. 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly dis-
agree. 
     
Neither agree 
nor disagree. 
     
Strongly 
agree. 
By taking actions to improve its impact on the environment, Furniturama creates important benefits to 
society that are independent from current or longer- term future financial performance. 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly dis-
agree. 
     
Neither agree 
nor disagree. 
     
Strongly 
agree. 
By taking actions to improve employees’ working conditions throughout its supply chain, Furniturama 
creates important benefits to society that are independent from current or longer- term future financial 
performance.  
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly dis-
agree. 
     
Neither agree 
nor disagree. 
     
Strongly 
agree. 
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Please answer the following questions. [These were additional questions included in the US ver-
sion and not in the German version. These questions were asked only in the CSR condition and 
were not included in the No CSR condition.] 
Please indicate how you believe Furniturama’s actions to improve its impact on the environment would 
affect other investors’ decisions to invest in Furniturama. 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Very nega-
tively 
      
No effect 
      Very 
positively 
Please indicate how you believe Furniturama’s actions to improve employees’ working conditions 
throughout its supply chain would affect other investors’ decisions to invest in Furniturama. 
                     
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Very nega-
tively 
      
No effect 
      Very 
positively 
When making your investment decision, did you consider how other investors would react to Furni-
turama’s actions to improve its impact on the environment? 
 Yes  
 No 
      
 
       
When making your investment decision, did you consider how other investors would react to Furni-
turama’s actions to improve employees’ working conditions throughout its supply chain? 
 Yes  
 No 
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General information 
Thank you for participating in this study. Finally, we would like to ask you to provide a few personal de-
tails. Recall that your answers will remain completely anonymous and that we will not be able to link 
your answers to your identity. 
What is your occupation? 
(Please choose only one.) 
 Sell-side analyst   
 Buy-side analyst 
 Fund/Asset/Portfolio manager 
 Investment advisor 
 Other, please specify: _____________________________________ 
 
What is… 
… the number of years of your experience with investment valuation? Ca. _____________ years. 
… the overall number of years of your professional experience? Ca. _____________ years. 
… the number of years of professional experience in your current position? Ca. _____________ years. 
 
Is socially responsible and/or ethical investing your primary job responsibility? 
[Question added later and only in the US version.] 
 Yes 
 No 
 
What is your gender? 
 Female 
 Male 
 
What is your nationality? _____________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
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Abstract 
In recent years, firms have increased their reporting of information that is not based on account-
ing standards, e.g. non-financial performance information regarding Corporate Social Respon-
sibility, intangibles, or intellectual capital. This provides firms with leeway for strategic choices 
as to how and what to report and emphasize. For example, firms can use graphics as a tool of 
persuasion and impression management. Investors may be affected by these reporting elements 
because graphics tend to be salient and easily accessible. Especially when cognitive resources 
are scarce, e.g. because of time pressures, graphics may be particularly influential when inves-
tors make an investment decision. We predict that graphics can direct investors’ attention to 
certain particularly positive key performance indicators (KPI), which can then lead to higher 
assessments of a firm’s investment attractiveness. We test our predictions in an experiment with 
investment professionals as participants and manipulate whether a graphic is shown or not be-
fore we provide participants with quantitative information regarding a firm’s performance.  
Participants are then asked to assess the firm as investment opportunity. Importantly, we exam-
ine investors’ information acquisition using eye-trackers. Consistent with our theory, we find 
that a graphic can direct investors’ attention to particularly positive performance indicators: we 
further find that it leads to higher assessments of a firm’s investment attractiveness. Our results 
are important because they suggest that investors can be guided, if not manipulated by graphics 
when their cognitive resources are scarce. 
 
Keywords: Non-financial Information, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Sustainability, 
Integrated Reporting, Eye-Tracking, Salience, Availability 
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I. Introduction 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), e.g. IFRS or US-GAAP, govern firm 
reporting through specific requirements concerning content and presentation format. However, 
in so-called voluntary disclosure (VD), firms can report information on non-GAAP aspects 
(Deegan 2014; Bewley and Li 2000). For example, VD can include items on asset productivity 
such as customer or employee satisfaction (Lev and Gu 2016), intellectual capital (Nikolaj 2003; 
Abdolmohammadi 2005), intangibles (Lev and Gu 2016) or Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2009; Huang and Watson 2015; Friede, Busch, and Bassen 
2015). VD is not governed by tight rules, so firms have discretion to decide whether and how to 
disclose and emphasize certain aspects and key performance indicators (KPI). This allows im-
pression management by firms maximizing their value from reporting (Beattie and Jones 1992, 
Arunachalam, Pei, and Steinbart 2002): for example, firms can highlight well-performing KPIs 
(Amer 2005; Hillenbrand and Schmelzer 2017; Brown, Elliott, and Grant 2017).  
VD becomes increasingly important as so-called integrated reports (Eccles and Krzus 
2010, 2014) are emerging, aiming at combining mandatory reporting and VD as a novel form 
of reporting (IIRC 2013). Within the framework of VD, we are interested in the interaction of 
the disclosed elements, specifically the interaction of graphics and numerical data. We analyze 
whether investment professionals’ attention can be directed to certain performance indicators 
highlighted by a graphic connecting non-financial performance indicators with financial perfor-
mance indicators. Displaying this connection graphically might create the impression of a well-
functioning chain of value creation and would not be a new phenomenon (Kaplan and Norton 
1992; Banker, Chang, and Pizzini 2004). As graphics can increase the salience of specific infor-
mation items (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2012a, 2012b), they may have important behav-
ioral effects on investors: investors may be (unduly) influenced because firms have some dis-
cretion to design their reports to create a favorable impression.  
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Visual representations (e.g. graphics) are prominent elements in firm reporting, especially 
at firm’ websites (Ettredge, Richardson, and Scholz 2003; Bollen, Hassink, and Bozic 2006; 
Jones 2011). As powerful tools of persuasion (Jarvenpaa 1990; Arunachalam et al. 2002), they 
can have ambivalent effects. On the one hand, visual representations can assist information pro-
cessing (Lurie and Mason 2007; Cardinaels 2008) because they can facilitate information pro-
cessing, e.g. by creating vivid mental representations (Nisbett and Ross 1980; Hales, Kuang, 
and Venkatamaran 2011) and decreasing the cognitive effort required as they use less attentional 
resources (Loewenstein, Sunstein, and Golman 2014; Hillenbrand and Schmelzer 2017). On the 
other hand, because they are cognitively easier accessible, they can attract undue attention and 
interfere with investors’ decision making when firms use them in their VD (Simon 1979; Shah 
and Oppenheimer 2007; Glazer, Steckel, and Winer 1992). Not always may investors be able to 
decipher these reporting tactics and to discount VD adequately (Coram, Monroe, and Woodliff 
2009; Hobson and Kachelmeier 2005; Fanning, Agoglia, and Piercey 2015). 
Graphics may be particularly influential in situations in which cognitive resources are 
scarce or depleted, e.g. when making decisions under time pressure. Under time pressure, infor-
mation processing typically accelerates and individuals become more selective (Payne, Bettman 
and Luce 1996; Pietsch and Messier 2017; Kocher and Sutter 2006). This may be particularly 
common in the domain of investment decisions: financial markets are more than ever a high-
speed environment where even “millisecond advantages” (Nursimulu and Bossaerts 2014; 
Busse and Green 2002) matter so that investment professional are under a general pressure to 
process and evaluate information quickly.  
Thus, we predict that visually highlighting the link between performance driving perfor-
mance indicators and financial performance indicators increases the salience of the underlying 
value creation process. When positive performance indicators are highlighted in a graphic we 
expect this to result in higher assessments of a firm’s investment attractiveness.  
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To test our theory we conduct a 1x2 between-subjects experiment. We manipulate whether 
a firm discloses a graphic connecting some particularly positive non-financial with some partic-
ularly positive financial performance indicators before participants review a table containing 
quantitative financial and non-financial information and assess the firm as an investment oppor-
tunity. Importantly, this graphic only adds a visualization of the firm’s strategic assertions com-
municated before to all participants. I.e., only the existence of the graphic differed between 
conditions: the information about the assertions regarding the importance of the performance 
driving factors is kept constant across conditions.  
We focus on the procedural effects of a graphic and examine whether and how a firm 
could design a report to highlight certain performance indicators in order to create a favorable 
impression. To measure participants’ attention and gain insights into their information acquisi-
tion, we use eye-trackers. These devices record the participants’ eye movements: hence, we can 
analyze on which areas of interest (AoI) participants focus their attention. These data allow us 
to test whether a graphic guides participants’ attention to performance indicators made salient 
in the graphic thereby receiving a special weight in the information processing. So far, prior 
accounting research has primarily used eye-tracking data with a focus on balanced scorecard 
settings. For example, they have been used to analyze the role of accountability in investment 
decisions (Dalla Via, van Rinsum, and Perego 2016) and for performance evaluation (Kramer 
and Maas 2016; Chen, Jermias, and Panggabean 2016). Dalla Via et al. (2016) report eye-track-
ing data supporting their argument that –compared to outcome accountability– process account-
ability requires more information search effort from managers making an investment decision, 
which increases investment decision quality. Kramer and Maas (2016) find that managers’ prior 
experiences matter when they evaluate subordinates’ performance; however, they do not find 
evidence that attention patterns predict evaluation outcomes. Chen et al. (2016) find that man-
agers spending more time on strategically linked performance measures evaluate subordinates 
performance more consistent with strategic objectives of the business unit. The authors’ findings 
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suggest that top-down reasons, e.g. knowledge about strategy is more important than presenta-
tion format: however, in our study, we keep the former constant and focus on potential salience 
effects of reported elements. Our research is further related to recent research that has developed 
an interest in analyst’s behavior and found that the attention towards financial and non-financial 
information in management earnings forecasts may depend on whether historical performance 
is low or high and whether news are positive or negative (Bozzolan, Joos, and Rubaltelli 2017).   
Importantly, our participants are experienced investment professionals from Europe. 
While prior related research has used non-professional investors as participants (Clor-Proell, 
Proell, and Warfield 2014; Hales et al. 2011; Rennekamp 2012; Tan, Wang, and Zhou 2014), 
the study of Tan et al. (2014) suggests that investment experience might mitigate biases related 
to the ease of information processing. Thus, it is important that we can rely on investment pro-
fessionals as participants.  
Results support our predictions. Participants spend more time on positive performance 
indicators mentioned in a graphic, which leads to higher assessments of the firm’s investment 
attractiveness. Further, we find no evidence that the salience of some non-financial performance 
indicators spills over to other non-financial performance indicators not highlighted in a graphic.  
Our design does not allow us to distinguish whether graphics lead to more or less accurate 
assessments of a firm’s investment attractiveness and whether rather the firm or the investors 
would profit from the firm’s reporting decision. However, our study is important because it 
shows how firms can use graphics in their VD to direct attention towards positive performance 
indicators and to persuade investors to invest. Graphically displaying the link between positive 
potential non-financial performance drivers and financial performance indicators –e.g. through 
graphical representations or by enhancing (degrading) positive (negative) aspects through the 
design of the visualization (Birnberg, Turopolec, and Young 1983; Beattie and Jones 1992; 
Nisbett, Zukier, and Lemley 1981; Jones 2011) – can increase the salience of certain reporting 
elements. This may then influence investors’ decisions. This might improve firms’ reporting 
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and investment decisions as prior research posits that investors do not pay sufficient attention to 
non-financials (Juravle and Lewis 2008; Eccles and Viviers 2011; Dumas 2015). However, our 
results are further important because they show that investors may need to be aware that they 
could be unduly influenced by firms’ VD when cognitive resources are scarce, e.g. under time 
pressure or stress. 
Hence, we also contribute to the emerging debate on the value and potential benefits, but 
also on potential problems of integrated reports for investors’ decision-making (e.g. Eccles and 
Saltzman 2011; Jensen and Berg 2012; Abeysekera 2013; Busco 2014). Finally, our research 
may also inform standard setters and policy-makers whether and how to regulate firms’ disclo-
sures and specifically the use of graphical elements (Brown et al. 2017). This can be particularly 
important to safeguard compliance of firms with reporting rules and support comparability. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops our hypotheses 
and research question, and Section 3 describes our methodology. Section 4 reports the result of 
our study before section 5 concludes this paper. 
II. Theory and Development of Hypotheses and Research Question 
In addition to standardized financial reporting according to GAAP (e.g. IFRS or US 
GAAP), firms are allowed to voluntary disclose information on their activities that are not ac-
counting-standards based. Such VD can serve to account for specific firm performance aspects 
for which disclosure is not regulated. Thus, when reporting (non-)financial28 performance, firms 
have discretionary room to present themselves in the best way possible to manage impressions 
(Kleinmuntz and Schkade 1993; Beattie and Jones 1992; Arunachalam et al. 2002; Jones 2011). 
Inter alia, they can decide to make specific pieces of information more salient (Jarvenpaa 1990; 
Brown et al. 2017; Bordalo et al. 2012a, 2012b). This does not necessarily have to be detrimental 
                                                 
28 We refer to those contents of firm reports that are not governed by accounting standards as non-financials because 
they are not part of the primary financial statements. However, by this, we do not claim that non-financials do not 
affect financials or that they are irrelevant. 
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as it could allow investors to arrive at a more accurate valuation of the firm. For example, a 
study in which salience of fair value changes was not the result of a firm decision, but exoge-
nously imposed by the experimenters shows that making these changes more salient allows to 
better incorporate disclosed measurement differences into judgments because it eases cognitive 
effort (Clor-Proell et al. 2014). However, firms could also use their discretionary room to influ-
ence investors’ judgments unduly. For example, they could decide to reduce the salience of other 
information to hide it or make non-diagnostic information more salient, e.g. to profit from a 
dilution effect (Nisbett et al. 1981). In a VD setting, these reporting decisions would not exog-
enous, but strategic, and investors would need to factor in the firm’s strategic reporting deci-
sions.   
Investors may be affected by salient elements because individuals restricted by bounded 
rationality may use these as heuristic cues to cope with large amounts of information (Simon 
1979; Shah and Oppenheimer 2007). Attention is a finite resource (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 
2011; Weber and Johnson 2009) and can be scarce good in decision making in general, and in 
financial markets in particular (Loewenstein et al. 2014; Hillenbrand and Schmelzer 2017). In-
creasing salience can have positive or negative effects on investors’ decisions. On the one hand, 
salient elements can help investors to focus on the important items. On the other hand, salient 
elements can use attentional resources that are not available for alternative tasks and can lead to 
ignoring other (relevant) information (Glazer et al. 1992).  
Time pressure (Busemeyer and Johnson 2004; Ordonez and Benson 1997) may intensify 
the problem of scarce attentional resources. Prior research has found that time pressure influ-
ences information processing and decision making (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993; Payne, 
Bettman, and Luce 1996; Busemeyer and Johnson 2004). For example, time pressure can affect 
the amount of information searched for and used in a given time (Zur and Beznitz 1981; Payne 
et al. 1993, 1996) and it lets individuals accelerate the execution of the decision process (Edland 
and Svenson 1993), which could potentially lead to inferior results. Additionally, under severe 
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time pressure, individuals were found to utilize information selectively: they may spend less 
time on gathering information and use less information than was available (Maule, Hockey, and 
Bdzola 2000), which may also have a negative impact on decision quality (Kocher and Sutter 
2006).  
One way to guide the attention of a report’s users could be the use of graphics to illustrate 
and emphasize certain elements. For example, Brown et al. 2017 provide evidence that present-
ing non-GAAP earnings information as an image after participants review earnings measures 
(e.g. on social media or a corporate website) may affect how investors process and rely on ad-
justed earnings metrics. Due to the human condition, graphical or visual information is particu-
larly salient and attracts attention: depending on the report creators’ intentions, graphics, there-
fore, may make it easier or more difficult to understand and interpret information (Cardinaels 
2008; Hillenbrand and Schmelzer 2017; Arunachalam et al. 2002). On the one hand, displaying 
information graphically may facilitate information processing and decision-making; on the other 
hand, making a specific access to information easy might obstruct alternative approaches 
(Schkade and Kleinmuntz 1993) and could result in an overweighting of less diagnostic infor-
mation (MacGregor and Slovic 1986; Lurie and Mason 2007; Nisbett et al. 1981). Graphics are 
more vivid than numerical information (e.g. presented in tables) and are more directly translat-
able in mental representations. Hales et al. (2011) show how vividness can matter in an invest-
ment context as vivid information is processed more easily than less vividly presented and less 
salient information (Nisbett and Ross 1980; Keller and Block 1997; Lurie and Mason 2007).  
As it is easier to form mental representations from graphics and to access them (Kahneman 
1973), they can also create positive feelings of fluency (Oppenheimer 2008; Alter and Oppen-
heimer 2009; Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka, and Simons 1991). Individ-
uals prefer to place more weight on information that is easy to process (Gluck and Bower 1988; 
Goodie and Crooks 2004; Shah and Oppenheimer 2007) and tend to consider information that 
is more fluent, i.e. cognitively easier to process to be true (Reber and Schwartz 1999). Applying 
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this theory to the readability of financial disclosures, Rennekamp (2012) shows that the easiness 
with which information is processed can play an important role in investment decisions. 
Graphics may even be more likely to play an important role under time pressure. In a 
related eye-tracking study from consumer decision-making, Pieters and Warlop (1999) found 
that consumers under time pressure accelerate visual scanning and increase the attention spent 
on pictorial information compared to brand information. Thus, graphics can have important be-
havioral effects. In this sense, they are not neutral, but a tool of persuasion and likely only used 
by firms if the message conveyed is in their interest (Amer 2005; Jones 2011).  
Firms may choose to add graphics to their performance reporting to make certain elements 
more salient and increase their weight (Mandel and Johnson 2002). For example, firms may 
choose to increase the salience of particularly positive performance indicators they believe or 
want investors to believe to lead to positive future financial performance. Particularly under 
time pressure, investors might be particularly vulnerable for heuristics, e.g. relying on salient 
elements. Hence, time-pressured investors following the guidance of this graphics could decide 
to direct more attention to this displayed and emphasized link between suggested driving per-
formance indicators and future financial success. We expect that –compared to investors without 
this guidance– investors provided with a graphic of a key driver model might attribute a higher 
importance to this link in their information processing. If the components of this link were cho-
sen to create the best impression of the firm’s future success (i.e. by emphasizing positive per-
formance indicators), an increased importance of these items would then be expected to increase 
the firm’s attractiveness as investment.  
H1: Making a key driver model with positive performance indicators 
graphically salient guides investors’ attention to this model.  
H2: Making a key driver model with positive performance indicators 
graphically salient increases a reporting firm’s attractiveness as  
investment.  
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To understand better what attracts attention when a key driver model with positive perfor-
mance indicators is made salient, we further want to examine which non-financial drivers ex-
actly receive more attention. On the one hand, only the specific performance indicator made 
graphically salient might receive more importance in the investor’s mental representation and, 
therefore, matter more in the investment decision. I.e., investor would only think more about the 
elements included and explicitly mentioned in the graphic. On the other hand, investors could 
extend their attention to other potential non-financial key drivers when they are triggered to 
think about a broader model of value creation. The reason for this is that the mental representa-
tion of a specific element and the category it belongs to can merge when a specific element from 
a category is made more salient and is perceived to be a good proxy for the whole category 
(Bless and Schwarz 2010). Thus, making a key driver model salient might not only increase the 
importance of the specific performance indicators in the graphic, but might also increase the 
importance of non-financial key drivers in general: therefore, it might also affect non-financial 
performance indicators not included in the graphic.  
In our research questions, we want to explore whether a graphically salient key driver 
model has a rather narrow effect on the non-financial performance indicators included in the 
graphic or whether this effect spills over to indicators not included in the graphic.  
RQ: Does making a key driver model with positive performance indica-
tors graphically salient increase the attention directed to non-financial 
performance indicators in general or is this limited to the specific  
performance indicators made salient? 
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III. Method 
Design 
In an 1x2 experiment (cf. the appendix), we manipulate between subjects whether an IT 
firm discloses a graphic (Figure 1) displaying a key driver model29 together with its performance 
information (“Graphic” condition) or not (“No graphic” condition).  
Figure 1: Graphic 
Connecting financial and non-financial performance 
In general, we believe that non-financial performance indicators are important drivers of financial success 
 
 
Specifically, participants were provided with a graphic linking possible non-financial key 
drivers (“Employee Engagement”, “Employee Retention”, and “Customer Satisfaction”) to fi-
nancial performance indicators (“Total Revenue” and “Operating Profit”). Importantly, this 
graphic does not contain new information, but provides only a visual representation of the firm’s 
strategic beliefs. At this point of time, participants from both conditions were already informed 
that the firm believed that employee satisfaction, customer satisfaction and other non-financial 
performance indicators are important drivers of financial success. Thus, we only manipulate the 
                                                 
29 For the design of our instrument, we were inspired by the corporate reporting homepage of SAP (SAP 2016), a 
German software blue chip. Within the section on strategy, SAP offers visitors a visual representation of the “Con-
nectivity of Financial and Non-Financial Indicators” and how these indicators may be interrelated. 
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existence of a graphic depicting this link and keep the information about the firm’s strategic 
beliefs constant across conditions.  
All participants are then provided with a table containing a selection of performance indi-
cators and their development over the two previous years. On the left half of this table, partici-
pants are provided with information about the performance in the two financial categories “ 
financial key performance indicators” and “shares and dividend”. On the right half of the table, 
they are provided with information about performance in the two non-financial categories “em-
ployees and customers”30 and “environmental”.  
In order to test our theory, the performance indicators made salient in the graphic show –
on average– a more positive performance compared to the performance indicators not made 
salient. Specifically, the former show an improvement of around 13% whereas the latter show 
an improvement of around 3%. This way, if participants were affected by the existence of the 
graphic, they should get a more positive impression of the firm as investment opportunity than 
participants without a graphic’s guidance. In order to have our participants make a decision 
under time pressure, the time limit to gather information about the firm was set to 120s in the 
condition without the graphic (“No graphic”) and to 135s in the condition showing the graphic 
(“Graphic”). This time limit induced a feeling of time pressure, but provided participants with 
enough time to form a first impression of the firm.31 As our dependent variable, we asked par-
ticipants for their assessment of the firm’s investment attractiveness.  
To ensure the suitability of our instrument and our design choices we had run a pilot study 
with seven investment professionals who did not participate in the subsequent experiment. 
Based on their feedback, we made minor adjustments to our experimental materials. 
                                                 
30 We refer to this category in our later analyses as SOCIAL.  
31 On average, participants in the “No graphic” condition spent 92.7s –approximately 30s less than the maximum 
possible time– on the table containing the performance information. Participants in the “Graph” condition spent 
86.9s reviewing this table. Furthermore, when asked how confident they were about their assessments of the in-
vestment attractiveness and of the financial and non-financial performance, participants were quite confident (no 
measure was significantly smaller than 4, the midpoint of our scale: all t < .89, p > .41). 
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Participants 
Our participants are investment professionals who participated at a summer school of a 
European financial analysts’ association. They were asked to participate in a short valuation 
exercise involving eye-trackers. From our initial sample of 26 participants, we had to exclude 
seven participants from the analyses, mainly because of technical calibration failures. Table 1 
provides information about our final sample of 19 participants.32 
Table 1: Sample Description 
Panel A: Number of Participants 
Study Completed Total  n = 26 
Exclusions  Total  n = 7 
 Reason for Exclusion   
 Restart due to technical problems n = 1  
 Participant with no work experience n = 1  
 Participants could not be calibrated n = 5  
Final sample Total  n = 19 
 “No graph” n = 7  
 “Graph” n = 12  
Panel B: Participants by Occupation 
Occupation % 
Investment consultant or advisor  36.8 
Financial analyst  31.6 
Fund manager  15.8 
Other (i.e., corporate finance, treasury management)  15.8 
Panel C: Participants’ Experience in Investment Valuation 
Years of Investment Valuation Experience % 
Less than 5 years 44.4 
5 to 9 years 16.7 
10 to 14 years 16.7 
15 to 19 years 5.6 
20 years and more 16.7 
                                                 
32 Inferences do not change when the analyses for which eye-tracking data are not required include the five partic-
ipants discarded due to calibration problems. 
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On average, participants had 8.3 years of experience in investment valuation and a total 
work experience of 13.4 years. They mainly worked as investment consultants or advisors 
(36.8%), financial analysts (31.6%), or fund managers (15.8%): 15.8% were classified as 
“Other”.33  
Eye-Trackers 
To track participants’ eye-movements, we used mobile devices (Eyegaze EyeFollower by 
interactive minds). These eye-trackers measure participants’ gaze points at a 120Hz rate with a 
typical average bias error of .45°. Four cameras are built into a small box onto which a standard 
24” LCD monitor is fixated. Both the monitor and the camera box are connected to a notebook 
recording the eye-tracker data. Two of these cameras follow the head movements and direct the 
other two cameras to track the eye-movements by measuring eyeball reflections. These devices 
allow participants to move their head freely without being disturbed by any additional equip-
ment.  
Detailed Procedures 
After participants had agreed to participate in our study, they were randomly assigned to 
a condition and seated in front of the eye-trackers in a separate, moderately lit room at the con-
ference site. In front of their eye-tracker, participants found the printed experimental materials 
showing a short introduction to the study. Participants were told that their task was to evaluate 
an IT firm as an investment opportunity. Most importantly, all participants were informed that 
the firm believed “that, in general, employee satisfaction, customer satisfaction, and other non-
financial performance indicators are important drivers of financial success and therefore use[d] 
an Integrated Report to provide information on its financial and non-financial KPIs.” Thus, in-
formation about the firm’s strategic beliefs regarding the importance of (some) performance 
drivers was kept constant across conditions. Participants were then informed that they first had 
                                                 
33 Participants are classified based on the occupation they indicated on the post-experiment questionnaire. Partici-
pants indicating “other occupation” and providing details about their occupation are re-classified into another spe-
cific category when possible. 
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to complete a short procedure to calibrate the eye-trackers individually, before they had limited 
time to review the firm’s reported performance data. Participants in the “Graphic” condition 
were also informed how to navigate back and forth between the graphic and the performance 
data table. All participants also learned that and how they could finish the exercise before their 
time was up (“No graphic” condition: 120s, “Graphic” condition: 135s). Participants then started 
the calibration procedure. Properly and thoroughly calibrating the participants is key to gather-
ing reliable eye-tracker data and research accuracy. Hence, we use only successfully calibrated 
participants. 
After the calibration, only participants in the “Graphic” conditions saw a graphic (Figure 
1) containing the visual representation of a key driver model. Importantly, the heading over this 
graphic gave no indication that there was any empirically tested foundation for the firm’s beliefs 
about the possible links between non-financial and financial performance indicators. Specifi-
cally, under the heading “Connecting financial and non-financial performance”, participants 
could read the sentence: “In general, we believe that non-financial performance indicators are 
important drivers of financial success”, which only repeated the information already provided 
in the instructions to participants from all conditions.  
Next, all participants were provided with a selection of the firm’s performance data and 
participants had limited time to review the data and assess the firm’s investment attractiveness. 
After they provided this assessment, participants filled out a short PEQ. As a small token of 
appreciation, participants could provide us with their email address at the end of the otherwise 
anonymous participation to receive a heat map showing which information they focused on 
when they were working on the task.  
Measures 
To test our hypotheses and research question regarding the attention of investors, we 
measure the time spent inside different areas of the table containing the information about the 
firm’s (non-)financial performance as recorded by the eye-trackers. To facilitate the analysis of 
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eye-movements, the eye-trackers’ software (Nyan) can be configured to measure, calculate and 
export the total time spent inside so-called areas of interests (AoI). Depending on the desired 
analysis, different AoI can be defined. For our analyses, we define rectangular AoI: Figure 2 
shows an overview over these AoI.  
Figure 2: Definitions of Areas of Interests (AoI) 
LABEL PERF  LABEL PERF 
“TABLELEFT”  “TABLERIGHT” 
Financial key performance indicators  Employees and Customers  
“F
IN
K
P
I”
 
 “OPS” 
(Software subscription revenue,  
Cloud subscription revenue, Software 
and software-related service revenue) 
 
 
 “SOCIAL” 
(Number of employees at year-end, 
Personnel expenses per employee, 
Employee engagement in %, 
Business Health Culture Index in %, 
Women in %, Female managers in %, 
Employee retention in %, 
Customer Satisfaction: Net Promoter  
Score, Customer Retention: Ratio of  
New Customers to Lost Customers in %) 
 
 
 
 “EARNINGS” 
(Total revenue, Operating profit,  
Operating margin, EBIT,  
EBIT margin) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “ASSPROD” 
(Free cash flow, Net liquidity, Days'  
sales outstanding , Equity ratio,  
R&D expenses, R&D expenses  
in % of total revenue) 
 
 
 Environmental  
 
 “ENV” 
(Greenhouse gas emissions, 
Greenhouse gas emissions per employee, 
Greenhouse gas emissions per revenue, 
Total energy consumed, Energy  
consumed per employee, Renewable  
energy sourced in %, Data center  
energy consumed, Data center energy  
per employee) 
 
 
 
 
 
Shares and dividend   
 “SHARES” 
(Weighted average shares, Earnings  
per share, Dividend per share,  
Share prices at year-end,  
Market capitalization) 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
Notes: This table outlines the different AoI used. “TABLELEFT” consists of information about both the Financial 
Key Performance Indicators (“FINKPI”) and the Shares and Dividend (“SHARES”). The former category is further 
broken down in “OPS” (referring to operative KPIs), “EARNINGS” (referring to earning KPIs), and “AssProd” 
(referring to asset productivity). “TABLERIGHT” consists of non-financial performance information about “SO-
CIAL” issues relating to employees and customers and environmental (“ENV”) issues. Horizontally, an AoI con-
sists of the AoI LABEL (description of the KPI) and the AoI PERF (numerical performance information). Note 
that the headers are only included in the AoI “TABLELEFT” and “TABLERIGHT”. 
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Time spent is commonly used as proxy for attention (Findley and Gilchrist 2003; Casini 
and Maçar 1997; Wedel and Pieters 2008; Holsanova 2011; Chen et al. 2016): Table 2 shows 
an overview over our key measures.  
Table 2: Measurement of Key Measures 
Panel A: Important Areas of Interest (AoI) 
TABLELEFT 
Time [in s] spent on the left half of the performance data table 
containing the financial performance indicators. 
TABLERIGHT 
Time [in s] spent on the right half of the performance data ta-
ble containing the non-financial performance indicators. 
TABLERIGHT_REL_PAGE 
Time [in s] spent on the right half of the performance data ta-
ble relative to the time overall spent on the page.  
TABLERIGHT_REL_AOI 
Time [in s] spent on the right half of the performance data ta-
ble relative to the time overall spent on all the AoI.  
SOCIAL Time [in s] spent on the category Employees and Customers. 
ENV Time [in s] spent on the category Environmental. 
Panel B: Investment Attractiveness 
INV 
How do you evaluate ProIT as an investment opportunity on a 
scale from 0 to 100 (with 0 being ‘poor investment’ and 100 
being ‘excellent investment’)?  
Our main variables regarding investors’ attention spent (Table 2, Panel A) are TABLE-
LEFT, the time spent on the left half of the data table containing the financial performance 
indicators, and TABLERIGHT, the time spent on the right half of the data table containing the 
non-financial performance indicators. As the key driver model suggests that the latter drive fu-
ture financial performance, we use the attention for the non-financial performance indicators to 
measure the attention for the key driver model creating value. However, in addition to the abso-
lute time spent, it is important to compare the time spent relative to the entire time for retrieving 
information. Thus, we define two additional relative measures for the non-financial KPI: the 
time spent either relative to the time overall spent on the page (TABLERIGHT_REL_PAGE) 
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or relative to the time spent on all the AoI (TABLERIGHT_REL_AOI). Further, we are inter-
ested in the two AoI within the larger AoI TABLERIGHT: SOCIAL, the time spent on the 
category employees and customers, and ENV, the time spent on the category environmental. 
For additional analyses, we define further AoI inside the AoI containing the four categories of 
performance indicators according to our table. We refer to the name and description of the per-
formance indicators as LABEL and to the quantitative information describing the performance 
as PERF.  
Our main dependent variable regarding the assessment of the firm’s investment attractive-
ness is INV, which is our participants’ assessment of the attractiveness (on a scale between 0 
and 100) of our firm as an investment opportunity (Table 2, Panel B).  
IV. Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
We start reporting our results by providing descriptive statistics for the key measures in 
our experiment (Table 3, Panel A and B).  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (Mean, Median, [Standard Deviation]) and Observations for Key Measures  
 “No graphic” “Graphic” 
Panel A: Important Areas of Interest (AoI) 
TABLELEFTa 59.66 49.78 
 68.03 53.17 
 [19.24] [21.29] 
TABLERIGHTb 21.65 27.98 
 21.90 29.49 
 [11.80] [10.44] 
TABLERIGHT_REL_PAGEc .23 .32 
 .23 .30 
 [.10] [.11] 
TABLERIGHT_REL_AOId .26 .38 
 .23 .35 
 [.10] [.13] 
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SOCIALe 12.21 17.05 
 9.29 19.05 
 [8.67] [6.30] 
ENVf 7.79 7.69 
 8.44 6.87 
 [5.24] [4.49] 
Panel B: Investment Attractiveness 
INVg 56.43 68.17 
 50.0 65.0 
 [19.73] [9.65] 
Number of Observations 7 12 
Notes: All attention measures refer to the time spent inside the respective AoI and are measured in seconds. 
a TABLELEFT: Time [in s] spent on the left half of the performance data table. 
b TABLERIGHT: Time [in s] spent on the right half of the performance data table. 
c TABLERIGHT_REL_PAGE: Time [in s] spent on the right half of the performance data table relative to time 
spent on the page. 
d TABLERIGHT_REL_AOI: Time [in s] spent on the right half of the performance data table relative to time spent 
on all AoI. 
e SOCIAL: Time [in s] spent on the category Employees and Customers. 
f ENV: Time [in s] spent on the category Environmental. 
g INV: Assessment of the attractiveness of our firm as an investment opportunity [on a scale from 0 to 100]. 
Participants in the “Graphic” condition seem to have spent more time on the half of the 
table with non-financial KPIs than participants in the “No Graphic” condition (27.98s vs. 
21.65s). Results for the relative time measures show a similar pattern (time relative to page: 
32% vs 23%, time relative to all AoI: 38% vs. 26%). The opposite is the case for the half of the 
table with the financial KPI. “No graphic” participants seem to have spent more time reviewing 
data in this half (59.66s vs. 49.78s). These results are in line with H1 predicting that making a 
key driver model with positive performance indicators graphically salient guides investors’ at-
tention to this model. Moreover, they seem to suggest that participants not only increased the 
time spent on the non-financial KPIs, but also shifted importance away from the financial KPIs.  
H2 predicts that making a key driver model with positive performance indicators graph-
ically salient increases a reporting firm’s attractiveness as investment. Consistent with H2, par-
ticipants in the “Graphic” condition assigned a higher score (68.17) than participants in the “No 
graphic” condition (56.43). 
 165 
With regard to our RQ, there does not seem to exist a difference between the “No graphic” 
and “Graphic” condition regarding the time spent on the environmental KPI (7.79s vs. 7.69s). 
The difference in attention between conditions regarding the time spent on non-financial per-
formance indicators seems to be driven by the time spent on the social KPIs (“No graphic” 
condition: 12.21s, “Graphic” condition: 17.05s). This is the category containing the three non-
financial KPI included in the graphic. Thus, the graphic appears to have only an effect on the 
specific KPIs shown in the model, and does not seem to produce a spillover effect.  
Heat maps (Figure 3, Panel A and B) help to visually illustrate these results. The heat 
maps are based on the participants’ aggregated eye-tracker data and show the areas of the per-
formance data table on which the participants focused the most. Hereby, red color indicates a 
higher intensity or a higher amount of time spent inside the respective areas. 
Figure 3: Heat Maps of the KPI Table by Condition 
Panel A: “No graphic” Condition 
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Panel B: “Graphic” Condition 
 
While the left side of the table in general seems to have received more attention than the 
right side, the heat map of the participants in the “Graphic” condition shows a higher intensity 
inside the AoI SOCIAL. No differences seem to exist for the AoI ENV.  
Tests of Hypotheses 
H1 predicts that making a key driver model with positive performance indicators graph-
ically salient guides investors’ attention to it. To test H1, we use time as measured by the eye-
trackers as proxy for attention. As the right half of the table contained the non-financial perfor-
mance indicators allegedly driving financial performance, we compare how much time partici-
pants in the “Graphic” condition spent on the right half of the table to the time spent by partici-
pants in the “No graphic” condition (Table 4, Panel A).  
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Table 4: t-Tests for Key Measures 
 “No graphic” “Graphic” 
Panel A: Attention Measures 
TABLELEFTa 
Mean 59.66 49.78 
t-test t= 1.008, p= .328 
TABLERIGHTb 
Mean 21.65 27.98 
t-test t= 1.218, p= .120 
TABLERIGHT_REL_PAGEc Mean .23 .32 
 t-test t= 2.006, p= .031** 
TABLERIGHT_REL_AOId Mean .26 .38 
 t-test t= 2.023, p= .030** 
SOCIALe 
Mean 12.21 17.05 
t-test t= 1.407, p= .089* 
ENVf 
Mean 7.79 7.69 
t-test t= .043, p= .966 
Panel B: Investment Attractiveness 
INVg 
Mean 56.43 68.17 
t-test t= 1.756, p= .049** 
Notes: All attention measures refer to the time spent inside the respective AoI and are measured in seconds. 
a TABLELEFT: Time [in s] spent on the left half of the performance data table. 
b TABLERIGHT: Time [in s] spent on the right half of the performance data table. 
c TABLERIGHT_REL_PAGE: Time [in s] spent on the right half of the performance data table relative to time 
spent on the page. 
d TABLERIGHT_REL_AOI: Time [in s] spent on the right half of the performance data table relative to time spent 
on all AoI. 
e SOCIAL: Time [in s] spent on the category Employees and Customers. 
f ENV: Time [in s] spent on the category Environmental. 
g INV: Assessment of the attractiveness of our firm as an investment opportunity [on a scale from 0 to 100]. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. P-levels are one-
tailed for directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. 
Directionally consistent with our expectation, participants in the “Graphic” condition 
spent more time on the right half (27.98s vs. 21.65s), but this difference misses conventional 
levels of statistical significance closely (t = 1.22, p = .12, one-tailed). 
However, it is also important to compare the participants’ behavioral differences between 
the two conditions based on relative values to learn something about the share of the time they 
spent on different AoI. Therefore, we additionally compare two relative measures, namely the 
time spent relative to either the time overall spent on the page or to the time spent on all the AoI. 
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Results show that differences for these relative measures are statistically significant (time rela-
tive to page: 32% vs 23%, t = 2.01, p = .03; time relative to all AoI: 38% vs. 26%, t = 2.02,  
p = .03; one-tailed). Taken together, these results corroborate H1.  
As shown in the descriptive results, the graphic does not only seem to attract more atten-
tion per se, but also seems to draw attention away from the left half of the table containing the 
financial performance indicators (“Graphic” condition: 49.78s, “No Graphic” condition: 59.66s; 
difference statistically not significant: t = 1.01, p = .33, two-tailed). Thus, in addition, we test 
whether attention was rather directed on the right half of the KPI table dependent on whether 
participants were provided with the graphic first (Table 5).  
Table 5: Attention for Non-financial Performance Information Regression Results 
Dependent Variable TIME 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Time Measure ABSOLUT REL_PAGE REL_AOI 
Constant  
(p-value) 
59.66*** 
(.000) 
.64*** 
(.000) 
.74*** 
(.000) 
TAB_RIGHT  
(p-value) 
-38.01*** 
(.000) 
-.41*** 
(.000) 
-.48*** 
(.000) 
GRAPH  
(p-value) 
-9.87 
(.159) 
-.09* 
(.074) 
-.12** 
(.044) 
TAB_RIGHT*GRAPH  
(p-value) 
16.21* 
(.069) 
.18** 
(.038) 
.23** 
(.022) 
N 19 19 19 
Notes: Results are based on a long dataset with standard errors clustered for participants (19 clusters). ABSOLUT 
refers to the time spent the half of the performance data table measured in s. REL_PAGE refers to the time on table 
half relative to the total time spent on the table page. REL_AOI refers to the time on table half relative to the total 
time spent on all AoI. TAB_RIGHT is 0 for data reported in the left half of the table (financial KPIs) and 1 for data 
in the right (non-financial KPIs). GRAPH is 0 for participants in the “No graphic” condition and 1 for participants 
in the “Graphic” condition. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. P-levels are one-
tailed for directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. 
Our independent variables are a dummy variable for the side of the KPI table (0 for left 
and 1 for right), a dummy for the manipulation whether participants saw the graphic (0 for the 
“No graph” and 1 for the “Graph” condition) and the interaction thereof. A significant positive 
interaction coefficient would support the idea that attention is redirected by the graphic. Again, 
we use different measures for our dependent variable: absolute time spent, time spent relative 
 169 
to either the time overall spent on the page or to time spent on all the AoI. They all show a 
consistent pattern and the expected positive coefficient (absolute time: β = 16.21, p = .07; time 
relative to page: β = .18, p = .04; time relative to all AoI: β = .23, p = .02, one-tailed). These 
further results are in line with the theoretical reasoning behind H1.  
H2 predicts that making a key driver model with positive performance indicators graph-
ically salient increases a reporting firm’s attractiveness as investment. We test H2 by comparing 
the investment attractiveness between the “No graphic” and “Graphic” conditions as assessed 
by participants. Participants in the “Graphic” condition assigned a higher score (68.17) than 
participants in the “No graphic” condition (56.43). A t-test shows that this difference is statisti-
cally significant (Table 4, Panel B: t = 1.76, p < .05, one-tailed). 
H1 and H2 together predict a mediation such that a graphic increases the attention for 
elements of a key driver model, which then results in a higher assessment of investment attrac-
tiveness when these key drivers are positive. Hence, we test this underlying theory with a system 
of equations that are estimated using Zellner’s “seemingly unrelated regressions” (SUR) model 
(Zellner 1962; Greene 2012). The corresponding model is depicted in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Path Model 
 
Notes: GRAPH is coded 1 when participants have seen a graphic and 0 otherwise. TABLERIGHT is the time spent 
[in s] on the right half of the table containing the non-financial performance indicators. The dependent variable 
INV is the investment attractiveness as assessed by our participants [scale from 0 to 100]. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. P-levels are one-
tailed for directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise.  
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In line with our theory, a graphic containing a key driver model (i.e. GRAPH = 1) directs 
investors’ attention to the half of the table with the non-financial performance indicators 
TABLERIGHT (β = 6.33, p < .10, one-tailed). This increased attention spent on the positive 
non-financial performance indicators then increases investment attractiveness INV (β =.45,  
p = .05, one-tailed). The statistically insignificant coefficient (β = 8.86, p = .15, two-tailed) 
between GRAPH and INV suggests a full mediation.  
To obtain a better understanding of the graphic’s effect, we continue by analyzing our RQ. 
We want to explore whether a graphic increases attention directed to non-financial performance 
indicators in general or only to the specific ones included in the graphics. Our descriptive results 
suggest that the difference with regard to the attention directed at non-financial KPIs is mainly 
driven by differences in the AoI SOCIAL. This is the category containing the three non-financial 
KPI included in the graphic. T-test results (Table 4, Panel A) show that –consistent with our 
general theory– participants in the “Graphic” condition spent more time inside the AoI SOCIAL 
than “No graphic” participants (17.05 vs. 12.21: t = 1.41, p-value = .09, one-tailed). Again, 
results become stronger when the dependent variable is not the absolute time spent, but the time 
spent relative to the time spent on the total page or on all AoI: untabulated t-tests show that p-
values (one-tailed) in these cases are .02 (t = 2.19) and .02 (t = 2.29). As already expected from 
reviewing the descriptive results, there is no difference for the AoI ENV (7.79 vs. 7.69, t = .04, 
p-value = .97). These results do not support the idea of a spillover effect. Rather, they suggest 
that only the KPI included in the graph receive more attention by investors. The results of the 
analysis of RQ are interesting because they suggest that firm’s may highlight specific KPI very 
selectively without having to worry too much about any spillover effects. 
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Supplemental Analyses 
Earnings vs. Shares 
Following the theoretical explanation that a graphic can increase the salience of the spe-
cific performance indicators included in it, it could be interesting to follow up with an analysis 
of the financial performance indicators included in the graphic. Specifically, they were “Total 
Revenue” and “Operating Profit”: we classify them as belonging to the category of performance 
indicators for earnings and assign them an AoI EARNINGS. According to our theory and prior 
findings, this AoI might also receive more attention by participants in the “Graphic” condition.  
For the absolute time, there are no differences between conditions (“No graphic”: 14.01 
vs. “Graphic”: 14.67, t = .162, p = .87, two-tailed). However, again, it might be important to 
look at the time spent on EARNINGS in relation to the time spent on the AoI FINKPI. Relative 
to the time spent inside the whole AoI FINKPI, time spent inside EARNINGS is slightly higher 
in the “Graphic” condition than in the “No graphic” condition (38% vs. 32%). However, this 
difference misses conventional levels of significance closely (t = 1.23, p-value = .12, one-tailed, 
untabulated). This difference might be marginal because earnings numbers in general already 
receive a high interest by investors, which would limit the potential of a graphic to guide atten-
tion. Thus, making them salient might not lead to a strong increase of investors’ attention spent 
on well-known and established performance indicators, but rather with less established perfor-
mance indicators: we expect the latter to be increasingly included stronger in emerging inte-
grated reporting.  
Interestingly, there seems to be another difference with regard to attention for other finan-
cial performance indicators. From reviewing the heat maps, it seems that –compared to partici-
pants in the “Graphic” condition– participants in the “No graphic” condition were more inter-
ested in data inside of the AoI SHARES. The connection to our main theory could be that in-
vestors without guidance from a visualization of the key driver model could be mainly interested 
in information about stock market data, e.g. performance indicators in our category on shares 
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and dividends. Participants having seen a graphic, however, might be thinking less about stock 
market data and more about the driving factors leading to an increase in a firm’s earnings.  
In line with this idea, the AoI SHARES received more attention by “No graphic” partici-
pants than by “Graphic” participants (14.14s vs. 10.05s). Untabulated results show that this dif-
ference, however, is statistically insignificant with absolute time spent as dependent variable  
(t = 1.03, p-value = .32; two-tailed). Still, a difference seems to exist in the AoI PERF (the area 
where the quantitative performance information is shown) inside SHARES (“No Graphic” vs. 
“Graphic”: 8.11s vs. 4.27s, t = 1.53, p = .15, two-tailed, untabulated). Again, it might be im-
portant to examine relative measure in addition to the absolute time spent. Indeed, p-values 
decrease to levels indicating marginally significant differences for the time spent either relative 
to the time overall spent on the page or relative to the time spent on all the AoI (PERF inside 
SHARES: 8.9% vs. 4.5% and 10.5% vs. 5.0%, both t > 1.94, p –values < .07, two-tailed, 
untabulated). These results are consistent with our theory that investors think more about the 
link of non-financial key drivers and financial performance measures after this model was made 
visually salient than when this was not the case. Investors without this visual guidance rather 
seem to be interested in stock market related data. 
Alternative Explanation: Increased Interest 
An alternative explanation for our results could be that a graphic only increases the general 
interest in the firm and its reporting, which might motivate participants to spend more cognitive 
effort and to scrutinize the firm more. This might question our explanations at least for the ab-
solute time measures. While, in general, relative measures corroborate our theory at least as 
good as absolute measure, we add a supplemental analysis to address this potential alternative 
explanation. We analyze whether the graphic increased the overall time spent by our participants 
on the page showing the KPI table. This could be the case because a graphical representation 
might have raised the general interest for the firm and because these participants had slightly 
more time available (135s instead of 120s). However, untabulated results show that there are no 
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statistically significant differences for time spent on the table page between the “No graphic” 
and “Graphic” condition –neither for the total time spent on the whole page nor for the time 
spent only on the table containing the AoI (time on page: 92.71s vs. 86.86s, time on all AoI: 
81.30s vs. 77.76s; both t < .55, p > .58, two-tailed). Directionally, participants in the “No 
graphic” condition even spent slightly more time. If the graphic only increased the general in-
terest in the firm and its reporting, we would expect participants in the “Graphic” condition to 
spend more time than  participants in the “No Graphic” condition.  
V. Conclusion 
In an experiment, we show how a graphic included in a firm’s VD can influence profes-
sional investors’ decisions under time pressure: it can guide investors’ attention towards positive 
KPI to increase their salience and subsequently increase investors’ assessment of a firm’s in-
vestment attractiveness. By collecting and analyzing eye-tracker data, we can corroborate our 
theory that participants spent more time on the AoI containing the highlighted and particularly 
positive KPIs. Consistent with our theory, assessments of a firm’s investment attractiveness are 
higher when pecific positive KPIs are made salient. Furthermore, we find no evidence that the 
increased salience produces a spillover of attention to other non-financial KPI not highlighted 
in our graphical representation.  
Our results are important for firms because they highlight how firms can use graphics in 
their unregulated communication to persuade investors to invest in them. Graphically displaying 
the link between positive potential non-financial performance drivers and financial performance 
indicators can increase the salience of certain reporting elements, which may then influence 
investors’ decisions. Our results further suggest that firms can target their report users’ attention 
to specifically selected pieces of information.  
As the firms’ discretion can improve or worsen investors’ decision, our study’s results are 
important for investors because they need to be aware that they may be unduly influenced by 
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firms’ reporting decisions. This may be particularly problematic when their cognitive resources 
are scarce, e.g. under time pressure or when they experience stress on their job.  
Our research further contributes to the emerging discussion on how the link between fi-
nancial and non-financial information should be represented in integrated reports (e.g. Eccles 
and Saltzman 2011; Jensen and Berg 2012; Abeysekera 2013; Busco 2014). While there may 
exist problems when investors’ attention is unduly influenced, guiding attention might be con-
sidered useful when it helps to convey important information about a firm that would go unno-
ticed without guidance. Thus, our research also contributes to a long-standing discussion on the 
usefulness of non-financial information for investors’ decision-making, e.g. intangibles, intel-
lectual capital, or Corporate Social Responsibility. It may inform standard setters and policy-
makers whether and how to regulate firms’ disclosures and specifically the use of graphical 
elements (Brown et al. 2017).  
  
 175 
References 
Abdolmohammadi, M. J. 2005. Intellectual Capital Disclosure and Market Capitalization. Jour-
nal of Intellectual Capital 6(3): 397–416. 
Abeysekera, I. 2013. A Template for Integrated Reporting. Journal of Intellectual Capital 14 
(2): 227–45. 
Alter, A. L., and D. M. Oppenheimer. 2009. Uniting the Tribes of Fluency to Form a Metacog-
nitive Nation. Personality and Social Psychology Review 13 (3): 219–35. 
Amer, T. S. 2005. Bias Due to Visual Illusion in the Graphical Presentation of Accounting In-
formation. Journal of Information Systems 19 (1): 1–18. 
Arunachalam, V., B. K. W. Pei, and P. J. Steinbart. 2002. Impression Management with Graphs. 
Effects on Choices. Journal of Information Systems 16 (2): 183–202.  
Banker, R. D., H. Chang, and M. J. Pizzini. 2004. The Balanced Scorecard. Judgmental Effects 
of Performance Measures Linked to Strategy. The Accounting Review 79 (1): 1–23.  
Beattie, V., and M. J. Jones. 1992. The Use and Abuse of Graphs in Annual Reports: Theoretical 
Framework and Empirical Study. Accounting and Business Research 22 (88): 291–303. 
Bewley, K., and Y. Li. 2000. Disclosure of Environmental Information by Canadian Manufac-
turing Companies: A Voluntary Disclosure Perspective. In Advances in Environmental 
Accounting & Management. Edited by M. Freedman and B. Jaggi, 201–26. New York, 
London: Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
Birnberg, J. G., L. Turopolec, and S. M. Young. 1983. The Organizational Context of Account-
ing. Accounting, Organizations and Society 8 (2-3): 111–29. 
Bless, H., and N. Schwarz. 2010. Mental Construal and the Emergence of Assimilation and 
Contrast Effects. The Inclusion/Exclusion Model. In Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology. Edited by M. P. Zanna, 319–74. 42. Oxford: Academic. 
Bollen, L., H. Hassink, and G. Bozic. 2006. Measuring and Explaining the Quality of Internet 
Investor Relations Activities: A Multinational Empirical Analysis. International Journal 
of Accounting Information Systems 7 (4): 273–98. 
Bordalo, P., N. Gennaioli, and A. Shleifer. 2012a. Salience in Experimental Tests of the Endow-
ment Effect. The American Economic Review 102 (3): 47–52.  
Bordalo, P., N. Gennaioli, and A. Shleifer. 2012b. Salience Theory of Choice under Risk. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 (3): 1243–85. 
Bozzolan, S., P. Joos, and E. Rubaltelli. 2017. How do Analysts Process Managerial Earnings 
Forecasts? An Experimental Study Using Eye-Tracking Technology. Working Paper 
(LUISS University, Tilburg University, University of Padova). 
Brown, N. C. W. B. Elliott, and S. M. Grant. 2017. Non-Gaap Images, Press Release Promi-
nence, and Investors’ Reliance on Non-Gaap Earnings. Working Paper (University of Del-
aware, University of Illinois, University of Washington).  
Busco, C. A. 2014. Integrated Reporting: Springer. 
Busemeyer, J. R., and J. G. Johnson. 2004. Computational Models of Decision Making. In 
Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making, 133–54. Edited by D. J. Koehler 
and N. Harvey. Malden, Oxford, Victoria: Blackwell Publishing.  
Busse, J. A., and T.C. Green, T. C. 2002. Market Efficiency in Real Time. Journal of Financial 
Economics 65 (3): 415–437. 
Cardinaels, E. 2008. The Interplay between Cost Accounting Knowledge and Presentation For-
mats in Cost-based Decision-making. Accounting, Organizations and Society 33 (6): 582–
602.  
 176 
Casini, L., and F. Maçar. 1997. Effects of Attention Manipulation on Judgments of Duration 
and of Intensity in the Visual Modality. Memory and Cognition 25 (6): 812–18. 
Chen, Y., J. Jermias, and T. Panggabean. 2016. The Role of Visual Attention on Managerial 
Judgment in Balanced Scorecard Performance Evaluation. Insights from Using an Eye-
Tracking Device. Journal of Accounting Research 54 (1): 113–46. 
Clor-Proell, S. M., C. A. Proell, and T. D. Warfield. 2014. The Effects of Presentation Salience 
and Measurement Subjectivity on Nonprofessional Investors’ Fair Value Judgments. Con-
temporary Accounting Research 31 (1): 45–66.  
Coram, P. J., G. S. Monroe, and D. R. Woodliff. 2009. The Value of Assurance on Voluntary 
Nonfinancial Disclosure. An Experimental Evaluation. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & 
Theory 28 (1): 137–51.  
Dalla Via, N., M. van Rinsum, and P. Perego. 2016. How Accountability Influences Investment 
Decision Quality in a Balanced Scorecard Setting. An Eye-tracking Experiment. Working 
Paper (Erasmus University Rotterdam). 
Deegan, C. 2014. Financial Accounting Theory. Sydney: McGraw-Hill Education Australia. 
Dumas, C. 2015. The Challenges of Responsible Investment Mainstreaming: Beliefs, Tensions, 
and Paradoxes. Working Paper (Ghent University). 
Eccles, N. S., and S. Viviers. 2011. The Origins and Meanings of Names Describing Investment 
Practices that Integrate a Consideration of ESG Issues in the Academic Literature. Journal 
of Business Ethics 104(3): 389–402. 
Eccles, R. G., and M. P. Krzus. 2010. One Report: Integrated Reporting for a Sustainable Strat-
egy. Hoboken, N. J.: John Wiley & Sons. 
Eccles, R. G., and M. P. Krzus. 2014. The Integrated Reporting Movement: Meaning, Momen-
tum, Motives, and Materiality. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley. 
Eccles, R. G., and D. Saltzman. 2011. Achieving Sustainability through Integrated Reporting. 
Stanford Social Innovation Review 59: 56–61. 
Edland, A., and O. Svenson. 1993. Judgment and Decision Making under Time Pressure. In 
Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment and Decision Making. Edited by O. Sven-
son and A. J. Maule, 27–40. Boston: Springer. 
Ettredge, M., V. J. Richardson, and S. Scholz. 2001. The Presentation of Financial Information 
at Corporate Web Sites. The International Journal of Accounting Information Systems 2: 
148–68.  
Fanning, K., C. P. Agoglia, and M. D. Piercey. 2015. Unintended Consequences of Lowering 
Disclosure Thresholds. The Accounting Review 90 (1): 301–20.  
Findlay, J. M., and I. D. Gilchrist. 2003. Active Vision: The Psychology of Looking and Seeing. 
Oxford, New York. 
Friede, G., T. Busch, and A. Bassen. 2015. ESG and Financial Performance: Aggregated Evi-
dence from More than 2000 Empirical Studies. Journal of Sustainable Finance & Invest-
ment 5 (4): 210–33. 
Glazer, R., J. H. Steckel, and R. S. Winer. 1992. Locally Rational Decision Making: The Dis-
tracting Effect of Information on Managerial Performance. Management Science 38 (2): 
212–26. 
Greene, W. H. 2012. Econometric Analysis, 7th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Gluck, M. A., and G. H. Bower. 1988. From Conditioning to Category Learning: An Adaptive 
Network Model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 117 (3): 227–47. 
Goodie, A. S., and C. L. Crooks. 2004. Time-Pressure Effects on Performance in a Base-Rate 
Task. The Journal of General Psychology 131 (1): 18–28. 
 177 
Hales, J., X. (J.) Kuang, and S. Venkatamaran. 2011. Who Believes the Hype? An Experimental 
Examination of How Language Affects Investor Judgments. Journal of Accounting Re-
search 49 (1): 223–55.  
Hillenbrand, A., and A. Schmelzer. 2017. Beyond Information. Disclosure, Distracted Atten-
tion, and Investor Behavior. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance (forthcom-
ing). 
Hirshleifer, D., S. S. Lim, and S. H. Teoh. 2011. Limited Investor Attention and Stock Market 
Misreactions to Accounting Information. The Review of Asset Pricing Studies 1(1): 35–
73. 
Hobson, J. L., and S. J. Kachelmeier. 2005. Strategic Disclosure of Risky Prospects. A Labora-
tory Experiment. The Accounting Review 80 (3): 825–46.  
Holmen, J. 2005. Intellectual Capital Reporting. Management Accounting Quarterly 6 (4): 1–9.  
Holsanova, J. 2011. How we Focus Attention in Picture Viewing, Picture Description and Men-
tal Imagery. In Bilder, Sehen, Denken: Zum Verhältnis von begrifflich-philosophischen 
und empirisch-psychologischen Ansätzen in der bildwissenschaftlichen Forschung. Ed-
ited by K. Sachs-Hombach and R. Totzke, 291–313. Köln: Herbert von Halem. 
Huang, X. “B.” and L. Watson. 2015. Corporate Social Responsibility Research in Accounting. 
Journal of Accounting Literature 34: 1–16.  
IIRC (International Integrated Reporting Council). 2013. The International <IR> Framework. 
Jarvenpaa, S. L. 1990. Graphic Displays in Decision Making. The Visual Salience Effect. Jour-
nal of Behavioral Decision Making 3 (4): 247–62.  
Jensen, J. C., and N. Berg. 2012. Determinants of Traditional Sustainability Reporting Versus 
Integrated Reporting. An Institutionalist Approach. Business Strategy and the Environ-
ment 21 (5): 299–316. 
Jones, M. J. 2011. The Nature, Use, and Impression Management of Graphs in Social and En-
vironmental Accounting. Accounting Forum 35: 75–89. 
Juravle, C., and A. Lewis. 2008. Identifying Impediments to SRI in Europe: A Review of the 
Practitioner and Academic Literature. Business Ethics: A European Review 17 (3): 285–
310. 
Kahneman, D. 1973. Attention and Effort. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 
Kaplan, R. S., and D. P. Norton. 1992. The Balanced Scorecard. Measures that Drive Perfor-
mance. Harvard Business Review (January-February): 71–79.  
Keller, P. A., and L. G. Block. 1997. Vividness Effects. A Resource‐Matching Perspective. 
Journal of Consumer Research 24 (3): 295–304. 
Kleinmuntz, D. N., and D. A. Schkade. 1993. Information Displays and Decision Processes. 
Psychological Science 4 (4): 221–27. 
Kocher, M. G., and M. Sutter. 2006. Time is Money – Time Pressure, Incentives, and the Quality 
of Decision-Making. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 61(3): 375–92. 
Kramer, S., and V. S. Maas. 2016. Selective Attention to Performance Measures and Bias in 
Subjective Performance Evaluations: An Eye-Tracking Study. Working Paper (Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, University of Amsterdam).  
Lev, B. and F. Gu. 2016. The End of Accounting and the Path forward for Investors and Man-
agers. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley. 
Loewenstein, G., C. R. Sunstein, and R. Golman. 2014. Disclosure: Psychology Changes Eve-
rything. Annual Review of Economics 6: 391–419.  
Lurie, N. H., and C. H. Mason. 2007. Visual Representation: Implications for Decision Making. 
Journal of Marketing 71 (1): 160–77. 
MacGregor, D., and P. Slovic. 1986. Graphic Representation of Judgmental Information. Hu-
man-Computer Interaction 2 (3): 179–200. 
 178 
Mandel, N., and E. J. Johnson. 2002. When Web Pages Influence Choice: Effects of Visual 
Primes on Experts and Novices. Journal of Consumer Research 29 (2): 235–45. 
Margolis, J. D., H. A. Elfenbein, and J. P. Walsh. 2009. Does It Pay to Be Good? A Meta-
Analysis and Redirection of Research on the Relationship between Corporate Social and 
Financial Performance. Working Paper (Harvard University, Washington University in 
St. Louis, University of Michigan).  
Maule, A. J., G. R. J. Hockey, and L. Bdzola. 2000. Effects of Time-Pressure on Decision-
making under Uncertainty: Changes in Affective State and Information Processing Strat-
egy. Acta Psychologica 104(3): 283–301. 
Nikolaj, B. P. 2003. The Relevance of Intellectual Capital Disclosure: A Paradox? Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal 16 (1): 49–56. 
Nisbett, R. E., and L. Ross. 1980. Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social 
Judgment. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall. 
Nisbett, R. E., H. Zukier, and R. E. Lemley. 1981. The Dilution Effect. Nondiagnostic Infor-
mation Weakens the Implications of Diagnostic Information. Cognitive Psychology 13 
(2): 248–77.  
Nursimulu, A. D., and P. Bossaerts. 2013. Risk and Reward Preferences under Time Pressure. 
Review of Finance 18 (3): 999–1022. 
Oppenheimer, D. M. 2008. The Secret Life of Fluency. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (6): 
237–41. 
Ordonez, L., and L. Benson III. 1997. Decisions under Time Pressure: How Time Constraint 
Affects Risky Decision Making. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 
71(2): 121–40. 
Payne, J. W., J. R. Bettman, and E. J. Johnson. 1993. The Adaptive Decision Maker. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Payne, J. W., J. R. Bettman, and M. F. Luce. 1996. When Time Is Money: Decision Behavior 
under Opportunity-Cost Time Pressure. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes 66 (2): 131–52. 
Pieters, R., and L. Warlop. 1999. Visual Attention during Brand Choice: The Impact of Time 
Pressure and Task Motivation. International Journal of Research in Marketing 16 (1): 1–
16. 
Pietsch, C. P., and W.F. Messier. 2017). The Effects of Time Pressure on Belief Revision in 
Accounting: A Review of Relevant Literature within a Pressure-Arousal-Effort-Perfor-
mance Framework. Behavioral Research in Accounting 29 (2): 51–71. 
Reber, R. and N. Schwarz. 1999. Effects of Perceptual Fluency on Judgments of Truth. Con-
sciousness and Cognition 8(3): 338–42. 
Rennekamp, K. M. 2012. Processing Fluency and Investors’ Reactions to Disclosure Readabil-
ity. Journal of Accounting Research 50 (5): 1319–54.  
SAP. 2016. Connectivity of Financial and Non-Financial Indicators. Gaining a Holistic View of 
Our Performance. Accessed October 03, 2017. Available at: https://www.sap.com/inte-
grated-reports/2016/en/strategy/connectivity.html. 
Schkade, D. A., and D. N. Kleinmuntz. 1994. Information Displays and Choice Processes: Dif-
ferential Effects of Organization, Form, and Sequence. Organizational Behavior and Hu-
man Decision Processes 57 (3): 319–37. 
Schwarz, N., H. Bless, F. Strack, G. Klumpp, H. Rittenauer-Schatka, and A. Simons. 1991. Ease 
of Retrieval as Information: Another Look at the Availability Heuristic. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology 61 (2): 195–202. 
Shah, A. K., and D. M. Oppenheimer. 2007. Easy Does It: The Role of Fluency in Cue 
Weighting. Judgment and Decision Making 2 (6): 371–79. 
 179 
Simon, H. A. 1979. Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations. The American Eco-
nomic Review 69 (4): 493–513.  
Tan, H.-T., E. Ying Wang, and B. O. Zhou. 2014. When the Use of Positive Language Backfires. 
The Joint Effect of Tone, Readability, and Investor Sophistication on Earnings Judgments. 
Journal of Accounting Research 52 (1): 273–302. 
Weber, E. U., and E. J. Johnson. 2009. Mindful Judgment and Decision Making. Annual Review 
of Psychology 60: 53–85. 
Wedel, M., and R. Pieters. 2008. A Review of Eye-Tracking Research in Marketing. Review of 
Marketing Research 4: 123–47.  
Zellner, A. 1962. An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly Unrelated Regressions and 
Tests for Aggregation Bias. Journal of the American Statistical Association 57 (298): 348–
68. 
Zur, H. B., and S. J. Breznitz. 1981. The Effect of Time Pressure on Risky Choice Behavior. 
Acta Psychologica 47 (2): 89–104.
  
180 
Appendix 
Experiment Materials 
Thank you for taking the time to participate at this valuation exercise, which will ap-
prox. take 5 minutes of your time. 
 
Instructions: 
 
1. Your task is to evaluate the performance of the company ProIT. The company 
is specialized in producing, implementing and maintaining business software. 
ProIT believes that, in general, employee satisfaction, customer satisfaction 
and other non-financial performance indicators are important drivers of finan-
cial success and therefore uses an Integrated Report to provide information on 
its financial and non-financial KPIs. 
2. This valuation exercise is anonymous. We will not be able to link your name to 
any of the answers you will give.  
3. This valuation exercise uses eye-tracking technology. The technology consists 
of multiple cameras following your eye movements. In order to calibrate the 
system to your eyes, you will be asked to follow a short calibration procedure 
at the beginning.  
4. The valuation exercise consists of two parts: First, you will receive financial 
and non-financial information on the company ProIT. This information will be 
displayed on the monitor for only 2:15 min [in No Graph condition: 2:00 min]. 
Second, once you have finished your assessment of the information, we will 
ask you to provide an evaluation of the company’s performance and to answer 
some additional questions. 
5. [Paragraph left out in No Graph condition.] The information that you receive on 
company ProIT will be displayed on two different pages. You can use the yel-
low arrows on the bottom of the pages to navigate back and forth on your own: 
         
6. If you want to finish your task before the time is up, click on the button in the 
upper right corner of the browser window that says: “Finish Task” 
7. Any questions? 
Start the exercise 
Please follow the instructions on the screen: First look at the camera field below the 
screen, then follow and fixate the blue dots. In case there are problems with the cali-
bration, please ask for our support. 
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ProIT Performance Summary [Note: Word copy of the html table used for the data collection.] 
€ millions, unless otherwise stated 
 
Financial key performance indicators 2012 2011 
Change 
in % 
 Employees and Customers 2012 2011 
Change 
in % 
 Software subscription revenue 1'282 1'031 24.3   
Number of employees at year-end (based on Full-
Time Equivalents FTE) 
16'106 14'944 7.8 
 Cloud subscription revenue 780 583 33.8   
Personnel expenses per employee – excluding 
share-based compensation (FTE) 
110 107 2.8 
 Software and software-related service revenue 3'178 2'830 12.3   Employee engagement in % 88.6 75.0 18.1 
 Total revenue 5'240 4'444 17.9   Business Health Culture Index in % 66 65 1.5 
 Operating profit 1'301 1'220 6.6   Women in % (FTE) 30 30 0.0 
 Operating margin in % 24.8 27.5 -9.6   Female managers in % 19.4 18.7 3.7 
 EBIT 1'429 1'284 11.3   Employee retention in % (FTE) 96.0 88.6 8.4 
 EBIT Margin 27.3 28.9 -5.6   Customer Satisfaction: Net Promoter Score 8.0 7.1 12.7 
 Free cash flow 820 833 -1.5   
Customer Retention: Ratio of New Customers to 
Lost Customers in % 
14.4 14.0 2.9 
 Net liquidity 367 409 -10.3  Environmental 2012 2011 
Change 
in % 
 Days' sales outstanding (DSO) 75 60 25.0   Greenhouse gas emissions in kilotons 123 122 0.8 
 Equity ratio (total equity in % of total assets) 53 55 -3.5   
Greenhouse gas emissions per employee (FTE) in 
tons 
7.6 8.2 -6.5 
 Research and development expenses 563 485 16.2   Greenhouse gas emissions per € revenue in grams 23.5 27.5 -14.5 
 
Research and development expenses in % of total 
revenue 
10.8 10.9 -1.5   Total energy consumed in GWh 220 215 2.3 
Shares and dividend 2012 2011 
Change 
in % 
  Energy consumed per employee (FTE) in MWh 13.6 14.3 -4.9 
 Weighted average shares, basic in millions 297 297 0.0   Renewable energy sourced in % 49.5 47.0 5. 
 Earnings per share in € 2.6 2.9 -10.0   Data center energy consumed in GWh 40 39 2.6 
 Dividend per share in € 1.0 1.1 -9.1   Data center energy per employee (FTE) in KWh  2'725 2'824 -3.5 
 Share prices at year-end in € 48.7 40.9 19.2       
 Market capitalization in € billions 14.5 12.1 19.2       
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Questionnaire 
Question 1:  
How do you evaluate ProIT as an investment opportunity on a scale from 0 to 100  
(with 0 being ‘poor investment’ and 100 being ‘excellent investment’)? 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 2:  
How do you evaluate the financial performance of ProIT on a scale from 0 to 100  
(with 0 being ‘weak financial performance’ and 100 being ‘excellent financial perfor-
mance”)? 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 3:  
How do you evaluate the non-financial performance of ProIT on a scale from 0 to 100  
(with 0 being ‘weak non-financial performance’ and 100 being ‘excellent non-financial per-
formance”)? 
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Please also indicate your agreement with the following statements: 
I am very confident about the investment evaluation I made. 
       1                2                3                4                5                6                7 
           Fully disagree                                                                                                         Fully agree 
 
I am very confident about the evaluation I made regarding the financial performance. 
       1                2                3                4                5                6                7 
           Fully disagree                                                                                                         Fully agree 
 
I am very confident about the evaluation I made regarding the non-financial performance. 
       1                2                3                4                5                6                7 
           Fully disagree                                                                                                         Fully agree 
 
The customer KPIs provided are an important input for the valuation of ProIT. 
       1                2                3                4                5                6                7 
           Fully disagree                                                                                                         Fully agree 
 
The employee KPIs provided are an important input for the valuation of ProIT. 
       1                2                3                4                5                6                7 
           Fully disagree                                                                                                         Fully agree 
 
The environmental KPIs provided are an important input for the valuation of ProIT. 
       1                2                3                4                5                6                7 
           Fully disagree                                                                                                         Fully agree 
 
The valuation task was difficult. 
       1                2                3                4                5                6                7 
           Fully disagree                                                                                                         Fully agree 
 
The valuation case was realistic. 
       1                2                3                4                5                6                7 
           Fully disagree                                                                                                         Fully agree 
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Which financial and non-financial KPIs were most important for your valuation of ProIT 
(multiple answers possible)? 
 
 
Which additional information or KPIs would have been necessary for you to provide a 
more thorough valuation of the company (multiple answers possible)? 
 
Additional questions: 
Thank you for having participated in the valuation exercise. Finally, we would like to ask 
you to provide a few personal details. Recall that your answers will remain completely 
anonymous and that we will not be able to link your answers to identity. 
What is your occupation? 
Sell-side analyst  
Buy-side analyst  
Fund/Asset/Portfolio manager  
Other, please specify: _____________________________________ 
What is the number of years of your experience with investment valuation? 
 
What is the overall number of years of your professional experience? 
 
What is the number of years of professional experience in your current occupation? 
 
 
Thank you for your cooperation! 
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SELBSTÄNDIGKEITSERKLÄRUNG  
Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich diese Arbeit selbständig verfasst und keine anderen als die angege-
benen Quellen benutzt habe. Alle Koautorenschaften sowie alle Stellen, die wörtlich oder sinn-
gemäss aus Quellen entnommen wurden, habe ich als solche gekennzeichnet. Mir ist bekannt, 
dass andernfalls der Senat gemäss Artikel 36 Absatz 1 Buchstabe o des Gesetzes vom 5. Sep-
tember 1996 über die Universität zum Entzug des aufgrund dieser Arbeit verliehenen Titels 
berechtigt ist. 
 
 
Bern, 29. Mai 2018 Christoph Hörner 
